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Essays on Public Economics
Ferran Elias Moreno
This dissertation contains three essays on Public Economics, Labor Economics and
Political Economy. The common theme across all the chapters is Public Economics:
either understanding the effects of government policies in order to improve their
design, or how the design of electoral rules affects government spending and tax
collection.
The first chapter estimates the employment and wage effects of payroll tax credits
at different moments of the life cycle. In 1997, Spain reduced payroll taxes for new
hires younger than 30 and older than 45. Time variation and age discontinuities allow
me to perform both a difference-in-difference analysis and a regression discontinuity
design. Using administrative data, I find that employment at age 30 increased by
2.42%. Moreover, I show that the gains do not come at the expense of non-subsidized
workers, indicating that the policy led to net job creation. Wages of new hires are not
affected by the reform. In contrast, the tax cut at 45 had no effect on employment or
wages. For prime-age workers, the lower payroll taxes can be interpreted as a transfer
from taxpayers to firms. Combining the above estimates and standard tax incidence
formulas, I obtain a lower bound labor demand elasticity of -0.63 at age 30 and zero
for workers who are 45 years old. An analysis of wage densities and other observable
characteristics supports the conjecture that the elasticity decreases with age because
the quality of available workers decreases with age. I consider several alternative
explanations for the results, but none of them are consistent with the evidence. A
cost-benefit analysis shows that payroll tax receipts would increase if the tax rate for
workers under 30 was reduced. The results at age 45 suggest low efficiency costs of
payroll taxes for prime-age workers. Finally, I discuss implications for payroll tax
reforms, welfare-to-work schemes, and job-search assistance.
The second chapter studies how changes in electoral rules affect spending on local
public goods, taxation, and redistribution. The Voting Right Act guaranteed the
right to vote for minorities, including the prohibition of any electoral discriminatory
practices on the basis of race. This triggered a series of court decisions outlawing
discriminatory electoral rules between 1970 and 1990. I study the effects of several
court orders that guarantee minority representation on city public budgets, and find
that both local public good expenditures (5-7.5%) and city tax collection (5-10%)
increased, after the changes towards non-discriminatory electoral rules. I also ex-
plore the distributional consequences of non-discriminatory elections and find that
the fraction of black public workers and citizens increased after changes in the elec-
tion system, while those of whites decreased. The growth rates of black house values
and rents also increase more. The findings are inconsistent with a negative effect
of ethnic heterogeneity in the city council on public goods, and with common-pool
theories. I show evidence that the most plausible channel that explains the results is
the new legislative bargaining power that black communities gained.
The third chapter investigates the effects of partial employment protection reform
in Spain. Most employment protection reforms in Europe have been partial. They aim
to introduce flexibility at the margin by targeting new hires and placing restrictions
on which firms can hire with lower levels of EP. However, it is not clear what the right
way to target jobs at the margin is. We exploit a unique quasi-experiment in Spain
that decreased employment protection of new permanent hires who were younger
than 31 between 2001 and 2006. Only firms with very low employment volatility
could hire with lower levels of EP. Using an administrative dataset, we show that the
reform had no effect on hirings, lay-offs, quits, contract length, starting wages and
post-entry wages. We compare the results for the policy in 2001-2006 with a similar
policy in 1999-2000, but that instead of restricting which firms could benefit from it,
it targeted only workers who had not been in a permanent contract for a certain time.
The 1999-2000 policy had significant effects on hiring. Overall, the evidence suggests
that restrictions on which workers can benefit from the policy are better at targeting
marginal jobs than constraints that exclude firms with high levels of employment
volatility.
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Chapter 1
Labor Demand Elasticities Over the Life Cycle: Evidence
from Spain’s Payroll Tax Reforms
Abstract
This paper estimates the employment and wage effects of payroll tax credits at different
moments of the life cycle. In 1997, Spain reduced payroll taxes for new hires younger than
30 and older than 45. Time variation and age discontinuities allow me to perform both a
difference-in-difference analysis and a regression discontinuity design. Using administrative
data, I find that employment at age 30 increased by 2.42%. Moreover, I show that the gains
do not come at the expense of non-subsidized workers, indicating that the policy led to net
job creation. Wages of new hires are not affected by the reform. In contrast, the tax cut
at 45 had no effect on employment or wages. For prime-age workers, the lower payroll taxes
can be interpreted as a transfer from taxpayers to firms. Combining the above estimates
and standard tax incidence formulas, I obtain a lower bound labor demand elasticity of -
0.63 at age 30 and zero for workers who are 45 years old. An analysis of wage densities
and other observable characteristics supports the conjecture that the elasticity decreases with
age because the quality of available workers decreases with age. I consider several alternative
explanations for the results, but none of them are consistent with the evidence. A cost-benefit
I thank Ethan Kaplan, Wojciech Kopczuk and Bentley MacLeod for their help and guidance
at all stages of this paper. Elliott Ash, Chris Boone, Davide Crapis, François Gerard, David López-
Rodŕıguez, David Munroe, Olivia Nicol, Pablo Ottonello, Evan Riehl, Miikka Rokkanen, Nicolás
de Roux, Bernard Salanié, Oriol Vallés, and seminar participants at Columbia University provided
helpful comments. I also want to thank the Ministry of Labor and Social Security of Spain, and
specially Almudena Durán, for help accessing data. All mistakes are my own. fe2139@columbia.edu.
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analysis shows that payroll tax receipts would increase if the tax rate for workers under 30
was reduced. The results at age 45 suggest low efficiency costs of payroll taxes for prime-age




Labor demand and labor supply elasticities are a central parameter for the design
of tax systems and welfare programs. In recent decades, major policy developments
focused on encouraging labor supply by making earnings subsidies conditional on
work. Accordingly, much attention has been devoted to measuring supply responses
for men, women, and young and older workers (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999; Moffit,
2002). However, the employment and wage effects of these policies also depend on
labor demand. For instance, the more inelastic demand is, the less welfare-to-work
programs will increase employment and earnings. Despite that, less attention has
been devoted to estimating labor demand elasticities at different points of workers
careers.2
In this paper, I exploit payroll tax cuts in Spain that affected workers younger
than 30 and older than 45 to estimate labor demand elasticities at different ages.
The Spanish context is interesting for evaluation of active labor market policies given
its high and persistent level of unemployment (Figure 2.1).3 Despite the relevance
of understanding the effects of labor policies on employment in dysfunctional labor
markets, there is little evidence from such settings. Most evaluations have focused on
countries without sustained levels of high unemployment. (Card et al., 2010).4
The central empirical fact established in this paper is that labor demand elastici-
2For evidence for young workers see Katz (1998) and Egebark and Kaunitz (2014). Huttunen
et al. (2013) provide evidence for low-wage workers older than 54. Conclusions regarding the value
of labor demand elasticities over the life cycle are complicated given the different contexts studied
in each paper. For a review of the earlier literature, see Hamermesh (1993).
3In the mid-nineties, unemployment reached 25%. During the Great Recession, unemployment
has been even higher. The lowest level of unemployment during the last three decades was around
10%, a number that would be considered high in most OECD countries.
4For instance, Card et al. (2010) review the effects of active labor market policies in 26 countries.
Only 3 of them (Dominican Republic, Slovakia, and Poland) featured levels of unemployment similar
to those in Spain for some years between 1990 and 2014. The majority of the countries studied had
unemployment rates between 5 and 10% between 1990 and 2014.
3
ties vary over the life cycle. Reduced form estimates show an increase of employment
of 2.42% at the age of 30, and a zero effect at 45. For both groups, wages are not af-
fected by the reform. Combining the employment and wage estimates with standard
tax incidence formulas, I can recover a lower bound for the structural labor demand
elasticity at each age. I measure a labor demand elasticity of -0.63 for 30 year old
workers, and a perfectly inelastic labor demand, or zero, for workers around the age of
45.5 I consider several explanations for the different elasticities. The evidence is con-
sistent with the quality of available workers decreasing with age, such that at some
point between 30 and 45 marginal workers might start facing a perfectly inelastic
labor demand.
The Spanish context offers two main advantages for the study of demand elastic-
ities over the life cycle. First, it is difficult to find a quasi-experiment that happens
during the same macroeconomic context, within the same set of institutions, and with
the same policy but at different ages. Second, I use a rich administrative dataset that
contains employment and wage records of over one million individuals throughout
their labor lives. Access to wage data is crucial to estimate the reduction in labor
costs generated by the policy. Moreover, the quality of the data allows me to ana-
lyze potential substitution effects in “non-treated” groups (Davidson and Woodbury,
1993; Crepon et al., 2013). This is important if one wants to understand whether
the demand responses reflect net job creation or not. In addition, I can measure
the extent to which lower payroll taxes are subsidizing employment that would have
existed regardless of the policy change (Katz, 1998; Becker, 2011), a key estimate for
a cost-efficiency analysis.6
In May 1997, the Spanish government enacted a reform that allowed firms to
5In the paper, I call workers aged 25-30 young workers, and those with ages around 45 prime-age
workers.
6The literature calls this effect “windfalls” (Katz, 1998). I will use this terminology throughout
the paper. Windfalls can also be understood as the effects of the policy for inframarginal workers.
4
claim payroll tax credits only when hiring workers as new permanent employees.7 The
program featured age discontinuities that specifically targeted workers younger than
30 years old and older than 45 years old. A tax credit for the long-term unemployed,
regardless of their age, was also approved. In March 2001, the employment credit for
young workers was removed, providing an additional natural experiment. I estimate
the impacts of payroll tax credits on employment, job transitions, and wages using
two empirical strategies: first, a difference-in-difference (DD) for each policy change;
second, a regression discontinuity design (RDD) based on the age thresholds.
I begin by showing how firms respond to employment credits for workers that are
older than 45. The age distribution of workers under permanent contracts has a hole
or missing mass between the ages of 44-45. These “missing” permanent workers are
hoarded in temporary contracts: the age distribution of short-term employees has
an excessive mass at the same ages. Once workers reach their 45th birthday, firms
convert them to permanent employees. The RDD estimates show that the decrease in
temporary workers offsets the increase in permanent ones: firms are just arbitraging
between subsidized and non-subsidized contracts, without further effects on prime-
age employment. In other words, all subsidized contracts after 45 would have existed
absent the policy. Moreover, there is no evidence of workers capturing the tax credit
in higher wages; instead, the tax credit acts as a transfer from taxpayers to firms, a
finding that is consistent with employers holding all bargaining power. Accordingly,
the tax cut is very costly for the government (4.4 billion euros of lost revenue). The
lack of an employment effect suggests low efficiency costs of payroll taxes for prime-age
7The tax credits were not available for new temporary hires, the other main type of contract
in Spain. The main difference between permanent and temporary contracts is that the former does
not have an agreed expiration date and are subject to severance payments in case of dismissal. One
of the objectives of the government was to reduce the fraction of temporary workers since they are




I then turn to the effects on younger workers. Immediately after the 1997 policy
change, both permanent and temporary employment increase. Temporary contracts
are not subsidized, but they are also positively affected by the reform because firms
are using them to screen workers and make permanent those who perform better.
Accordingly, transitions from temporary to permanent jobs within the same firm
double. Overall, employment of young workers increases by 0.84% relative to its
pre-1997 level in the DD estimate. Importantly for the cost-efficiency of the policy,
half of the employment effect comes through a reduction in unemployment insurance
(UI) recipients.9 Wages are not affected by the reform. The RDD results confirm all
the DD findings, but the estimates measure a 2.42% increase in employment. This
number is significantly higher than the DD result. Since the RDD is not based on
the effects immediately after the policy change, it can be interpreted as a long-run
treatment effect. It suggests that the short-run results underestimate the effects of
the policy in the long-run due to adjustment costs (Chetty et al., 2011; Chetty, 2012;
Kleven and Waseem, 2013). I estimate that 7.6 out of 10 subsidized jobs created
would have existed in any case in 1997. This goes down to 4.6 out of 10 in 2001 due
to new limitations in the use of employment credits.10 Despite these windfalls, the
program for young workers is very cost-efficient because it decreases the number of
UI recipients. I estimate an increase in net revenue of 1.4 billion euros. The marginal
efficiency cost of funds (MECF) is -0.52, indicating that the employer’s payroll tax
rate for workers under 30 is on the declining part of the Laffer curve.
The key threat to interpreting the effect on young workers as net job creation is
8Saez et al. (2012) reach a similar conclusion for a payroll tax reform that targeted high-wage,
prime-age workers around the age of 38.
9Results exploiting the 2001 removal of the credit for young employees are analogous.
10Specifically, the new regulations restricted firms’ ability to fire subsidized workers and then use
such contractual arrangements again with new workers.
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that the estimates might be confounding positive and negative employment effects
across the threshold. I show evidence that the estimates indeed represent net job
creation. First, between 1997-2001 the age distribution of hires features a jump at
30 years, and the removal of the threshold in March 2001 allows me to see how
the jump disappears. If substitution had been ocurring, we expect to observe that
hiring above 30 jumps up. However, both visual inspection and regression results
show that the jump disappears only because hiring below 30 converges to the level of
hiring above 30, and that the latter stays constant. Evidence from separations does
not show any significant change across the threshold. Second, this result might be
specific to the change in 2001 and not reflect substitution for the whole period when
the policy was in place. I construct a counterfactual based on data far away from
the discontinuity (Saez, 2010; Kopczuk and Munroe, Forthcoming) and compare it
to the actual hiring distribution between 1997-2001. The assumption is that workers
close to the thresholds should suffer more from displacement because they are closer
substitutes. While this strategy detects a significant missing mass before 45, it does
not for workers after 30.11
The results are consistent with adverse selection of marginal workers increasing
with age. The most important increases in the employment rate happen before the
age of 30. Firms might infer that workers who have not joined the labor force by
then might be of lower ability. That signal will strengthen with age, as these in-
dividuals do not obtain basic working skills. Subsidized prime-age workers should
therefore come from a pool of much lower ability workers, while this negative selec-
tion should be weaker for young workers. Analysis of the wage densities confirms
that. The wage density of young subsidized workers is only slightly shifted to the left
compared to their non-subsidized age peers. For prime-age workers, the wage density
11I perform three additional strategies to show that substitution is not a concern. All of them
provide evidence inconsistent with substitution. See section 1.3.3 for further details.
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of subsidized workers is much more concentrated on the lower end than that of non-
subsidized workers. In addition, adverse selection should also be detectable in other
observable characteristics. Regression results show that both younger and prime-age
subsidized workers are less likely to have finished college and have accumulated less
work experience during the last 12 months. More importantly, this negative gap be-
tween subsidized and non-subsidized workers is significantly larger in magnitude for
prime-age workers relative to young workers.
I show that several alternative explanations for the results are inconsistent with
the evidence. First, I confirm that the null employment effect for prime-age workers
is not caused by inelastic labor supply. Second, I consider whether the different
elasticities could be explained by young and prime-age workers being in different
firms. Third, I show that different levels of bargaining power or hiring costs at each
age cannot explain the results. Fourth, pass-through of payroll taxes on wages is not
consistent with the findings.
The fundamental characteristics of the labor market that point to a decreasing
labor demand elasticity with age, and to adverse selection as its main cause, are not
unique to Spain. Blundell et al. (2013) show similar employment rates with respect
to age for the US, UK and France. In addition, Topel and Ward (1992) show that
the early years in the labor market are very important, since that is when most
wage increases and job changes happen. Moreover, the finding that labor demand
elasticities are higher for younger workers than for prime-age workers is consistent with
recent evidence that estimated demand elasticities for different age groups separately
and in different contexts. Katz (1998) estimates an elasticity of -0.5 for disadvantaged
youth in the US. Egebark and Kaunitz (2014) estimate an elasticity of -0.31 for young
workers in Sweden during the Great Recession.12 Huttunen et al. (2013) measure an
12A potential explanation for the higher elasticity estimated in this paper relative to Egebark
and Kaunitz (2014) is the high level of unemployment for workers younger than 30 in Spain.
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elasticity between -0.067 and -0.13 for low-wage workers older than 54 in Finland.13
The advantage of this paper is that the same policy applied at different ages, during
the same macroeconomic context and within the same set of institutions. Thus,
we can be sure that the different elasticities are caused by changes during the life
cycle and not by other contextual factors. In light of previous evidence, the policy
implications might apply to other countries.
I discuss the two main implications for policy. First, the estimates of labor demand
elasticities of young and prime-age workers suggest that the optimal profile of payroll
taxes should be age-dependent. It would start at a lower level for young workers
and rise with age, reaching a plateau somewhere between the ages of 30 and 45 as
increasing adverse selection makes marginal workers unemployable. While a lower
payroll tax would not encourage hiring of workers close to retirement, results in
Huttunen et al. (2013) suggest it would help some to stay employed. Thus, payroll
taxes should start decreasing as workers approach the age of retirement. Theoretical
work on the optimal age-profile of payroll taxes is a promising avenue for future
research. Related work exists for income taxes (Weinzierl, 2011) and employment
protection (Cheron et al., 2011).
Second, labor demand elasticities are also important for the design of work-
encouraging transfer schemes such as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). Saez
(2002) shows that the EITC resembles an optimal transfer program when labor supply
responses happen along the extensive margin. However, his analysis rests on perfectly
elastic demand. Rothstein (2010) simulates the impact of the EITC and shows that
with a finite labor demand elasticity a substantial part of EITC payments is captured
by firms through lower wages. Moreover, workers who are ineligible also experience
13A crucial difference between the policy studied in Huttunen et al. (2013) and the one in this
paper is that the tax credit applies to current employees and new hires, not only to new hires. They
show that the policy reduces exits to non-employment, but does not affect entry from unemployment.
It is thus consistent with the results in this paper: the elasticity for prime-age marginal workers is
0. I discuss further the implications of this in section 1.5.
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wage declines. Thus, the estimates in this paper draw into question the ability of the
EITC as a redistributive tool.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the administrative dataset
I use, the institutional details of payroll tax legislation in Spain, and considers the
theoretical predictions of the reforms for the young and prime-age labor market.
Section 2.5 presents the empirical strategy, the results, and a cost benefit analysis.
Section 1.4 discusses the age-specific labor demand elasticities estimated in light of
the previous literature, and provides evidence in favor of adverse selection as the main
driver of the decline of the elasticity with age. I also show evidence ruling out other
potential stories. Finally, section 1.5 discusses the policy implications.
1.2 Data and Institutional Context
1.2.1 Data
I use data from the Continuous Sample of Work Lifes (Muestra Continua de Vidas
Laborales, MCVL). It is a joint administrative dataset from three different sources:
the social security administration, the census, and the tax administration in Spain. It
has detailed information on the start and end of each employment and unemployment
spell, monthly wages (bottom- and top-coded), the reason why the job relationship
ended, the type of contract (very importantly, whether the contract benefited from a
tax credit or not), the size of the firm, the sector, whether the job was part-time and
the number of hours, the location of the job, etc. The data also contains information
about the individual: sex, education, date of birth, province of birth, citizenship, as
well as the date of birth and sex of the members of their household.
The sample was constructed in the following way: in 2004, over 1 million of work-
ers, or 4% of all individuals who had some relationship with social security, were
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selected.14 Sampling was random, without any kind of stratification. The data con-
tains the labor history of each individual since he started working, including periods
when the worker was collecting UI or after he retired and started receiving pension
benefits. The same individuals selected in 2004 were followed for each edition of the
dataset between 2005 and 2012. Thus, I can reconstruct the working life of the in-
dividuals since they started working up to 2012. In case a worker selected in 2004
leaves the sample in any of the future years, because he stops having a relationship
with social security (i.e. he is out of employment and does not collect UI; he dies), he
is replaced by another randomly selected worker that had some relationship that year
with social security. Similarly, the whole labor life of that new worker is included in
the dataset. Finally, if any of the workers is not sampled during one of the editions
of the dataset because he did not have any relationship with social security for a year
or more, but he becomes employed again, he will reappear in the dataset the year in
which he had restarted his relationship with the social security system.
The retrospective nature of the dataset raises concerns about its representativeness
for the years before 2004. This might be a problem specially for the results exploiting
the policy change in 1997. However, as shown in Bonhomme and Hospido (2012) it is
only an issue when going back to the late 1980s. There are four main reasons for that.
First, mortality rates are low throughout the period. Second, attrition due to exit
from the labor force because of retirement is not a problem since the dataset includes
pensioners and their previous labor histories. Third, from the mid nineties and until
the Great Recession, emigration out of Spain was very low. In fact, Spain became
a host country for immigrants. Fourth, early career interruptions are a concern for
women. However, as I show in section 1.4, the results are the same across genders.
Thus, problems of attrition due to the retrospective design of the sample are not a
14Individuals who had some relationship with social security were either formally employed, re-
ceiving some kind of unemployment insurance, or were perceiving a contributory pension.
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concern.
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics for the year 1997, when the tax credit policy
was enacted. I classify the workers in 5 year age groups and report the descriptive
statistics for the main groups of the empirical analysis: 25-30, 30-35, 40-45, and 45-50.
Workers are more likely to be men for all age groups. Most of them have achieved at
most secondary education. The fraction that at most completed primary education
is increasing in age. Most of them are Spanish citizens, but the importance of the
immigrant labor force is bigger for the younger cohorts (almost 20%) than for older
cohorts (around 5%). Their real daily wage is of 37 euros for young workers, rising to
47.26 for prime-age workers. The fraction of workers in what is considered good jobs
(permanent and public workers) is increasing in age, while the fraction of employees in
short-term contracts is decreasing. Incidence of part-time work is higher for younger
workers. The mean size of the firm is around 8-10 workers and most people work in
the services sector.
1.2.2 Payroll Tax Legislation in Spain
Payroll tax legislation sets different payroll tax rates depending on the regime to which
the worker is affiliated. The main group, called “Régimen General”, includes most
private and public employees (13,419,951 workers or 77% of total).15 The following
groups are self-employed workers (2,951,021 workers or 17% of total) and farmers
(685,960 or 4% of total). There are other small schemes for coal workers, sea workers,
and housekeepers. The employment credits that are the focus of this paper apply to
all new permanent jobs, except for the sector of self-employed individuals. I will thus
focus on workers affected by the policy, but will also discuss the employment effect for
self-employed workers, since it is a common practise by firms to declare some work as
15Data is for 2010. Source is Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social (MESS), 2012.
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carried out by self-employed individuals to avoid paying payroll taxes and severance
payments.
Payroll taxes in Spain are paid both by the employer and the employee. They
are a function of the wage of the employee and two tax rates: one that applies to
employers and one that applies to employees. There is a maximum and a minimum
base for the wage depending on the occupational category of the worker. The first
two columns in table 1.2 show, for employees in “Régimen General”, the minimum
and maximum basis for each category of worker for 1997. The last three columns
show the tax rates for both employers (23.6%) and employees (4.7%), as well as the
combined tax rate (28.3%).16 The tax revenue collected is used to pay unemployment,
workers’ accident, and health insurance; and retirement, widow and orphan pensions.
The money is also allocated to pay for training courses and to protect the workers in
case of firm’s default.
Spain’s unemployment is very high and volatile as can be seen in figure 1.1a. Even
in the peak of the 2000’s housing boom, unemployment was around 10%. It is also
higher for younger cohorts and women (figure 1.1b). In order to stimulate hiring
and increase employment, the Spanish government has implemented policies to re-
duce labor costs.17 Permanent and temporary contracts are the two main types of
work arrangements in Spain; the programs that reduce employers’ payroll taxes apply
only for workers hired as new permanent workers. It would have been a controversial
political decision to stimulate temporary employment. In fact, one of the objectives
of the reform was to reduce the fraction of temporary jobs. Temporary contracts
are generally considered bad jobs in Spain, though it is hard to causally prove that
they harm workers.18 Jimeno and Toharia (1993) show that temporary contracts
16 The payroll tax rate of the main group of workers has been very stable. Last reform took effect
in 1995 and decreased firms’ payroll tax rate by 3.3% and employees’ payroll tax rate by 4.1%.
17 See online appendix for a full list of laws regarding payroll tax policy.
18Autor and Houseman (2010) do provide evidence that temporary job positions harm workers
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have a negative wage differential of about 10%. However, Davia and Hernanz (2004)
show that this wage differential is caused by different worker characteristics. Arranz
and Garcia-Serrano (2007) show that job stability has declined in Spain since the
introduction of temporary contracts. Regarding the effects on training of short-term
contracts, Albert and Hernanz (2005) find that workers holding temporary contracts
are less likely to be employed in firms providing training. More importantly, tem-
porary workers employed in firms providing training are less likely to be chosen to
participate in training programs.
There are three main programs that reduce payroll tax rates: first, for workers
hired before their 30th birthday; second, for employees hired after their 45th birthday;
third, for the long-term unemployed (LTU) regardless of their age. Figure 1.2 displays
the evolution of these programs over time. The upper figure depicts the case of the
credit for young workers and the LTU. Both tax cuts were introduced in May 1997.
At that time, the credits represented a 40% decrease of the tax rate for the first two
years of the contract. There were some changes in the generosity of the tax credit,
but they always applied for the first two years of job relationship. The main difference
between them is that the credit for young employees did not require the worker to
have been at least 1 year unemployed. Thus, they applied to a broader population.
The credit for the young was discontinued in March 2001, while the LTU credit was
kept in place. After that, firms hiring young workers with a credit could only do so
if the individual fell in the category of LTU.
The lower figure depicts the case of the prime-age credit after 45 and that for the
LTU. The credit for workers older than 45 was first enacted in 1982. Until 1997, it
also required that the worker had been LTU (red dashed line). After that, it applied
to all workers older than 45 (red solid line). During the period of study, the prime-age
credit after 45 suffered only small changes in its generosity. The presence of a credit
in a US context.
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for the LTU is important because it will minimize substitution effects across the age
thresholds.
The dose of the treatment is sizable. Using the basis and tax rates for 1997 and
assuming an employee with wage equal to 2,000 euros, the monthly tax credit after
1997’s reform, for hiring a young worker, is 2000 × .236 × .4 = 188.8. Thus, the
subsidy represents a 7.6% saving in labor costs during the first two years of the job
relationship.19 In contrast, the monthly tax credit for workers older than 45 years
old when hired as permanent workers would have been 2000 × .236 × .6 = 283.2
euros each month during 2 years, and 2000 × .236 × .5 = 236 euros for the rest of
the contract duration. The savings represent 11.5% and 9.5% of the labor costs for
the first two years and the rest of the contract, respectively. Thus, the employment
credits represent an important reduction in total labor costs.
Though the tax credits are not limited to firms that expand its workforce, its ad-
ministrative design makes them similar to a marginal employment subsidy (Johnson
and Layard, 1986). There are several limitations that limit the scope of the em-
ployment credit so that it targets only individuals with low job stability (temporary
workers and unemployed).20 Most importantly, they can only be received for workers
who have not been working in a permanent contract during the last 3 months. Since
on average temporary and unemployed workers have lower skills, this implies that
the program targets low-skilled individuals (Albert and Hernanz, 2005; Arranz and
Garcia-Serrano, 2007; Davia and Hernanz, 2004; Jimeno and Toharia, 1993).
Two administrative details of the employment credits are important to limit the
possibility of strategic behaviors by firms, like excessive churning. The first one
19Note that this is the percentage saving for each new subsidized young hire during the first two
years of job relationship. Since currently employed workers are not subsidized, the average reduction
in labor costs per worker will be much smaller. See section 1.4 for more details.
20Guell and Petrongolo (2007) estimate that 86% of new entries in Spain are under short-term
contracts, and that only 5.7% of them are converted into permanent jobs.
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was introduced in 1999. Firms who wrongfully dismissed workers with a tax cut
are ineligible to hire again with a tax credit.21 The second limitation is that an
employment credit contract cannot be signed with workers who hold a permanent
contract with the same firm group during the previous 24 months.22
Wage-setting in Spain is quite centralized. All collective bargaining agreements
negotiated at a level superior to the firm (i.e. national and provincial agreements;
sectoral agreements) apply to all firms that belong to the corresponding geographical
or sectoral area, even if they did not participate in the negotiation.23 In general, lower
level agreements cannot modify agreements reached at a superior level. Consequently,
around 90% of workers in the private sector have their wages fixed by collective
bargaining (Izquierdo et al., 2003; OECD, 2012). The negotiated wage is occupation
specific (i.e. manager, administrative, etc.), applies to all ages, and increases with
tenure within the firm.24
Claiming a tax credit was an easy task. Figure 1.3 shows the back-page of a
labor contract. The employer has to fill in one of the options available in the sixth
clause of the contract. Option a) specifies the tax credit that was available between
January 2000 and March 2001 for workers under 30. Option c) specifies the tax
credit when the employer hires a worker over 45 years old. Finally, options b), d)
21The limitation applies either for a year since the dismissal happened or for as many workers as
wrongful dismissals happened.
22Other limitations are: the tax-credited contracts cannot be used to hire relatives of the owner or
of the management chief; there are people who cannot benefit from the contract too: firms managers,
home service, people in jail, professional sportsmen, artists, and dockers working for public societies;
the employers need to be current with tax payments and must not have been excluded from the
program because of any infraction they could have committed. Finally, the tax-credited contract,
combined with other programs, cannot suppose a tax credit of more than 60% of the annual wage.
23Agreements affecting most workers (50%) are negotiated at a sectoral and provincial level. 25%
of workers’ conditions are negotiated at the national level. 8% are negotiated at the state level
(Izquierdo et al., 2003).
24Other issues negotiated are overtime hours, conversion of temporary contracts into permanent,
limitations to temporary and part-time hiring, retirement, and services to workers as provision of
lunch and transport.
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and e) describe the tax cuts available if the firm hires employees in other situations
not only related to their age: workers registered as unemployed for at least a year,
women hired in sectors in which they are underrepresented, and unemployed people
perceiving unemployment assistance.
Finally, the age-targeted employment credits were accompanied by lower severance
payments. However, Elias (2014) explores the effects of lower severance payments
for young workers during the period 2001-2006, when no employment credits were
available for that group. There are no effects on hiring, employment or wages of
reduced dismissal costs. Elias (2014) argues that the main reason why this policy
was not effective is that only firms that did not dismiss a worker in the last 6 months
could hire another worker with lower severance payments. The rationale for such
restriction was to limit excessive churning. Firms with the most turnover are likely to
be the most affected by high employment protection, but the limitation will not allow
them to benefit from lower severance payments. Such limitation was in place between
1997-2001 only to claim lower severance payments, not the tax credit. Therefore, the
main effect of the policy changes in 1997 must have been related to the employment
credits. The details of severance payments regulation are explained in the online
appendix.
1.2.3 Theoretical Predictions and Heterogenous Responses
The standard tax incidence model, or competitive labor market, predicts that a de-
crease in payroll taxes will shift demand outwards. My identification strategy thus
relies on this exogenous change in demand. The new employment and wage equilib-
rium will depend on the elasticities of labor demand and supply. The more elastic
is supply, the greater will be the effect on employment, and the smaller the effect
on wages. On the other hand, the more elastic is demand, the greater the effect on
both employment and wages. Figures 1.4a, 1.4b, and 1.4c represent the extreme cases
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with perfect elastic supply, perfectly inelastic supply, and perfectly inelastic demand,
respectively.25 26
But as explained in section 1.2.2, the labor market in Spain is not a spot market.
Around 90% of workers in the private sector have their wages determined by collective
bargaining. Figure 1.4d represents the equilibrium in a right-to-manage model, in
which unions and employers bargain over wages (Nickell and Andrews, 1983; Johnson
and Layard, 1986; Boeri and van Ours, 2008). Then, employers take wages as given
and choose employment levels that maximize the profits of the firm. The outcome
depends on the bargaining power of unions (0 ≤ β ≤ 1; 0 is the competitive case,
and 1 the case in which the union sets wages unilaterally). The solid black line
represents the competitive equilibrium case.27 The stronger the bargaining power of
unions, the higher the equilibrium wage. The dashed black line depicts the situation
when all bargaining power is on the union-side. The exact location of the equilibrium
depends on the bargaining power of unions. The shift outward in demand will increase
employment, but wages will remain the same as long as supply constraints do not
become binding. Given the level of union coverage in Spain, and the high level of
unemployment, such a representation seems realistic. Note that the predictions are
the same in a competitive market with perfectly elastic supply, and thus the standard
incidence formulas can still be applied.
25Note that supply will not shift out. In the standard tax incidence model, shifts in supply depend
on changes in the reservation wage. Its main determinant is non-wage income. Since the reform
does not alter that variable, supply does not shift out. In the case of a search model, an increase in
the arrival rate of job offers increases the reservation wage. That lowers the probability of accepting
an offer and is akin to a decrease in labor supply. In that case we expect to find increases in wages.
26Models that depart from the competitive labor market framework by introducing search-and-
matching frictions also predict that an employment credit will shift demand out (Pissarides, 1998;
Mortensen and Pissarides, 2001), and that the new employment and wage equilibrium will depend
on the point where the demand and wage (supply) functions cross. I discuss further the implications
of search-and-matching models in section 1.4.
27Labor supply is flat as a consequence of assuming that all workers are identical and have the
same reservation wage. While this might not be the case, it eases the graphical representation.
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A shift in demand corresponds to firms who are at the margin of hiring. The
tax credit makes some new matches productive and employment increases. However,
there will also be responses by firms that would have hired in any case, but will
do now with a tax credit. This can happen through two channels: first, firms can
substitute workers above 30 (below 45) for workers below 30 (above 45) (Davidson and
Woodbury, 1993). Second, firms can claim a tax credit for a worker under 30 or above
45 that would have been hired in any case, and receive the tax credit as a transfer.
Such behavioral responses will give rise to inefficiencies in the implementation of
employment credits and I will explore them too.
But transaction costs will limit the extent to which substitution and windfalls are
happening. First, as described in section 1.2.2, there are several limitations in the
policy that will minimize such behavior. Second, substitution across age groups de-
pends on the extent to which workers under 30 and above 45 are good substitutes in
production for existing workers, and on the extent that it is easy to churn employees.
Given the high level of severance payments for permanent workers, dismissing perma-
nent workers to replace them with subsidized ones seems a rather costly alternative.28
Third, there is also an employment credit for the long-term unemployed that can be
used regardless of the age of the worker. Thus, the hiring of the most disadvantaged
workers between 30 and 45 was also incentivized.
However, can we expect the responses to be identical in the young and prime-age
labor market? In other words, are labor demand and supply elasticities the same over
the life cycle? Closer inspection of each labor market suggests that this will not be
the case. Each labor market has very distinct features. Figure 1.5 contains several
pictures that summarize the main differences. Figure 1.5a shows that the employment
28For dismissals considered wrongful by the courts, severance payments amount to 45 days of
salary for each year of tenure in the firm, up to 42 months of salary. 3/4 of all layoffs that go to
court are considered wrongful by judges (Bentolila, 1996). For more details on severance payments
see the online appendix.
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rate of workers younger than 30 years old is much lower than for prime-age workers. It
also shows that the most important increases in the employment rate happen before
the age of 30. Between the age of 20 and 30, the employment rate increases by 35.86
percentage points (pp). After 30, the evolution is much slower, increasing by an extra
12.95 pp at the age of 45. The low employment rate of young workers is certainly due
to these individuals being in other activities, such as education, but it is also caused
by a much higher incidence of unemployment for young workers. As can be seen in
figure 1.5b, the unemployment rate is around 37% for workers aged 20-25, and drops
to 20% for those aged 30-35. Unemployment of prime-age workers is much lower,
being around 12.5% at ages 45-50.
Since the policy subsidizes only new permanent hires, it is important to further
distinguish between permanent workers and those in other types of contracts. Figures
1.5c and 1.5d display the ratio of permanent and temporary workers with respect to
all individuals who are working at each age, respectively. Before the age of 30, there is
an increase in the ratio of permanent workers, and a decrease in the ratio of temporary
ones. Therefore, the young labor market is characterized by transitions to more stable
jobs. Note that the ratio of permanent workers barely changes after the age of 30. It
remains constant around 50% until the ages of 55-60, when workers start retiring. In
contrast, the ratio of temporary workers after 30 is still decreasing, though at a much
slower rate. These are workers that are becoming self-employed or are finding public
sector jobs, as can be seen in figure 5 in the online appendix. Thus, there does not
seem to be much room at the age of 45 to increase permanent employment.
Figure 1.5e shows the starting wage of permanent workers at the age at which
they are hired. It is before the age of 30 when most wage increases happen. After 30,
the wage of new permanent hires stabilizes. Consequently, the young labor market is
also characterized by transitions to better jobs, while such dynamism halts after 30.
Finally, figure 1.5f shows the mean length of permanent contracts over age at
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hired. Job tenure of new hires is increasing until 30, is stable until the age of 50, and
then starts dropping as workers approximate the age of retirement. Lower job tenure
for young workers is important since it might deter some firms from hiring them. If
an employer has to invest in worker skills, he wants to maximize the expected return
from a job relationship. To the extent that younger workers stay shorter in firms,
that can deter hiring in the young labor market.
It is important to note that these characteristics are not unique to the Spanish
labor market. Blundell et al. (2013) plot the employment rate for the USA, UK
and France in 1977 and 2007 and find similar patterns. Topel and Ward (1992) also
show, for the US, that it is during the early years in the labor market that most
wage increases and job changes happen. Finally, Murphy and Welch (1990) show,
also for the US, that the age-earnings profile is an increasing concave function, with
most wage increases happening during the early years of a worker’s career. To the
extent that the characteristics of the Spanish young and prime-age labor market are
shared across countries and over time, the findings of this paper will have a wider
applicability for labor policy design.
1.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
The policy changes in 1997 and 2001, as well as the age discontinuities at 30 and 45
years old, provide the opportunity to explore the effects of employment tax credits
through two different empirical strategies. First, I implement a RDD exploiting the
policy age cutoffs. The estimation window is 12 months on each side of the threshold.
The specification for the discontinuity at 30 is:
yit = η1[ãgeit < 30] + βãgeit + λãgeit ∗ 1[ãget < 30] + εit (1.1)
yit indicates whether individual i is employed or transitions in and out of a job (per-
manent, temporary, self-employed, public), ãgeit is the month distance with respect
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to their 30th birthday, and 1[ãgeit < 30] is a dummy indicating that the worker did
not cross his 30th birthday yet. Thus, the coefficient of interest is η.29
Identification in a RDD relies on no manipulation of the running variable, that
is, the age at which the hire occurs. It is plausible that firms game the regulation
by substituting workers older than 30 (younger than 45) for workers younger than
30 (older than 45). But substitution might not only happen across ages, but also
across contract types (permanent, short-term, self-employed, and public). Given the
diversity of manipulation strategies, the RDD will first help us identify the relevant
adjustment channels.
The second strategy exploits the policy changes through a difference-in-difference.
I select a window of time of a year and a half before and after the reforms, and
construct a quarterly balanced panel of workers aged 25-30, 30-35, 40-45 and 45-50.
Individuals aged 30-35 and 40-45 are the control group. The specification is:
Yit = α + β1Treatmenti + β2Postt + β3Treatmenti ∗ Postt + γXit + εit (1.2)
Subscript i denotes the individual, and q the quarter. I will use as outcome variables,
Yiq, dummies indicating whether an individual was employed, and also whether the
worker was hired, laid-off, or quitted his job. The latter two variables are important
since they will show whether there is excessive churning from employers willing to
game the regulation by separating from their workers, and later rehiring employees
with a tax credit. Xiq is a vector of control variables: sex, education, disability,
immigrant, dummies for industry sector, part-time job, firm’s workforce size, province
fixed effects.
Identification in a DD analysis relies on parallel trends for both treatment and
control groups. If transitions and employment for each group were following different
trends, a DD estimate might just capture these differential patterns. Thus, I com-
29Similarly, for the discontinuity at 45, the specification is: yit = η1[ãgeit > 45]+βãgeit+λãgeit∗
1[ãget > 45] + εit
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plement the static evidence by running a specification including interactions between
the treatment group and 10 quarter time interactions.30 I will plot the coefficients
and standard errors for each period and confirm that there are no differential pre-
treatment trends across groups. Still, as in the RDD, the parallel trends assumption
might not hold after the policy change. Substitution from the control to the treatment
group will bias upwards any employment estimate.
Assessing the importance of the substitution effects is of central importance. The
RDD and DD estimates will provide first evidence of which are the various channels
that firms are using to adjust to the policy. These strategies will show us that in
the prime-age labor market, the policy only induces substitution and has no effect
on employment. For the case of young workers, there will be an increase in the
employment of workers younger than 30, relative to those older than 30. I will show
that the relative increase in young employment is indeed net job creation, and that
substitution was not a concern. To do that, I follow three main strategies: first, I use
2001’s reform to observe how the age-distribution of hires and separations converges.
Second, I construct a counterfactual of how hiring would have been in non-treated
areas next to the thresholds. If substitution is more intense next to the discontinuities,
such strategy will detect a missing mass (Kopczuk and Munroe, Forthcoming). Third,
I repeat the DD results but using several control groups: 30-31, 31-32, 32-33, 33-34,
and 34-35. I detail each strategy and provide some additional tests in section 1.3.3. All
the strategies fail to provide evidence consistent with substitution effects for workers
older than 30.
Finally, the difference-in-difference and RDD estimates can be interpreted as re-
30The specification is:
Yiq = α+ δq + φa + βqTreatmenti + γXiq + εiq (1.3)
Yit indicates whether individual i is hired, laid-off, quits or is employed in period t. φa are age
specific dummies. βq are the quarter by quarter DD estimates. Xit is a vector of control variables
as in equation 1.2.
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flecting the short- and long-run responses to the policy, respectively. The DD analysis
focuses on the effects six quarters following the policy reform in 1997. Short-run re-
sponses might not be very informative of how employment credits affect behavior in
the long-run or in the new steady-state if agents face optimization frictions or adjust-
ment costs in the short-run (Chetty, 2012; Kleven and Waseem, 2013). For instance,
(Card et al., 2009) finds that the distribution of long-run outcomes of active labor
market policies is more positive in the long-run than in the short-run. Nevertheless,
it might also be the case that in the long-run, firms and workers start using the policy
discontinuities in a strategic way, undoing any benefitial effects of the policy. The
RDD design can shed light on long-run responses since it does not focus on the effects
immediately after a policy change. However, a caveat of this interpretation is that
the sample of workers that are subject to the policy changes over time.
1.3.1 Effects on Transitions, Employment and Wages of
Prime-Age Workers
The evidence on transitions and employment of prime-age workers is the same both
using the DD and the RDD strategy. I thus discuss only the RDD here, and I
relegate the DD findings to the online appendix. Figure 1.6 displays the hiring flows
around the 45th birthday. Figures on the left are for the period when the policy is in
place (1997-2006). Figures on the right are for a period when the policy had an extra
requirement: only workers older than 45 that had been unemployed for a year could be
hired with a tax credit. As can be seen, the policy generates a big jump in permanent
hiring at 45 between 1997-2006. Visual inspection suggests that firms are gaming
the regulation. After the 43rd birthday, the distribution features a faster decline in
hiring. This suggests that firms delay some hires until the worker’s 45th birthday. For
the period 1992-1997, the distribution of permanent hires does not display a similar
distortion. There is though a jump at 45, which is consistent with the one year of
24
unemployment that was necessary then to claim the tax credit over 45. Thus, some
workers might have waited to be hired until they fulfilled both requirements. As can
be seen from the lower figures, the policy does not affect the flows into temporary
jobs. This is consistent with the policy only subsidizing permanent jobs.
Figure 1.7 displays the stocks of workers within each type of job around the
45 year threshold for the period 1997-2006. In contrast to what the flow figures
suggest, the policy is affecting both temporary and permanent workers. The stock of
permanent workers decreases around the age of 44, whereas the stock of short-term
workers increases around the same age. At 45, there is a jump upwards in the stock
of permanent workers, and a jump downwards in the stock of temporary employees.
The slope after 45 for permanent jobs is steeper than before the threshold. However,
as can be seen in figure 1.7c, this does not translate in a reduction in non-employed
workers. The figures suggests that some of these extra permanent workers after 45
would have been either temporary or would have worked in the public sector. Overall,
the figures suggest a null effect on employment of prime-age workers.
If employers were delaying the entry into permanent contracts of temporary work-
ers, there should be an increase in the length of temporary contracts before 45. Con-
sistent with that, figure 1.7f shows that between the ages of 41 and 44.5, temporary
contracts were unusually long.
Table 1.3 translates the above discussion into estimates. Panel A and B analyze
the effects on hires. Panel A restricts the sample to 1 year immediately after the
policy change (short-run). Panel B is for the sample between 12 months after the
policy change until 2006 (long-run). Both in the short- and long-run, the policy
only affects flows into permanent employment at the thresholds, but not entries into
short-term, self-employment, public jobs or UI. Long-run estimates of transitions are
slightly larger than short-run ones, but the estimates are not significantly different.
This finding suggests that for new hires adjustment to the policy was fast and that
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optimization frictions were not very important.
Panel C reports the results for employment effects at the 45 years old discontinuity.
There is a positive effect on the number of people employed with permanent contracts.
However, the size of the effect is identical to the drop of people employed with short-
term contracts after 45, as column 3 indicates. There is no effect on employment
of the program. Thus, the program for workers older than 45 years just retimes
conversions from short-term to permanent that would have had happened otherwise.
Note that the slope after 45 for permanent contracts is positive and significant. The
slope after 45 for short-term workers is negative and significant, and so is the slope
for non-employed workers. However, that might be caused by changes in the slope
before 45 because firms and workers are delaying permanent hiring until the worker
crosses the 45th birthday, as discussed above. To test whether the change in slopes is
caused by reallocation in the proximity of the threshold, panel D reports the results
of a donut RDD. I omit 1 year on each side of the threshold. Thus, I test whether the
progression of employment is the same between 12-24 months before the discontinuity
with respect to 12-24 months after the threshold. The lower panel of table 1.3 reports
the results of the slopes: permanent employment is still increasing faster after the
threshold, but once one accounts for the decrease in temporary employment, the
slope after 45 is no longer significant (column 3). There is a small but significant
negative effect on the slope after 45 for public workers. Overall, non-employment
is not decreasing faster after the discontinuity (column 6), confirming the graphical
evidence.
The results for prime-age workers show that the payroll tax credit at 45 was not
successful in stimulating prime-age employment. Firms gamed the policy by arbitrag-
ing between subsidized contracts (permanent) and non-subsidized ones (temporary).
This result is surprising in light of a 9.5% decrease in labor costs for the whole du-
ration of the contract. One potential reason why the policy might fail in increasing
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employment is that workers were capturing the rent in terms of higher wages. How-
ever, in section 1.4 I will show that that was not the case and that firms are actually
the ones receiving the transfer.
I now turn to discuss the impacts on wages. The results are based on a DD
analysis exploiting the change in 1997 and are shown in columns 1-3 in table 1.4. The
dependent variable is the log real daily wage and I select the sample of new permanent
hires. The retiming of entry into permanent jobs around 45 will cause compositional
effects on the treatment and control groups. Better workers should be able to avoid
a delay when signing their permanent contract. Thus, the pool of permanent hires
after 45 should become relatively worse after 1997. And the pool before 45 relatively
better. Column 1 reports the results without control variables. Wages of new hires
after 45 are on average 2.3% lower. However, when I include individual controls the
coefficient drops to -1.8% and is only significant at the 10% level.31 When I include
occupation, cohorts, calendar quarter, and province fixed effects the coefficient is no
longer significant and drops to -0.3%. Thus, once one accounts for compositional
changes, there does not seem to be any effect on wages of prime-age workers.
1.3.2 Effects on Transitions, Employment and Wages of
Young Workers
Difference-in-Difference Evidence . I start by exploring the effects of the em-
ployment credit through a DD. Since permanent and temporary contracts are the
most prevalent ones, I will focus most of the discussion on them. The results for
transitions in and out of these work arrangements are in the upper panel of table 1.5.
Permanent hires increase by 0.35 (pp). The number of permanent lay-offs decreases
by 0.046 pp. This could be caused by firms dismissing workers over 30 in order to
31Controls are: education, experience, sex, citizenship, workers’ disability, firm size, firm sector,
and part-time job.
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replace them with younger subsidized workers. In contrast, the number of quits in-
creases by 0.082 pp. The latter effect is consistent with some young workers breaking
their job matches knowing that, thanks to the employment credit, they are more
likely to receive a job offer and improve their job situation. However, the estimates
of separations are an order of magnitude smaller than those of hires. This indicates
that excessive churning is not a concern.
There is also an increase in temporary hires of 0.37 pp. This is an indirect effect
of the policy, since temporary contracts were not subsidized. However, both lay-offs
and quits of temporary workers also increase by .32 pp and .15 pp. Firms could be
using temporary contracts to screen young workers. For those who perform better,
they will break the temporary contract and hire them as permanent. Consistent with
that story, transitions from temporary to permanent contracts within the same firm
also increase by 0.18 pp (column 7, panel A).
The analysis of flows suggests that the stock of young workers should increase. The
lower panel of table 1.5 reports the estimates for employment. The stock of young
permanent and temporary workers increases by 0.22 pp and 0.19 pp, respectively.
Note that there is no evidence of crowding out of other work arrangements like self-
employment or public jobs. Thus, overall employment increases by 0.34 pp. Very
importantly too, the stock of workers receiving UI decreases by 0.17 pp. Part of
that effect can happen because temporary workers are more likely to suffer non-
employment spells because of the short-term nature of their job. Another part can
come from workers unemployed for a long time. The decrease in UI implies that
subsidizing employment might be a cost-efficient way to increase employment, since
it will trigger savings from social insurance schemes.
Figure 1.8 displays the dynamic effect of the policy. The identification assumption
of parallel trends across treatment and control groups, before the policy change,
appears to hold. The estimates oscillate around zero and are not significant before
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the policy change. Once the policy is enacted, the estimates jump upward and become
significant.
If I compare the estimates to the mean level of transitions and employment during
the year previous to the reform in 1997, they represent an increase in permanent
transitions of 57% (relative benchmark mean is 0.61%). The increase in short-term
transitions is of 15.6% (benchmark is 2.38%). Permanent employment increases by
1.06% (benchmark is 20.85% and short-term employment by 0.97% (benchmark is
19.68%). Overall private sector employment of workers aged 25-30 increases by 0.84%
(benchmark is 40.53%) and the number of UI recipients in this age group decreases
by 3.82% (benchmark is 4.42%).
I now turn to the effects on wages of employment credits. I repeat the difference-
in-difference analysis as in equation 1.2. The dependent variable is the log daily real
wage of new permanent hires. On one hand, the increase in employment of young
workers might push wages up if there are supply constraints. However, such effect is
unlikely given that the wage of 90% of private sector workers are decided by collective
bargaining (see section 1.2.2). On the other hand, the increase in employment under
30 might be happening through workers of lower ability or in less productive positions
(and hence, lower collectively-bargained wages). If such compositional effects are
happening, we expect to find a negative effect on the average wage. Columns 4-6 in
table 1.4 show the results. Column 4 does not include controls, column 5 includes
individual characteristics, and column 6 includes several fixed effects.32 None of the
coefficients are statistically significant. Note also that the coefficient in the most
stringent specification is very small (0.09%). In line with the institutional details of
collective bargaining, there is no evidence of supply constraints. There is no evidence
either that the increase in employment of young workers is happening mainly through
32Individual controls are education, experience, sex, citizenship, workers’ disability, firm size, firm
sector, part-time job. Fixed effects include occupation, province, cohort, and calendar quarter.
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an expansion of jobs for low-wage positions.
The employment credit for young employees was discontinued in 2001. This pro-
vides and opportunity to check the robustness of the 1997 DD. Since the tax cut had
been in place for almost 4 years, it also allows to test for how persistent the effects
are. The findings are in the online appendix. All the results are analogous to those
obtained with the change in 1997.
Regression Discontinuity Evidence . Figure 1.9 displays the hiring flows
around the 30th birthday. Figures on the left are for the period when the policy is
in place (1997-2001). Figures on the right are for a period when the credit for young
workers did not exist (2001-2005). As can be seen, the policy generates a jump in
permanent hiring at 30 between 1997-2001. For the period 2001-2005, the distribution
of permanent hires does not display such jump. The lower-left figure shows the hiring
distribution of temporary contracts when the credit was available. In contrast to the
DD evidence, there is not evidence of the subsidy affecting temporary hires around
the threshold. This is consistent with employers needing time to screen workers before
hiring them as permanent with the tax credit.
Table 1.6 reports the estimates of the jump at 30. Panel A shows the results for
the first 12 months after the policy is enacted (short-run), and panel B from the 12th
month and onward (long-run). Like the results for prime-age workers, the tax credit
does not affect transitions into temporary or public jobs, self-employment, and UI.
The long-run estimate is larger (.14 pp) than the short-run one (.11 pp), but not
significantly different. Like for prime-age workers, the response in hiring was fast.
In terms of the stocks of workers, the payroll tax credit for individuals younger
than 30 generates kinks at the discontinuity. Figures 1.10 and 1.11 display the evo-
lution of workers in permanent or short-term contracts, receiving UI, or the fraction
of all those who work. I restrict the treatment sample to cohorts that were at most
29 in May 1997 (born between 05/1968 and 03/1971), so that they could benefit
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from the policy for at least a year. I use as a placebo sample cohorts that could not
benefit from the employment credits during the months before becoming 30 because
the policy had been removed (born between 03/1973 and 03/1976). Cohorts crossing
their 30th birthday when the policy was in place experienced slower increases in their
probability of being permanent workers after the threshold. The fraction of them
being short-term workers was decreasing before 30, and decreased at a slower pace
after 30. This indicates that in the long-run, part of the effect is shifting between
subsidized and not subsidized contracts. There also seems to be a smaller slope after
30 for the evolution of all individuals who are working, indicating that the policy is
also having employment effects. As a confirmation of that, note that the evolution of
UI recipients was decreasing before 30, and stabilizes or slightly increases after 30.33
Note that for placebo cohorts there are not such changes in slopes centered at 30.
To translate the above discussion into estimates, I perform a RDD as in equation
3.1, but now the coefficient of interest is λ, or the differential employment slope after
30 relative to the slope before 30. Table 1.6 reports the results. Panel C shows it
for treated cohorts and panel D for the placebo cohorts. The coefficients confirm the
visual analysis. The slope after 30 for permanent workers is significantly less positive,
whereas that of short-term workers is significantly less negative. The slope for UI is
also significantly less negative after 30. Most importantly, the slope after 30 for overall
employment is significantly less positive. The coefficient indicates that the increases
in overall employment are 0.065 pp smaller every month after 30. To compare that
estimate with the difference-in-difference one, 6 quarters after overall employment
would have increased by 1.17 pp more if the policy had been in place until the age of
31.5. The estimate in the long-run is significantly larger than the short-run one, that
indicated an increase of .34 pp 18 months after the policy had been enacted. Thus,
while the effects on transitions are quite immediate, the increases in employment take
33For self-employed and public workers, see figure 4 in the online appendix .
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more time to build up. Finally, note that none of the estimates for the slope after 30
for the placebo cohorts are significant (panel D).
1.3.3 Substitution Effects
Both the DD and the RDD evidence confirm that the payroll tax credit increased
employment under 30 relative to that over 30. However, part or all the increase could
be offset by a negative effect on workers older than 30. I turn now to explore this
possibility. I rely on several methods.
Convergence of the hiring distribution after 2001 . First, I consider the
potential effects that the credit for workers younger than 30 could have on hiring
on each side of the threshold. Figure 1.12 illustrates each case. The first graph
considers the situation absent any discontinuity. In that case, the number of entries
into permanent contracts would have been smooth across the 30 year threshold. The
second graph represents a situation in which both job destruction and creation are
taking place around the threshold. Finally, the third graph shows the case when there
is no job destruction next to the threshold and the policy only stimulated hiring below
it. Exploiting the 2001 reform, I can look at how the age-distribution of permanent
hires adapts once the credit is removed. The idea is to identify a pattern similar to
the ones just described. The 2001 change is more adequate for that purpose because
the only change across the 30th threshold was the removal of the credit for workers
under 30. Inference based on the 1997 change is more complicated because a credit
for long-term unemployed workers was also introduced.34
Figure 1.13a shows the raw hiring data before and after each policy change. As
is visually evident, the removal of the tax credit for workers younger than 30 led
to a convergence of the hiring distribution only from below 30, as illustrated in the
34Evidence on displacement for 1997 is in the online appendix. See figure 3. The results are
consistent with those for 2001.
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hypothetical figure 1.12c. Hiring above 30 does not show any jump upwards as ex-
pected with displacement effects. In order to translate the discussion into numbers,
I estimate difference-in-difference coefficients for each age bin. The specification is:






δaAgeit ∗ Treatmentt + εit (1.4)
The omitted group are workers 20 years old or less. The coefficient δa is a
difference-in-difference estimate of the effects of the policy for each age bin relative to
the workers in the omitted group. The age bins are 3 months wide. As can be seen
in figure 1.13b, the policy was creating jobs below 30, but was not destroying jobs
above 30, relative to workers below 20 years old. Also, the effects of the policy are
slightly stronger for workers between 25 and 30 years old than for younger workers.
Though the evidence so far suggests that there were no displacement effects, and
that all the adjustment happened through an expansion of hiring below 30, it could
still be the case that workers above 30 were more likely to separate from their employ-
ers. Figures 1.13c and 1.13d show that this was not the case. Estimates for lay-offs
and quits, with respect to the age when the separation occurs, are not significantly
different for the treatment (25-30) and the control group (30-35).
Hiring counterfactuals . A caveat with the strategy above is that it might
be specific to the period around 2001, and not reflect substitution happening during
the whole period (1997-2001) for which the policy was in place. For that reason,
I construct counterfactuals of how the hiring distribution would have looked like if
the threshold had been moved to the left of 30 (i.e. at 29 years) or to the right of
45 (i.e. 46). Under the assumption that workers close to each threshold are more
substitutable than workers far away from the discontinuity, this method should detect
a missing mass of hires after 30 and before 45.
The following is a description of the details of the estimation. I only explain the
case for young workers, but the case for the prime-age workers is symmetric. cj is the
log number of individuals in bin j in my main specification. I group individuals into
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age bins indexed by j. Each bin is 3 months wide. To construct the counterfactual I








γi1[aj = i] + vj (1.5)
aj is the age at bin j, p is the order of the polynomial, which is 1 for the preferred
specification.35 aL and aU are the lower and upper bounds of the area that is not
used to construct the counterfactual.
The counterfactual distribution is estimated as the predicted values from 1.5 omit-






Missing mass is estimated as the difference between the observed and counterfac-
tual bin counts between the threshold (a∗) and the upper bound of the omitted area
(aU). I choose as lower and upper bound for young workers 20 and 31.5, respectively.
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(ĉj − cj) (1.7)





Standard errors are obtained using a bootstrap procedure. I sample residuals from
equation 1.5 with replacement to generate many age-hire distributions. The standard
errors are the standard deviation of the distribution of estimates obtained from each
sample.
Results are in figure 1.14. As can be seen, the counterfactual between 30 and 31.5
matches very well the actual distribution of hiring. The estimate of the missing mass
35The rationale behind the election of a first-order polynomial is that the hiring distribution of
workers between 30-45 years is highly linear.
36The lower bound for prime-age workers is 43.5, and the upper bound is 55.
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has the opposite expected sign and is not significantly different than 0. In contrast,
the counterfactual between 43.5-45 is different from the actual hiring distribution.
It detects a significant missing mass of hires of 6.77%. This evidence complements
the results based on the age distribution of hires before and after the policy change
in 2001. It suggests that substitution of workers older than 30 years for younger
workers is not happenning, not only around 2001, but during the whole period when
the policy was in place.
DD changing the control group. The counterfactual strategy fails to detect
a missing mass of hires just after 30, but does so before 45. If substitution is propor-
tionally higher next to the discontinuity, but dies away smoothly as we move to older
cohorts, this strategy will fail to detect substitution. A way to detect if that is the
case is to repeat the DD estimation, but using several control groups: 30-31, 31-32,
32-33, 33-34, and 34-35. If substitution was happenning, we would expect to see that
the estimated effects decrease as we choose as a control group older workers. This is
the same strategy as the one used in Blundell et al. (2004).
Results for both policy changes are in table 1.7. The estimates for new hires using
different control groups are very stable. Moreover, they are not significantly different
from each other and are not decreasing as we move away from 30. The coefficients
for lay-offs and quits show a similar picture.
Additional evidence on displacement . The evidence points to workers older
than 30 not being affected by substitution. I perform some additional robustness
checks. The specifications and results are detailed in section 5 in the online appendix.
First, individuals born in March 1971 crossed their 30th birthday when the policy
was removed in March 2001. Thus, those who were still unemployed at the age of
30 cannot suffer from displacement since the policy is no longer in place. Therefore,
if displacement was an issue, the changes in slope that we have detected for cohorts
crossing their 30th birthday between May 1997 and March 2001 should be smaller for
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the March 1971 cohort relative to similar cohorts born in the previous year. However,
the findings in tables 15-17 in the online appendix rule out that possibility.
The second strategy looks at cohorts that had already crossed the 30th birthday in
March 2001. In that case, after the removal of the policy they should benefit positively
since they will not suffer from displacement any more. Therefore, we should detect a
positive change in the evolution of their employment slope after March 2001. Results
are in tables 18 and 19 in the online appendix and I do not find evidence of a positive
rebound.
Finally, I plot the flows in and out of permanent contracts around each policy
change. If workers in the control group are substituted for workers in the treatment
group, we should observe that their monthly number of hires shifts down after May
1997 (up after March 2001). The graphs are displayed in figure 2 in the online
appendix and do not show evidence consistent with substitution.
Overall, the evidence rules out the presence of substitution effects. Thus, the em-
ployment estimates reflect net job creation, and do not confound positive and negative
employment effects on the treated and non-treated, respectively. It is important to
keep in mind that there were also non-age related employment credits targeting other
disadvantaged groups such as the long-term unemployed. Such schemes are probably
the reason why the policy is successful at stimulating employment below 30, while
not creating significant negative employment effects above 30.
1.3.4 Windfalls
The policy reduced the employer’s payroll tax for new permanent hires. However,
some hires would have happened in any case and employers receive a windfall of
money for them. In this section, I measure to what extent the tax cut for new hires
generates windfalls. This is a key estimate to perform a cost-benefit analysis (see
section 1.3.5).
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The data distinguishes between subsidized permanent contracts and non-subsidized
ones. Then, I can measure the extent to which there is crowding-out of non-subsidized
permanent contracts after the introduction of the subsidized contract. The ratio be-
tween crowded-out jobs and new subsidized jobs will tell us the fraction of new subsi-
dized employment that would have happened in any case. Note that since for young
workers there is an increase in employment, this ratio will be below 1.
I perform a difference-in-difference analysis for each type of contract exploiting
the 1997 and 2001 reforms. The upper panel of table 1.8 reports the windfall effects
for employment variables. In 1997, the crowd-out of permanent not subsidized em-
ployment of young workers accounts for 76% of the increase in subsidized permanent
employment. However, in 2001 the crowd-out had decreased to 46%. The drop in
the number of windfalls is consistent with regulatory changes in the administration
of the employment credits. After May 1999, firms that wrongfully dismissed a worker
hired with a tax credit cannot rehire somebody with a tax credit for a year or for
as many subsidized workers who were wrongfully dismissed. Therefore, the admin-
istrative change might make employers more careful when they dismiss a permanent
worker to hire a subsidized one, because in case the latter match does not turn out
to be productive, they might not be able to benefit again from employment credits.
Consistent with no prime-age employment creation, the windfall above 45 accounts
for all of the increase in subsidized permanent employment.37 Finally, figure 1.15
37The next three panels in table 1.8 shows the results for transitions. There is no reduction in
new hires without a tax cut after the policy change in 1997 for young workers. However, when
the tax cut for young workers is removed in 2001, new permanent regular contracts increase and
account for 35% of the decline in subsidized contracts. The presence of windfalls for older workers
is immediate after the reform in 1997. Separations of non-subsidized permanent contracts increase
after the policy reform both for young and old workers. Note that the increase happens both for
lay-offs and quits. The former is consistent with firms prefering to fire workers that fall into the ages
of treatment to replace them with subsidized workers. The latter suggests that workers that can
be hired with age-based employment credits might be aware that they have higher probability of
finding a new job, and thus quit their current one. However, note that they cannot find a subsidized
job in the same firm, since tax credits cannot be claimed for former permanent workers during 2
years. Note also that the removal of the policy in 2001 causes symmetric effects.
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confirms that the estimates are not due to pre-treatment trends.
1.3.5 Cost Benefit Analysis
Although the results in the paper suggest that the policy was successful in increasing
employment of young workers, it might have come at large costs for the government.
In this section, I use the estimates to perform a cost benefit analysis of the policy.
Payroll tax credits generate revenues for the government by inducing behavior that
would not have happened absent the policy. There are two types of behavioral re-
sponses: jobs that would not have been created otherwise (B1) and decreases in UI
recipients (B2). However, the policy also incurs in mechanical costs (M): jobs that
would have existed in any case and that now receive a tax credit. Once one knows the
effect on the government budget of both behavioral and mechanical responses, one
can estimate the Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds (MECF), or the ratio of the cost
to taxpayers of the government increasing taxes relative to the value of the additional
revenue received by the government (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2001).
Table 1.9 shows the main variables that are needed to estimate whether the policy
was cost-efficient or not. “Sample” is the mean number of individuals within each
group of workers in the dataset. “Population” is the translation of “Sample” into
the population following the construction of the MCVL dataset (elevated by 25).
“Mean Wage” and “Mean Length” are the average wage and duration for each type
of contract and for the relevant age group. Revenue is the estimated money accrued
or lost by the government according to the following equations:
B1 = Revenues = Ns x Ws x τf (1− t) x 730 +Ns x Ws x τf x (Ls − 730)+
+Ns x Ws x τe x Ls (1.9)
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B2 = SavingsUI = NUI x WUI x (1− τe x .65) x LUI (1.10)
M = RevenueLossw = Ns x Ws x τf (1− t) x 730 +Ns x Ws x τe x Ls (1.11)
Net Revenue = B1 +B2 −M (1.12)
where the subscript i refers to permanent subsidized jobs (s), permanent windfall
jobs (w), and unemployment insurance recipients (UI). Ni is the number of i jobs or
UI claims, Wi is the mean wage in situation i, τf is the firm’s payroll tax rate, t is the
tax rate discount, Li is the mean length of spell i, and τe is the employee’s payroll
tax rate. 730 is the number of days that the tax discount applies for young hires.
Finally, the taxes paid under UI are discounted by .65 because 35% of the payments
are covered by social security.
For workers under 30, the net number of jobs created was around 400,000.38 How-
ever, around 600,000 other jobs that would have existed in any case were now receiving
a tax credit. The decrease in UI receipts was around 200000. Multiplying these num-
bers by the mean job wage and mean job length, and by the payroll tax rate, the
increase in tax collection because of new contracts was of 1220 million euros. Rev-
enue also increased due to savings in UI by 887 million euros. Revenue lost because
of mechanical responses was of 724 million euros. Overall, for the group of workers
under 30, the policy is very cost efficient and increased net government revenue by
1383 million euros.
Since for workers older than 45, the policy did not increase employment or reduced
the number of UI recipients, all we need to know are mechanical responses. Around
900,000 jobs that would have existed in any case were now subsidized. The policy for
38All the magnitudes used in the cost benefit analysis are significant at the 1% level.
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prime-age workers is very cost-inefficient and implied losses in revenue of 4360 million
euros.
The MECF is the ratio of mechanical costs relative to the difference between





The MECF measures the ratio of the cost to taxpayers of funds raised to the value of
the funds received by the government. The difference in value between the numerator
and the denominator is caused by leakages in tax collection caused by firms that are
maximizing profits in the presence of taxation. The MECF for young workers is -0.52
(.15). That implies that the payroll tax rate for workers under 30 is on the declining
portion of the Laffer curve. For the group of prime-age workers, the MECF is 1.
Thus, the efficiency costs of the current level of payroll taxes for prime-age workers
are very low.39
1.4 Age-Specific Labor Demand Elasticities and
Explanations
1.4.1 Age-Specific Labor Demand Elasticities
The estimates on employment and wages can be used to recover labor demand elas-
ticities for each age group. In a partial equilibrium model, the impact on employment








39Saez et al. (2012) reach a similar conclusion for a payroll tax reform that targeted high-wage,
prime-age workers around the age of 38.














where w is the net wage, W is the gross wage or w(1 + t), t is the tax rate; and εD
and εS are the elasticities of labor demand and supply, respectively.
Using equations 1.14 and 1.16, the null employment and wage effect in the prime-
age labor market can only be rationalized as a consequence of marginal workers in
that market facing a perfectly inelastic labor demand.41 If demand had been elastic,
either employment or wages would have increased, or both. However, it does not
inform us about the elasticity of labor supply because the results are consistent with
both elastic and inelastic supply.42
In the market for young workers, the increase in employment and the zero effect on
wages can only be rationalized by a somewhat elastic labor demand and a very elastic
labor supply (εD << εS). That at the aggregate level labor supply is very elastic
is consistent with predictions of a right-to-manage union model. Recall that around
90% of private workers in Spain are covered by collective bargaining. Thus, bargained
wages are above the market clearing level, there is involuntary unemployment, and
an expansion in demand will happen along a very flat supply function. The perfectly
elastic supply is also consistent with the large level of unemployment for workers
under 30 in Spain. Thus, there should not be supply constraints for young workers.
41The exact estimated labor demand elasticity is -0.00905, with a 95% confidence interval between
[-0.032,0.014]. The employment estimate is based on column 3, panel C in table 1.3. Average private
sector employment at 45 is 49.5%. Overall labor costs at 45 are around 2 billion euros and savings
in labor costs are around 194 million euros. For more details about estimation of labor costs see the
discussion of the labor demand elasticity for young workers in that same section.
42To make sure that supply is not playing any role in the 0 employment effect for prime-age
workers, I repeat the results for men and women. Women are known to have more elastic supply.
Thus, if demand had been elastic we would detect a larger employment effect. I find same results
across gender, consistent with demand being inelastic. For more details see section 1.4.2.
41
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where the numerator is the percentage increase in employment, and the denominator
the percentage decrease in labor costs. Recall that the policy increased employment
of workers aged 30 by 1.17 pp. Private sector employment at those ages is 48.39%.
Thus, employment increased by 2.42%.
What is left now is to compute the reduction in labor costs caused by the tax cuts,
and the overall labor costs at 30. To estimate the decrease in labor costs, I calculate
the amount of taxes saved by firms during the first 2 years of job relationship in
a subsidized contract.43 I measure savings of 3 million euros for workers aged 30.
However, such reduction in labor costs does not meet the definition of an aggregate
labor demand elasticity: the change in employment due to a change in labor costs
for all workers, both incumbents and new entrants. If the tax cut had applied to all
workers, the reduction in labor costs would have been around 38 million euros at age
30. Overall labor costs of workers aged 30 between 1997 and 2001 were around 1 billion
euros. Thus, the reduction in labor costs would have been of 3.8%. Assuming that
employment would have increased by the same amount, 2.42%, with a hypothetical
reduction of 3.8%, I measure a lower bound for the labor demand elasticity of -0.63,
with a 95% confidence interval between [-0.8,-0.47].
There are two reason why this estimate has to be interpreted as a lower bound:
first, the critical assumption is that a tax cut both for incumbents and new entrants
43Recall that the tax cut for young workers applies only for the first two years of the contract.
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would not have increased employment by more than 1.17 pp. Such a policy would have
subsidized incumbent workers, which has no direct effects on employment. However,
the lower payroll tax bill could have increased new hires by more, and this could have
caused an increase in employment higher than 1.17 pp. Second, the wage data is top-
coded according to the maximum base for payroll taxes. Thus, I am not including the
wage cost to firms of workers who earn over the maximum base. Then, the percentage
reduction in labor costs caused by the tax cut would have been smaller than 3.8%.
This is not the first paper to exploit employment tax credits to estimate labor
demand elasticities.44 In fact, the finding that labor demand elasticities are higher
for younger workers than for prime-age workers is consistent with recent evidence
that estimated demand elasticities for different age groups separately and in different
contexts. Huttunen et al. (2013) study a subsidy for low-wage workers older than
54 in Finland. They find very small employment effects and report demand elastic-
ities between -0.067 and -0.13. Their estimate is close to the one in this paper, but
different from 0. The Finnish scheme applied to all workers older than 54, not only
to new hires. The authors show that the impact is driven by decreases in the exit
to non-employment, and not from entry from unemployment. Thus, their results are
also consistent with old unemployed workers facing inelastic demand. Katz (1998)
evaluates the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit in the US for young disadvantaged workers.
He reports a demand elasticity for young workers of -0.5 under the assumption of
infinitely elastic supply.45 In a more recent paper, Egebark and Kaunitz (2014) eval-
uate a firm-side payroll tax cut implemented in Sweden for workers younger than 25
just before the onset of the Great Recession. Their findings point to a labor demand
elasticity of -0.31.46
44See Hamermesh (1993) for review of earlier studies on labor demand.
45He does not have wage data and thus cannot infer the slope of the supply function.
46A potential explanation for the higher elasticity estimated in this paper relative to Egebark
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However, we should be cautious before concluding from the previous literature that
labor demand elasticities decrease with age. The evidence at each age is not based
on the same policy changes. Moreover, the different estimates in the literature could
be specific to the characteristics of the targeted group and the context on which each
program was implemented. First, Katz (1998) sample is composed of disadvantaged
youth, who might face a different labor demand than the group of young workers as a
whole. Second, it is a well-known fact that hours of work of young workers are more
procyclical than that of prime-age men (Clark and Summers, 1981; Gomme et al.,
2004). Though this could partly be due to changes in labor supply over the cycle,
it could also be due to labor demand for young workers being more elastic during
downturns. In fact, Jaimovich et al. (2013) show in a simulation that age-specific
labor supply is not enough to account for the differential cyclicality across age groups,
and that a model including age-specific labor demand does a better job. Therefore,
the estimates in Egebark and Kaunitz (2014) might reflect just recessionary periods.47
Third, the estimates might be conditional on each country’s labor market institutions.
Finland and Sweden do not have minimum wage laws. Instead, minimum wages are
decided through collective bargaining.48 Then, payroll tax shifting on wages might be
more likely to happen. In such situation, employment credits do not decrease labor
costs. That could explain the null effect in Huttunen et al. (2013).
The main advantage of the quasi-experiment in this paper is that the same policy
targeted different age groups, during the same macro context, and within the same
set of institutions. Then, the potential channels that could explain the heterogeneous
results in the literature are shut off and we can be certain that the labor demand
elasticity does decrease with age. But why is labor demand elasticity decreasing with
and Kaunitz (2014) is the high level of unemployment for workers younger than 30 in Spain.
47Katz (1998) and Huttunen et al. (2013) focus on non-recessionary periods.
48For more details, see Huttunen et al. (2013) and Egebark and Kaunitz (2014).
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age? In the remaining of this section, I consider several channels that could rationalize
the findings.
1.4.2 Explanations
The decreasing demand elasticities with age are consistent with the pool of marginal
workers being more adversely selected as they age. In this section, I show evidence
consistent with that. I also consider several alternative explanations. I show that the
results do not change when I separate by gender. Then, I focus on firm characteristics,
on the possibility that payroll taxes are shifted on wages for prime-age workers, on
wage capture by prime-age workers, and on hiring costs for each age group. None of
these alternative channels is consistent with the results
Adverse Selection . The evidence based on the characteristics of the young and
prime-age labor market (figure 1.5) is consistent with adverse selection increasing with
age. The ratio of permanent workers does not increase after 30. Firms could infer that
workers who failed to have a permanent contract before 30 are of lower ability. That
signal might be strengthened over time (Greenwald, 1986). The more a worker stays
out of the permanent workforce, the more likely he is to suffer unemployment spells
that depreciate his skills. Then, firms might see prime-age non-permanent workers as
adversely selected with certainty.
In contrast, the signal will be less strong for young workers, as firms understand
that is difficult for them to land a stable job (Ryan, 2001). Younger workers might be
riskier because they have less history in the labor market and then greater uncertainty
about their productivity. But the average productivity of a risky young worker might
be higher than that of an adversely selected prime-age worker.
If adverse selection is increasing with age, it should be detectable in the wages.
Suppose a skill distribution for young and prime-age workers. The skill distribution
should be mapped into a wage distribution. Thus, if prime-age subsidized workers are
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more negatively selected than their age peers, they should come from the lower end of
the skill distribution. Then, their wages should also be concentrated on the left-end of
the distribution. In contrast, young subsidized workers are not as negatively selected
as their age peers. Therefore, their skill and wage distribution should only be slightly
shifted to the left. As can be seen, subsidized and non-subsidized prime-age workers
are very different (figure 1.16a). Prime-age subsidized workers are coming from a
much less productive pool of individuals. In contrast, the average subsidized young
worker is not very different than the average non-subsidized young worker (figure
1.16b). Thus, the analysis of the wage densities is consistent with adverse selection
increasing with age.
Adverse selection should also be detectable in other observable characteristics of
these workers. Thus, I can still provide an additional test. Note that both young and
prime-age workers will be negatively selected with respect to their age-counterparts.
But the question here is whether subsidized prime-age workers are relatively more
negatively selected than young ones. To test that, I restrict the sample to workers
hired as permanent workers and run a regression with a dummy equal to 1 if the
worker was hired with a tax credit, and 0 if not, on several predictor and control
variables. The specification is as follows:
Yipct = α + δp + φc + γt + βXipct + ψ45ipct + κ45ipctXipct + εipct (1.19)
Yipct is a dummy that indicates whether the individual was hired with a tax cut or
not. δp, φc, and γt are province, cohort, and year fixed effects, respectively. Xipct
is a vector of characteristics of the worker and the job: education, sex, citizenship,
disability, experience, wage, industry sector, part-time, and firm’s size. 45ipct is a
dummy indicating that the worker is 45 years or older.
Table 1.10 reports the results. Column 1 shows them for workers under 30 years
during the period between May 1997 and March 2001 (when the tax credit for young
employees was available). Column 2 reports the estimates for prime-age workers
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45-50 years old between May 1997 and June 2006. Column 3 reports the results
pooling both types of workers and adding interactions for those older than 45. The
estimates are consistent with adverse selection worsening with age: both young and
prime-age subsidized workers are worse in several observable characteristics (univer-
sity education, experience during the last 12 months, firm’s size, and wage) than their
counterparts. Moreover, the interactions reveal that subsidized prime-age workers are
much more negatively selected than young employees in three dimensions: they are
less likely to have finished a college degree, they have accumulated less experience
during the last 12 months, and their wages are lower. However, they are more likely
to work in slighty larger firms.
The above evidence, and the evolution of employment over age (figure 1.5), are
consistent with adverse selection increasing with age in the pool of marginal work-
ers. However, there can be other reasons that could explain the decreasing elasticity
between the ages of 30 and 45. I turn now to consider some of the most plausible
ones.
Supply of Men and Women . I begin by showing further evidence that the
elasticity of labor supply does not play any role in explaining the results for prime-age
workers. Women are known to have more elastic labor supply (Eissa and Liebman,
1996; Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999). Figure 1.1b shows the unemployment rate for
men and women aged 45-50. Since unemployment is higher among women, it suggests
that female labor supply should be more elastic in Spain too. Thus, employment re-
sponses should be higher for women, as long as demand is elastic. I repeat the analysis
for men and women separately. The evidence is presented in section 4 in the online
appendix. The results across gender are very similar and not significantly different.
Therefore, it confirms previous results that the key driver of the null employment
effect in the prime-age labor market is an inelastic demand.
Payroll taxes are shifted on wages . If workers value the benefits that are
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financed through payroll taxation, they will accept a lower wage in compensation
for these services. The argument can be traced back to Summers (1989) for man-
dated benefits and Lazear (1990) for severance payments. In a perfect market, any
government-ordered transfer from the firm to the worker can be offset by a voluntary
transfer of the same size from the worker to the firm. Then, payroll taxes can be fully
shifted onto wages, and employment credits will not affect the level of employment.
Gruber (1997) shows that this is the case when there is full valuation of benefits
financed by payroll taxes.
However, the presence of minimum wages breaks down the argument. Firms will
not be able to fully shift payroll taxes to wages for workers who are in the proximity of
the minimum wage. Thus, a potential explanation for the results is that young workers
are more likely to be at the minimum wage than prime-age workers. If that is the
case, we would expect that younger workers hired with a tax cut are more likely to be
at the minimum wage than prime-age workers. Figure 1.16 shows the wage density for
each age group during the period 1997-2001 for permanent and temporary contracts
(1.16c), for all permanent contracts (1.16d), and for permanent subsidized contracts
(1.16e). The red dashed lines represent the area of the minimum wage. Figures 1.16c
and 1.16d do show that the density of minimum wage workers is larger for younger
workers. If the increases in employment were caused by that factor we would expect
that such higher mass also shows up for permanent subsidized contracts. However,
figure 1.16e shows that the wage density for subsidized contracts is very similar across
age groups. Thus, differential incidence of minimum wage workers does not seem to
explain the results.
Small v. Large Firms. One possibility is that there is no impact on prime-age
workers because they are not working in small firms. Small firms are likely to be more
liquidity constrained than large firms. Thus, they might not be able to hire workers
at the occupation-specific wage given the burden of payroll taxes. Then, the increase
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in demand might be driven by them. In addition, hiring policies in large firms might
be directed by a human resources department. The age requirement of the tax credits
might impose an additional transaction cost on the human resources department that
deters them from using the employment credits. In fact, Cahuc et al. (2014) study a
payroll tax credit for new hires in small French firms during the Great Recession and
find increases in employment growth.
I repeat the analysis for small and large firms. The RDD results are in table 1.11.
For young workers, the probability of being hired in a small firm before the threshold
is significantly .28 pp higher. In large firms, the estimate is not significant. For
prime-age workers, both in small and large firms the estimate is significant. However,
note that the increase in hiring is of .37 pp for small firms, whereas it is only of .07
pp for large firms. Then, it is mostly small firms that are delaying the time at which
they hire prime-age workers to claim the tax credit. This is not consistent with small
firms not hiring prime-age workers and cannot justifiy the inelastic labor demand for
older workers.
Another potential interpretation of this result is that informal workers are more
likely to be at small firms. However, the effects of the policy happen mostly through
workers that were temporary within the same firm before becoming permanent. If
firms were trying to save taxes by keeping workers underground, there is no rationale
for hiring them as temporary before, since those contracts are not subsidized and have
to pay the standard level of payroll taxes. Therefore, this finding signals to another
relevant margin through which the policy is acting. The increases in employment
happen for young workers in small firms.
Search-and-matching . (1) Wage capture. The introduction of rigidities in the
labor market highlights some channels that could explain the differential elasticities
across groups. Two of the equations determining the equilibrium in such models are
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the job creation condition (Pissarides, 2000):
p− w(1 + τ)− (r + λ)pc
q(θ)
= 0 (1.20)
and the wage function:
w = (1− β)z + βp(1 + cθ)
1 + τ
(1.21)
where p is the productivity, w is the wage, τ is the firm’s payroll tax rate, r is the
interest rate, λ is the rate of arrival of an adverse shock that breaks the job match,
c is the hiring cost; θ is the ratio between vacancies and unemployed workers, and
represents labor market tightness; q(θ) is the rate at which vacant jobs become filled, β
is the worker’s bargaining power, z is the income that an unemployed worker receives.
A decrease in the payroll tax rate will increase job creation as long as gross wages,
w(1 + τ), also decrease. Gross wages will stay the same if workers are able to capture
the rent created by the lower tax rates. That is the case when workers hold all
bargaining power, or β = 1. If prime-age workers have all bargaining power that
could explain the zero effect on employment.
Inspection of the wages of subsidized workers provides an opportunity to test
this channel. Employers hiring workers with a credit before the age of 45 do so by
claiming the LTU credit. The tax cut for those cases is smaller than that after 45
(figure 1.2b). Moreover, the LTU credit applies only for the first 2 years, while that
for workers older than 45 applies for the whole duration of the contract. Thus, if
subsidized prime-age workers are capturing the rent, we should see a jump up in their
wages after 45. For young workers, the tax cut is not so different as that for the LTU:
both apply for 2 years and in 1997 and 1998 the tax credit was exactly the same
(figure 1.2a). Thus, there should not be a jump in wages at 30. Graphical evidence in
figure 1.17 shows a jump in the starting wage for workers hired with a wage subsidy
after 45. As expected, there is no jump at 30. However, the jump at 45 could be
caused by selection of workers across the discontinuity. I will use a RDD, but adding
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control variables to correct for selection, in order to test if the jump is causal. The
specification is:
yiptq = α + β1age
∗
iptq + γXiptq + f(a− age∗) + δp + ρt + φq + εiptq (1.22)
where yiptq is the log real daily wage, age
∗
iptq is a dummy indicating that the employee
was hired after his 45th birthday, or before his 30th birthday. f(a− age∗) is a local
linear polynomial in age on each side of the threshold. Xiptq are control variables
such as education, sex, previous wage, experience, disability, part-time job, firm’s
workforce, a dummy indicating that the worker was short-term within the same firm
that hired him as permanent with a tax credit, and the local unemployment rate
when hired. In addition, I control for province fixed effects, δp; ρt, calendar month
fixed-effects; and φq, quarter fixed-effects for the moment when the worker was hired
with a tax credit.
Table 1.12 reports the results for the RDD. The first three columns show it for
young workers, and the last three for prime-age workers. I show the results without
control variables, adding control variables and fixed-effects, and finally including a
dummy indicating that the worker had been a short-term employee within the same
firm before becoming permanent. The estimates of specifications not including a
dummy indicating that the worker had been a short-term employee within the same
firm are positive and significant. However, the coefficient is not significant anymore
when I include this control variable. Therefore, there is no evidence that prime-age
workers hired with subsidized contracts are capturing the tax cut in terms of higher
wages, ruling out the wage bargaining hypothesis. Moreover, for prime-age workers
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the tax credit acts as a transfer to firms.49 50
(2) Hiring costs. Another possibility is that prime-age workers were more costly
to hire because they were harder to find, given their high rates of employment. Figure
1.5c suggests that hiring costs are likely to be lower for young workers as a group.
However, note that the ratio of the workforce in permanent contracts at 30 and 45
barely changes. Thus, hiring costs just before the 30th threshold and at 45 should
be very similar. Then, we should not observe a positive impact just before 30 either.
Recall that the age-incidence estimates of the employment effect show a positive
and significant impact just before 30 (figure 1.13b). And that the effect at 30 is not
significantly different than the impact between 20 and 29 years. Then, an explanation
based on hiring costs fails to explain the results.
To sum up, the evidence is consistent with adverse selection increasing with age
in the pool of marginal workers. Thus, as adverse selection worsens over the life-
cycle, the labor demand elasticity of -0.63 for young workers decreases until reaching
0 at some point between the ages of 30 and 45. The fundamental characteristics
of the labor market that point to adverse selection as the main explanation of the
results are not only characteristic of Spain. Blundell et al. (2013); Topel and Ward
(1992); Murphy and Welch (1990) document similar features in other labor markets
of developed countries. Then, the implications for labor policy design are likely to
49Changes in the generosity of the employment credit in May 1999 provide an additional test.
I focus only on male workers because it is for them that the generosity of the employment credit
decreased unambiguously: the payroll tax rate cut decreased from 40% to 35% for the first year,
and from 40% to 25% in the second year, for male workers under 30. For the case of male workers
over 45, it decreased from a 60% tax cut for the first two years, to 45% and 40% for the first and
second year, respectively. Moreover, for the remaining of the contract it decreased from 50% to
40%. I perform a DD strategy. Table 20 in the online appendix reports the results. The results
are consistent with those of the RDD: none of the estimates are significant when I include all the
control variables.
50It could still be the case that prime-age workers hired with a tax credit do not perceive higher
wages, but firms grant them more non-pecuniary benefits. This is unlikely for two reasons: first,
non-pecuniary benefits are also determined through collective-bargaining. Second, higher non-wage
benefits for subsidized workers might undermine the morale of non-subsidized workers who had been
at the firm for a long time.
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hold in other contexts.
1.5 Discussion
The labor demand elasticity is a key parameter to evaluate and predict the impacts of
both demand and supply interventions in the labor market. In this section, I discuss
policy implications of the results, interpret earlier findings in light of the estimates in
this paper, and suggest avenues for future research.
Demand-Side Policies. (1) Employment Tax Credits and the Optimal Age-
Profile of Payroll Taxes. Employment tax credits have been considered as a policy
to increase employment for a long-time (Kaldor, 1936; Phelps, 1994, 1997). They are
used in many countries around the world. Most of them target either young or old
workers (or both) (OECD, 2009, 2013).51 52 The demand elasticities in this paper
show that tax credits for new hires will be effective and cost-efficient for young work-
ers, but not for prime-age workers. That could increase employment by smoothing
the school-to-work transition period (Ryan, 2001), and by subsidizing hiring of risky
young workers with yet unknown productivity and who have to be trained. Moreover,
intervention in the early labor market years can improve employment outcomes as
these workers age by reducing the pool of adversely selected workers. More experience
5112 OECD countries have provisions that target young or old workers. Belgium, France, Japan,
Portugal, and the US have specific policies both for young and old workers. Canada, Greece,
Italy, South Korea, Turkey and the UK have specific policies for young individuals. Poland has an
employment credit for old workers. Neumark and Grijalva (2013) also report that, between 1969
and 2012, US states implemented 149 employment credits.
52Another common design is to focus on low-wage workers regardless of their age. Kramarz and
Philippon (2001) study payroll tax subsidies for low-wage workers in France and find a small and
insignificant impact on entry from non-employment. Crepon and Desplatz (2001) study the same
policy and conclude that most employment effects happen through substitution between treated
and non-treated workers. Yet another design is to subsidize jobs in small firms. Cahuc et al. (2014)
study a payroll tax credit for new hires in small French firms during the Great Recession. They find
evidence that employment growth increased and that substitution was not happening. The results
in this paper confirm that targeting small firms is another important margin, since the employment
effect for younger workers happens only through small firms.
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during the early labor market years can have positive effects later on.
Yet, the fact that many countries target these policies to the population of older
workers is telling about the challenges that economies face in an aging society. The
estimates at 45 might not be valid for older workers who are closer to the retirement
age. Blundell et al. (2013) show, for the UK and France, that workers over 55 years
play a big role in explaining reductions in employment and hours of work during the
last 30 years. Huttunen et al. (2013) study a payroll tax cut for all low-wage workers
older than 54 in Finland. Their findings show that new entries were not affected,
which is in line with the results in this paper for 45 year olds. However, they found
a decrease in exits to non-employment, with a small impact on the employment of
workers older than 54. The positive effect could be due to this population being less
adversely selected since they are currently working. Therefore, the evidence suggests
that employment tax credits might also be benefitial if targeted at workers who are
much closer to retirement than those who are 45 years old. But this is as long as the
tax cuts target the currently employed and not new hires.
Perhaps a simple way to implement a reform according to the results in this paper
and in Huttunen et al. (2013), would be to make payroll taxes age-dependent. The
optimal payroll tax rate should be lower for young workers, and then increase with
age. Since the labor demand elasticity for marginal workers might reach 0 at some
point between the ages of 30 and 45, the plateau of the tax rate should be at some
point between those two ages. An interesting question for future research is where
exactly the plateau should be, but this is beyond the scope of this paper. Following
the results in Huttunen et al. (2013), the payroll tax rate should start decreasing
again at some point before the age of retirement to prevent some of these workers
from losing their jobs.
The development of the optimal age-profile of payroll taxes is an interesting avenue
for future research. There are two recent strands of literature that can shed some
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light to this problem. First, there are studies on the optimal age profile of income
taxes (Weinzierl, 2011) and employment protection (Cheron et al., 2011). Second,
there is research analyzing the optimal level of payroll taxes and UI over the business
cycle (Landais et al., 2014; Jung and Kuester, Forthcoming).53 While labor demand
elasticities can change depending on economic conditions, the findings in this paper
show that an important factor for optimal labor policy is age. Future research can
provide theoretical fundamentals of how an age-dependent payroll tax should be. In
addition, it can look at the optimal policy mix for different age groups.
Supply-Side Labor Market Policies . (1) Earned Income Tax Credit. Given
the demand elasticities in this paper, EITC would not be an attractive work-encouraging
transfer program for neither young nor older workers. The optimal transfer program
resembles the EITC when supply responses are concentrated along the extensive mar-
gin (Saez, 2002). But most optimal tax analysis and EITC discussions assume that
labor demand is perfectly elastic and thus that the incidence of taxes is only borne
by workers. Rothstein (2010) simulates the impacts of the EITC with different la-
bor demand elasticities. With infinitely elastic demand, EITC is successful in raising
both employment and earnings of low-skill mothers. He estimates that incomes of
low-income mothers would rise by $1.39 for every $ spent on the program.
However, assuming more realistic labor demand elasticities of -0.3, Rothstein
(2010) finds more modest positive employment effects, and that a substantial portion
of low-skill single mother’s EITC payments is captured by employers through reduced
wages: $1 in EITC spending increases after-tax incomes by $0.73. Importantly for
distributional reasons, the $0.73 estimate combines an increase of net-of-tax incomes
of women with children of $1.07 for each $ on the program, and a decline of $0.34 in
53Landais et al. (2014) look at the optimal level of UI over the business cycle. Jung and Kuester
(Forthcoming) study the optimal mix of payroll taxes, UI and employment protection over the
business cycle.
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the net-of-tax income of women without children.54 The estimates of labor demand
elasticity in this paper question the ability of EITC schemes as a tool for income
redistribution. An alternative is the use of a Negative Income Tax (NIT), but the
fear is that it would strongly discourage work. Instead, payroll tax credits are at least
successful in raising both employment and earnings of young workers.
(2) Job-Search Assistance. The results in this paper show that employment tax
credits can be a more efficient way of raising both employment and earnings than
job-search assistance. They can also help us understand why job-search assistance
interventions fail in general. Heckman et al. (1999) and Card et al. (2010) review the
literature on active labor market policies and conclude that these interventions (1)
have, at best, very small positive effects; (2) have very heterogenous effects depending
on age and gender; (3) have no effect when targeted at young workers.55
The latter conclusion might seem puzzling in light of the findings in this paper.
However, youth unemployment is high across all OECD countries (OECD, 2002,
2013). Acting through the supply-side might then have very small marginal effects
(Michaillat, 2012). Moreover, since supply-side policies do not alter firm’s hiring
incentives, any positive estimates might only reflect partial equilibrium changes. In
a research design that can look at general equilibrium effects, Crepon et al. (2013)
find zero net employment effects of job-search assistance. In the case of prime-age
workers, lack of employment effects of these policies can be caused by them facing
an inelastic demand. If job-search assistance or training treatments are not strong
enough to undo adverse selection, these policies will fail. Moreover, participation in
these programs might stigmatize workers, worsening adverse selection.
54There is empirical evidence to support Rothstein (2010) analysis. Leigh (2010) exploits variation
in state EITC supplements and finds that a 10% increase in the generosity of EITC is associated
with a 5% fall in the wages of high school dropouts. This number implies a labor demand elasticity
of -.3.
55Both surveys review also employment tax credits and find mostly zero effects. They argue that




Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
Age 25-30 Age 30-35 Age 40-45 Age 45-50
Variables Mean sd N Mean sd N Mean sd N Mean sd N
% Men 53.49 49.88 151,514 53.93 49.85 137,224 55.52 49.69 94,780 58.72 49.23 77,832
% Citizen 81.01 39.22 151,514 85.2 35.51 137,224 91.14 28.41 94,780 94.34 23.11 77,832
% University Education 21.59 41.14 151,514 22.27 41.6 137,224 24.52 43.02 94,780 25.41 43.54 77,832
% Secondary Education 57.54 49.43 151,514 54.97 49.75 137,224 49.41 50 94,780 45.65 49.81 77,832
% Primary Education 20.87 40.64 151,514 22.76 41.93 137,224 26.06 43.9 94,780 28.94 45.35 77,832
% Perm. 20.29 40.22 151,514 27.8 44.8 137,224 33.31 47.13 94,780 36.1 48.03 77,832
% Temp. 20.61 40.45 151,514 15.57 36.26 137,224 11.06 31.37 94,780 9.996 29.99 77,832
% Self-Emp. 5.25 22.3 151,514 8.667 28.13 137,224 13.95 34.65 94,780 17.12 37.67 77,832
% UI 3.941 19.46 151,514 4.66 21.08 137,224 3.862 19.27 94,780 3.901 19.36 77,832
% Public 1.297 11.31 151,514 3.139 17.44 137,224 5.177 22.16 94,780 4.652 21.06 77,832
% Non-Emp. 52.55 49.93 151,514 44.82 49.73 137,224 36.5 48.14 94,780 32.13 46.7 77,832
% Part-Time 54.4 49.81 151,514 44.6 49.71 137,224 35.95 47.99 94,780 33.31 47.13 77,832
Log Firm Workforce 2.192 3.219 77,860 2.356 3.305 82,108 2.19 3.191 63,839 2.077 3.166 55,850
Daily Wage 37.17 39.84 70,123 42.47 42.71 74,318 46.99 43.06 58,254 47.26 35.63 50,963
% Agriculture 3.08 17.28 151,514 3.79 19.1 137,224 4.467 20.66 94,780 5.454 22.71 77,832
% Industry 8.467 27.84 151,514 9.356 29.12 137,224 12.31 32.85 94,780 14.15 34.85 77,832
% Construction 4.049 19.71 151,514 4.595 20.94 137,224 4.977 21.75 94,780 5.543 22.88 77,832
% Services 32.83 46.96 151,514 38.12 48.57 137,224 40.81 49.15 94,780 40.64 49.12 77,832
Notes: the table shows summary statistics for workers in 1997. I group the workers by 5
year age groups, and report descriptive statistics for the main groups that I will use in the
statistical analysis: 25-30, 30-35, 40-45, and 45-50. I include workers’ personal characteristics
(sex, education, and Spanish citizenship) and job status (whether they work part-time, the size of
the firm in which they work, their daily wage, and sector in which they work).
Table 1.2: Payroll Tax Base and Tax Rates for 1997
Worker Group Minimum Base (monthly) Maximum Base (monthly) Employers Tax Rate Workers Tax Rate Total Tax Rate
Engineers and university graduates 697.23 2360.17 23.6 4.7 28.3
Technical engineers 578.23 2360.17 23.6 4.7 28.3
Chief administrative 502.69 2360.17 23.6 4.7 28.3
Non-graduated assistants 467.17 2360.17 23.6 4.7 28.3
Administrative officials 467.17 1936.64 23.6 4.7 28.3
Subordinate employees 467.17 1936.64 23.6 4.7 28.3
Administrative assistant 467.17 1936.64 23.6 4.7 28.3
First- and second-order officials (1) 15.90 64.55 23.6 4.7 28.3
Third-order officials (1) 15.90 64.55 23.6 4.7 28.3
Labourer (1) 15.90 64.55 23.6 4.7 28.3
Employees under 18 years (1) 15.90 64.55 23.6 4.7 28.3
Notes: Source is Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social (MESS), 2012. (1): daily tax base.
Worker group refers to the different contribution groups as established by Social Security law.
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Table 1.3: Effects on Transitions and Employment of Crossing the 45th Birthday Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Perm. Short-Term Self-Employed UI Public Worker —
Panel A: Effects on Transitions, Short-Run, RDD
Treatment 0.191∗∗ 0.108 0.0356 -0.0677 0.00345 —
(0.0723) (0.0711) (0.0294) (0.0499) (0.0498) —
Observations 458797 458797 458797 458797 458797 —
Panel B: Effects on Transitions, Long-Run, RDD
Perm. Short-Term Self-Employed UI Public Worker
Treatment 0.222∗∗∗ -0.0521 -0.000497 0.00150 0.00812 —
(0.0192) (0.0336) (0.00817) (0.0215) (0.00899) —
Observations 4169416 4169416 4169416 4169416 4169416 —
Perm. Short-Term Perm. or ST Self-Employed Public Worker Non-Employed
Panel C: Effects on Employment, RDD
Treatment 0.453∗∗∗ -0.410∗∗∗ 0.0428 -0.00625 -0.000474 -0.0360
(0.0410) (0.0549) (0.0557) (0.0219) (0.0111) (0.0572)
Slope Before 45 0.0386∗∗∗ 0.0372∗∗∗ 0.0758∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0153∗∗∗ -0.120∗∗∗
(0.00496) (0.00632) (0.00661) (0.00313) (0.00156) (0.00674)
Slope After 45 0.0922∗∗∗ -0.0625∗∗∗ 0.0297∗∗∗ -0.00528 -0.00123 -0.0232∗∗
(0.00791) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.00468) (0.00236) (0.0106)
Observations 3660875 3660875 3660875 3660875 3660875 3660875
Panel D: Effects on Employment, Donut RDD
Treatment 0.0605 -0.251 -0.191 0.0235 0.0565 0.111
(0.146) (0.178) (0.186) (0.0844) (0.0408) (0.190)
Slope Before 45 0.0832∗∗∗ 0.00546 0.0886∗∗∗ 0.0255∗∗∗ 0.0169∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗∗
(0.00546) (0.00683) (0.00713) (0.00336) (0.00164) (0.00725)
Slope After 45 0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0111 0.0119 -0.00224 -0.00531∗∗ -0.00433
(0.00779) (0.00937) (0.00973) (0.00458) (0.00223) (0.00986)
Observations 3660875 3660875 3660875 3660875 3660875 3660875
Notes: The estimates have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as effects
in percentage points. Panel A and B report the effects on entries into permanent, short-term,
self-employed, or public jobs, as well as into UI, around the 45th birthday thresholds. Panel A
focuses on the short-run effects (first 12 months after policy). Panel B focuses on the long-run
effects (from the 12th month until policy is removed). Panels C and D display the effects on the
probability of being employed in any of these contracts and the overall probability of working.
The specification is equation 3.1. The dependent variables are dummies indicating each type of
transition (panels A and B), or the employment status (panels C and D). The estimation window
is of 24 months on each side of the threshold. Panel D performs a donut RDD omitting the 12
months before and after the 45th birthday. Robust standard errors, clustered at the month of
birth level, are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%
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Table 1.4: Effects on Starting Wages, 1997
Prime-Age, 1997 Change Young, 1997 Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Starting Wage Starting Wage Starting Wage Starting Wage Starting Wage Starting Wage
Treatment -0.00938 0.0112 0.00108 -0.0444∗∗∗ -0.0517∗∗∗ -0.0207∗∗∗
(0.00998) (0.00853) (0.0108) (0.00604) (0.00492) (0.00687)
Post 0.0404∗∗∗ 0.0509∗∗∗ 0.0486∗∗∗ 0.0544∗∗∗ 0.0552∗∗∗ 0.0560∗∗∗
(0.00737) (0.00595) (0.00612) (0.00545) (0.00457) (0.00477)
Treatment x Post -0.0227∗∗ -0.0177∗ -0.00386 0.00351 -0.00692 0.000900
(0.0111) (0.00947) (0.00916) (0.00789) (0.00658) (0.00590)
Controls N Y Y N Y Y
Prov FE N N Y N N Y
Cohort FE N N Y N N Y
Calendar quarter FE N N Y N N Y
Occupation FE N N Y N N Y
Observations 15666 15666 15666 41564 41564 41564
Notes: The table displays the effects on wages of workers hired as permanent workers of
the expansion of payroll tax cuts in 1997. The specification is equation 1.2. The dependent
variable is log daily real wages. Columns 1-3 report the results for prime-age workers,
and columns 4-6 for young workers. Columns (1) and (4) do not include control variables.
Columns (2) and (4) include as control variables sex, education, experience, firm size,
sector, citizenship, part-time job, and workers’ disability. Columns (3) and (6) also include
calendar quarter, province, cohort and occupation fixed effects. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the month of birth level, are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.5: Effects on Transitions and Employment, 25-30 Vs. 30-35, 1997
Effects on Transitions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Perm. Perm. Perm. Temp. Temp. Temp. Trans. Temp.
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Hires Lay-Offs Quits to Perm.
Treatment 0.307∗∗∗ 0.0721∗∗∗ 0.0417∗∗∗ 1.784∗∗∗ 1.910∗∗∗ 0.320∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.0271) (0.0127) (0.00676) (0.103) (0.0346) (0.0135) (0.0109)
Post 0.349∗∗∗ 0.423∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.520∗∗∗ -0.0541∗ 0.133∗∗∗ 0.260∗∗∗
(0.0216) (0.0144) (0.00803) (0.0335) (0.0327) (0.0130) (0.00821)
Treatment x Post 0.347∗∗∗ -0.0458∗∗ 0.0820∗∗∗ 0.372∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.0300) (0.0191) (0.0112) (0.0556) (0.0472) (0.0195) (0.0141)
Observations 3693279 3693279 3693279 3693279 3693279 3693279 3693279
Effects on Employment
Perm. Short-Term Perm. or ST Self-Emp. Public UI Employed
Treatment -2.347∗∗∗ 6.275∗∗∗ 3.928∗∗∗ -2.296∗∗∗ -1.379∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.253∗∗∗
(0.0548) (0.0519) (0.0499) (0.0345) (0.0244) (0.0296) (0.0363)
Post 1.492∗∗∗ 0.0200 1.512∗∗∗ -0.348∗∗∗ -0.225∗∗∗ -0.610∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗
(0.0565) (0.0499) (0.0510) (0.0367) (0.0275) (0.0290) (0.0349)
Treatment x Post 0.217∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.402∗∗∗ -0.0441 -0.0189 -0.169∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.0745) (0.0706) (0.0669) (0.0466) (0.0326) (0.0381) (0.0479)
Observations 3693279 3693279 3693279 3693279 3693279 3693279 3693279
Notes: The estimates have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as effects
in percentage points. The treatment group are workers aged 25-30. The control group are
workers aged 30-35. In the upper panel, the dependent variable is a dummy indicating
whether a transition in or out of a permanent contract (columns 1-3) or a temporary
contract (columns 4-6) happened. In column 7th the dependent variable is a dummy that
indicates that the worker was converted to permanent, from a temporary contract, within
the same firm. The lower panel reports the results for employment. Each dependent
variable is one of the possible employment statuses. The policy change is the expansion
of payroll tax cuts in 1997. The specification is equation 1.2. Control variables included
are calendar quarter dummies, sex, education, experience, firm size, sector, citizenship,
part-time job, and workers’ disability. Robust standard errors, clustered at the month
of birth level, are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%
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Table 1.6: Effects on Transitions and Employment of Crossing the 30th Birthday Threshold
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Perm. Short-Term Self-Employed UI Public Worker —
Panel A: Hires, Short-Run, 05/1997-05/1998
Treatment 0.108∗ 0.00978 0.0110 -0.00439 0.0202 —
(0.0618) (0.0732) (0.0228) (0.0697) (0.0331) —
Observations 748551 748551 748551 748551 748551 —
Panel B: Hires, Long-Run, 06/1998-03/2001
Treatment 0.143∗∗∗ -0.0335 0.00972 -0.0237 0.00414 —
(0.0415) (0.0544) (0.0152) (0.0344) (0.0185) —
Observations 1965552 1965552 1965552 1965552 1965552 —
Perm. Short-Term Self-Emp. UI Public Employed
Panel C: Emp., Treated Cohorts Born 05/1968-03/1971
Treatment 0.247∗∗ -0.301∗ 0.00492 0.0201 0.0217 -0.0270
(0.119) (0.153) (0.0395) (0.0618) (0.0175) (0.144)
Slope Before 30 0.297∗∗∗ -0.0908∗∗∗ 0.0501∗∗∗ -0.0186∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗
(0.0123) (0.0123) (0.00309) (0.00519) (0.00164) (0.00660)
Slope After 30 -0.0930∗∗∗ 0.0404∗∗ -0.00789 0.0261∗∗∗ -0.00453∗∗ -0.0650∗∗∗
(0.0192) (0.0158) (0.00567) (0.00614) (0.00208) (0.00832)
Observations 4240362 4240362 4240362 4240362 4240362 4240362
Panel D: Emp., Placebo Cohorts Born 03/1973-03/1976
Treatment 0.103 0.221 -0.0181 -0.123 -0.00548 0.300
(0.116) (0.254) (0.0435) (0.0820) (0.0212) (0.269)
Slope Before 30 0.187∗∗∗ -0.0275∗ 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0287∗∗∗ 0.0363∗∗∗ 0.264∗∗∗
(0.00824) (0.0144) (0.00309) (0.00500) (0.00154) (0.0166)
Slope After 30 0.0139 0.0126 -0.0160∗∗∗ -0.0276∗∗∗ -0.0135∗∗∗ -0.00302
(0.0148) (0.0214) (0.00497) (0.00664) (0.00224) (0.0263)
Observations 4824197 4824197 4824197 4824197 4824197 4824197
Notes: The estimates have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted
as effects in percentage points. Panel A and B report the effects on entries into
permanent, short-term, self-employed, or public jobs, as well as into UI, around
the 30th birthday thresholds. Panel A focuses on the short-run effects (first 12
months after policy). Panel B focuses on the long-run effects (from the 12th month
until policy is removed). Panels C displays the effects on the probability of being
employed in any of these contracts, and the overall probability of working, for
treated cohorts born between 05/1968-03/1971. Panels D repeats the exercise in
panel C but for a placebo cohort: workers born between 03/1973-03/1976. The
specification is equation 3.1. The estimation window is of 12 months on each side
of the threshold. Robust standard errors, clustered at the month of birth level, are
shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%
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Table 1.7: Substitution Test Changing Control Group
1997 Change 2001 Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Hires Lay-Offs Quits
Control Group: 30-31
Treatment 0.212∗∗∗ 0.0171 0.0357∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.0165 0.158∗∗∗
(0.0456) (0.0218) (0.0112) (0.0386) (0.0243) (0.0220)
Post 0.380∗∗∗ 0.389∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ -0.184∗∗∗ 0.148∗∗∗ 0.0947∗∗∗
(0.0393) (0.0302) (0.0173) (0.0467) (0.0312) (0.0282)
Treatment x Post 0.313∗∗∗ -0.0134 0.0365∗ -0.284∗∗∗ -0.0252 0.0514∗
(0.0440) (0.0325) (0.0189) (0.0516) (0.0338) (0.0311)
Observations 2340503 2340503 2340503 2522139 2522139 2522139
Control Group: 31-32
Treatment 0.307∗∗∗ 0.0687∗∗∗ 0.0278∗∗ 0.885∗∗∗ 0.0454∗ 0.305∗∗∗
(0.0422) (0.0214) (0.0116) (0.0377) (0.0243) (0.0205)
Post 0.412∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗ -0.149∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.0438) (0.0302) (0.0171) (0.0455) (0.0310) (0.0265)
Treatment x Post 0.282∗∗∗ -0.0756∗∗ 0.0906∗∗∗ -0.318∗∗∗ 0.00734 -0.00835
(0.0481) (0.0327) (0.0188) (0.0506) (0.0336) (0.0296)
Observations 2333315 2333315 2333315 2512780 2512780 2512780
Control Group: 32-33
Treatment 0.315∗∗∗ 0.0710∗∗∗ 0.0415∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.0595∗∗ 0.349∗∗∗
(0.0405) (0.0218) (0.0116) (0.0381) (0.0244) (0.0202)
Post 0.320∗∗∗ 0.465∗∗∗ 0.171∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗
(0.0562) (0.0308) (0.0169) (0.0457) (0.0312) (0.0259)
Treatment x Post 0.373∗∗∗ -0.0912∗∗∗ 0.0984∗∗∗ -0.253∗∗∗ 0.0119 0.0217
(0.0595) (0.0332) (0.0186) (0.0508) (0.0338) (0.0290)
Observations 2324668 2324668 2324668 2504805 2504805 2504805
Control Group: 33-34
Treatment 0.388∗∗∗ 0.0796∗∗∗ 0.0601∗∗∗ 0.974∗∗∗ 0.0410 0.391∗∗∗
(0.0334) (0.0223) (0.0115) (0.0382) (0.0250) (0.0200)
Post 0.357∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗ 0.191∗∗∗ -0.196∗∗∗ 0.0550∗ 0.0888∗∗∗
(0.0382) (0.0306) (0.0170) (0.0457) (0.0315) (0.0251)
Treatment x Post 0.339∗∗∗ 0.00267 0.0780∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗∗ 0.0706∗∗ 0.0612∗∗
(0.0434) (0.0330) (0.0186) (0.0507) (0.0341) (0.0284)
Observations 2313937 2313937 2313937 2497485 2497485 2497485
Control Group: 34-35
Treatment 0.431∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 0.0495∗∗∗ 1.047∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(0.0467) (0.0230) (0.0126) (0.0393) (0.0258) (0.0201)
Post 0.299∗∗∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗ 0.0676∗∗ 0.0775∗∗∗
(0.0455) (0.0324) (0.0178) (0.0471) (0.0328) (0.0254)
Treatment x Post 0.394∗∗∗ -0.0812∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ -0.230∗∗∗ 0.0563 0.0723∗∗
(0.0504) (0.0346) (0.0194) (0.0521) (0.0353) (0.0286)
Observations 2271409 2271409 2271409 2458995 2458995 2458995
Notes: Each panel shows the effects on transitions in and out of permanent contracts of the
expansion of the payroll tax credits in 1997. Treatment group is composed of workers aged
25-30, and I use different control groups in each panel. The control group are workers aged 30-31
(first panel), 31-32 (second panel), 32-33 (third panel), 33-34 (fourth panel), and 34-35 (fifth
panel). The dependent variables are dummies indicating whether a transition in (first column)
or out happened (second and third column). Specification is equation 1.2. Control variables
included are calendar quarter dummies, sex, education, experience, firm size, sector, citizen-
ship, part-time job, and workers’ disability. Robust standard errors, clustered at the month of
birth level, are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.8: Windfalls Test
Young, 1997 Change Prime-Age, 1997 Change Young, 2001 Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Crowd-Out Subsidized Crowd-Out Subsidized Crowd-Out Subsidized
Non-Subsidized Jobs Jobs Non-Subsidized Jobs Jobs Non-Subsidized Jobs Jobs
Employment
Treatment -2.106∗∗∗ -0.240∗∗∗ 0.498∗∗∗ 0.297∗∗∗ -0.241∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗
(0.0549) (0.0103) (0.0779) (0.0116) (0.0333) (0.0160)
Post 1.145∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.797∗∗∗ 0.250∗∗∗ -0.112∗∗∗ 0.662∗∗
(0.0567) (0.0136) (0.0704) (0.00968) (0.0351) (0.0169)
Treatment x Post -0.810∗∗∗ 1.061∗∗∗ -0.953∗∗∗ 1.014∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ -0.768∗∗∗
(0.0744) (0.0188) (0.104) (0.0221) (0.156) (0.0773)
Observations 3693279 3693279 2178574 2178574 3988262 3988262
New Hires
Treatment 0.288∗∗∗ 0.0186∗∗∗ -0.0951∗∗∗ 0.0635∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.0259) (0.00236) (0.0239) (0.00468) (0.0240) (0.0197)
Post 0.252∗∗∗ 0.0977∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ 0.0631∗∗∗ -0.273∗∗∗ 0.0744∗∗∗
(0.0204) (0.00477) (0.0204) (0.00753) (0.0210) (0.00783)
Treatment x Post -0.0227 0.372∗∗∗ -0.111∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ -0.413∗∗∗
(0.0273) (0.0106) (0.0274) (0.0118) (0.0284) (0.0149)
Observations 3693279 3693279 2178574 2178574 3988262 3988262
Lay-Offs
Treatment 0.00127 0.0707∗∗∗ 0.00450∗∗∗ -0.0412∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ -0.201∗∗∗
(0.000888) (0.0127) (0.00123) (0.0159) (0.00703) (0.0126)
Post 0.0157∗∗∗ 0.407∗∗∗ 0.0116∗∗∗ 0.482∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ -0.00212
(0.00162) (0.0144) (0.00144) (0.0168) (0.00610) (0.0135)
Treatment x Post 0.0616∗∗∗ -0.107∗∗∗ 0.0480∗∗∗ 0.0522∗∗ -0.0293∗∗∗ 0.0500∗∗∗
(0.00311) (0.0189) (0.00380) (0.0245) (0.0103) (0.0171)
Observations 3693279 3693279 2178574 2178574 3988262 3988262
Quits
Treatment 0.00459∗∗∗ 0.0371∗∗∗ 0.00238∗∗∗ -0.0299∗∗∗ 0.347∗∗∗ -0.0281∗∗∗
(0.000293) (0.00675) (0.000786) (0.00749) (0.00776) (0.0102)
Post 0.0140∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.00447∗∗∗ 0.0981∗∗∗ 0.108∗∗∗ 0.00583
(0.00122) (0.00794) (0.000946) (0.00795) (0.00626) (0.0106)
Treatment x Post 0.0661∗∗∗ 0.0165 0.0334∗∗∗ -0.0309∗∗∗ -0.0176 0.0594∗∗∗
(0.00295) (0.0108) (0.00293) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0142)
Observations 3693279 3693279 2178574 2178574 3988262 3988262
Notes: The estimates have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as effects in
percentage points. The treatment group are workers aged 25-30 (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6) and 45-50
(columns 3 and 4). The control group are workers aged 30-35 (columns 1, 2, 5 and 6) and 40-45
(columns 3 and 4). The upper panel shows the employment effects for permanent non-subsidized
(windfalls or crowd-out) and permanent subsidized contracts. The next three panels shows the
effects on transitions in and out also for both types of contracts. The dependent variables are
dummies indicating whether a transition in or out happened (lower panels), or whether the
individual was employed (upper panel). I exploit both the expansion of the policy in 1997, and the
removal of the policy for young workers in 2001. Specification is equation 1.2. Control variables
included are calendar quarter dummies, sex, education, experience, firm size, sector, citizen-
ship, part-time job, and workers’ disability. Robust standard errors, clustered at the month of
birth level, are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.9: Cost-Benefit Analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sample Population Mean Wage Mean Length Revenue (millions) MECF
Young Workers, 1997-2001
Increase in Bonified Contracts 15629*** 390746*** 39.27*** 385.99*** 1220***
-0.52***(3102) (77545) (0.1) (1.7) (242)
Increase in Windfall Contracts 24740*** 618504*** 39.27*** 385.99*** -724***
(3102) (77545) (0.1) (1.7) (90.8)
(0.15)Decrease in UI 7814*** 195373*** 31.79*** 147.27*** 887***
(1550) (38773) (0.08) (1.39) (176)
Prime-Age Workers, 1997-2006
Increase in Windfall Contracts 36992*** 924800*** 41.81*** 977.76*** -4360***
1
(1623) (40592) (0.11) (5.52) (191)
Notes: Sample refers to the mean number of individuals within each group during the year
when the policy was in place. Population is the translation of Sample into the population
following the construction of the MCVL dataset (elevated by 25). Mean Wage and Mean
Length are the average wage and duration for each type of group. Revenue is the estimated
money accrued or lost by the government following equations 1.9-1.10. MECF is the
Marginal Efficiency Cost of Funds.
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Table 1.10: Sorting Into Tax Cut Contracts
(1) (2) (3)
Younger 30 Older 45 Both
University Education -0.0184∗∗∗ -0.0481∗∗∗ -0.0172∗∗∗
(0.00502) (0.00957) (0.00449)
Experience -0.113∗∗∗ -0.285∗∗∗ -0.113∗∗∗
(0.0146) (0.0307) (0.0147)
Log Firm Workforce -0.0267∗∗∗ -0.0183∗∗∗ -0.0266∗∗∗
(0.00137) (0.00156) (0.00136)
Wage -0.0515∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗ -0.0512∗∗∗
(0.0156) (0.0136) (0.0158)
University Education x Older 45 -0.0296∗∗
(0.0124)
Experience x Older 45 -0.175∗∗∗
(0.0194)
Log Firm Workforce x Older 45 0.00774∗∗∗
(0.00190)
Wage x Older 45 -0.163∗∗∗
(0.0132)
Observations 86857 28850 115707
Notes: The table displays the characteristics of permanent workers who are
hired with a tax cut with respect to permanent workers hired without tax
cut. Column 1 shows it for the sample of workers younger than 30 years old.
Column 2 shows it for the sample of workers older than 45. Column 3 shows
it for both groups of workers and includes interactions with dummies for
workers older than 45. Specification is equation 1.19. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the month of birth level, are shown in parentheses. * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.11: Effects on Transition of Crossing the Birthday Thresholds, Small Firms
(1) (2)
Perm. Short-Term
















Notes: The estimates have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as
effects in percentage points. The table displays the effects on entries into permanent
and short-term both for young and senior workers, and for small and large firms. The
specification is equation 3.1. The dependent variables are dummies indicating each type
of transition. The estimation window is of 12 months on each side of the threshold.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the month of birth level, are shown in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 1.12: Wage Incidence Across Age Discontinuities, Permanent Contracts with Tax Cut
Treatment: 27.5-30 Control: 30-32.5 Treatment: 45-47.5 Control: 42.5-45
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage Wage
Treatment -0.0134 0.0171 0.0154 0.194∗∗∗ 0.0700∗ 0.0409
(0.0346) (0.0285) (0.0276) (0.0472) (0.0357) (0.0351)
Men 0.0423∗∗∗ 0.0523∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0136) (0.0176) (0.0172)
University Education 0.354∗∗∗ 0.350∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗
(0.0230) (0.0222) (0.0375) (0.0367)
Disabled -0.0974 -0.0367 -0.146 -0.0890
(0.130) (0.126) (0.192) (0.187)
Agriculture -0.0721 -0.0569 -0.206∗∗ -0.197∗∗
(0.0793) (0.0767) (0.0816) (0.0798)
Industry 0.0683∗∗∗ 0.0565∗∗∗ 0.0422∗∗ 0.0340∗
(0.0173) (0.0167) (0.0201) (0.0196)
Construction 0.0410 0.0346 0.0601∗∗ 0.0626∗∗
(0.0274) (0.0265) (0.0269) (0.0263)
Part-Time -0.408∗∗∗ -0.405∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗ -0.471∗∗∗
(0.0267) (0.0259) (0.0290) (0.0283)
Log Firm Workforce 0.00137 0.00268 0.0114∗∗∗ 0.00980∗∗
(0.00291) (0.00281) (0.00403) (0.00394)
Experience 0.108∗∗∗ 0.0645∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗ 0.0308
(0.0267) (0.0260) (0.0251) (0.0259)
Unemp. Rate 0.00854 0.00896 0.00205 0.00524
(0.00565) (0.00546) (0.00421) (0.00413)
Previous Wage 0.237∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.289∗∗∗ 0.290∗∗∗
(0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0162) (0.0158)
Prov FE N Y Y N Y Y
Quarter FE N Y Y N Y Y
Calendar Month FE N Y Y N Y Y
Pre- and Post Linear Age Slope N Y Y N Y Y
Transition from ST within Firm N N Y N N Y
Observations 3009 3009 3009 1983 1983 1983
Notes: The table displays the effects on wages of crossing the policy thresholds at 30
and 45. The sample is for the period when there was a gap in subsidies across these
ages (05/1999-03/2001 at 30 and 05/1997-06/2006 at 45). I select only men because
for them the subsidy gap is unambiguous. The specification is equation 1.22. The
estimation window is of 2.5 years on each side of the threshold. Robust standard
errors, clustered at the month of birth level, are shown in parentheses. * significant
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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1.6.2 Figures
















1985q1 1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1 2015q1
Time
25−29 years 30−34 years
40−44 years 45−49 years








16 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Age
Women Men
1997−2006. Bin width: 5 years
Unemployment Rate
(b)
Notes: The data is from “Encuesta de Poblacion Activa”. Figure (a) shows the unemployment rate over
time for the main groups of the empirical analysis. The green dashed lines represent the quarter in which
the payroll tax cuts were changed. The abrupt changes in the first quarter of 2001, that coincide with the
second main policy change are due to changes in the survey question regarding who is considered unemployed.
Figure (b) shows the unemployment rate by age and by gender.
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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year
16 30 Long Term Unemp. All Ages
Tax Credit over Time, 16 30 and Long Term Unemp.
2001 change:
1) Removal 16-30 credit
2) Same eligibility across 30
3) Same credit across 30
1997 change:
1) Introduction of two tax credits: 16-30 and LTU


















1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Year
Long Term Unemp. All Ages Long Term Unemp. 45 65
45 65
Tax Credit over Time, Long Term Unemp. and 45 65
1997 change:
1) Easier eligibility 45-65
2) Higher credit 45-65
1997 change:
1) Introduction credit LTU all ages
(b)
Notes: The graphs display the evolution of the payroll tax credits over time. Figure (a) shows the evolution
of the credit for workers under 30 years and for the long-term unemployed (regardless of age). Figure (b)
shows the evolution of the credit for workers older than 45 and also for the long-term unemployed (regardless
of age). Note that the credit for the long-term unemployed is the same on both pictures. I show it in both
pictures because it was the credit that could be claimed on the other side of the thresholds and was thus
directly affecting the control group.
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Figure 1.3: Example of Labor Contract
Sexta: Si se reúnen los requisitos establecidos en el artículo 28 de la Ley 55/99 y no se encuentran en alguna de las causas de
exclusión del apartado cinco del citado artículo, la empresa se bonificará en las cuotas empresariales a la Seguridad Social por
contingencias comunes (8):
a) Jóvenes desempleados inscritos en la Oficina de Empleo menores de 30 años: 20 por 100 durante el período de 24 meses
siguientes al inicio de la vigencia del contrato. Cuando las contrataciones se realicen con mujeres la bonificación será del 25 por
100.
b) Desempleados inscritos ininterrumpidamente en la Oficina de Empleo durante un período mínimo de 12 meses: 50 por 100
durante el primer año de vigencia del contrato; 45 por 100 durante el segundo año de vigencia del mismo. Cuando las
contrataciones se realicen con mujeres la bonificación será del 60 por 100 durante el primer año y del 55 por 100 durante el
segundo año.
c) Desempleados mayores de cuarenta y cinco años: 50 por 100 durante el primer año de vigencia del contrato; 45 por 100
durante el resto de la vigencia del mismo. Cuando las contrataciones se realicen con mujeres la bonificación será del 60 por 100
durante el primer año y el 55 por 100 durante el resto de la vigencia del contrato.
d) Mujeres subrepresentadas que no reúnan el requisito de permanecer inscritas ininterrumpidamente en la Oficina de Empleo por
un período mínimo de 12 meses y sean menores de cuarenta y cinco años, la bonificación será del 35 por 100 durante el primer
año de vigencia del contrato y del 30 por 100 durante el segundo año de vigencia del mismo.
e) Desempleados perceptores del subsidio por desempleo en favor de los trabajadores incluidos en el Régimen Especial Agrario
de la Seguridad Social que, a su vez, estén incluidos en alguno de los colectivos a que se refieren las letras a), b), c) o d): 90 por
100 durante el primer año de vigencia del contrato; 85 por 100 durante el segundo año de vigencia del mismo.
Séptima: Al presente contrato le será de aplicación la Disposición Adicional primera de la Ley 63/1997, de 26 de diciembre.
 SI NO 
En caso afirmativo :
- que reúnen los requisitos y no se encuentra en alguna de las causas de exclusión de la citada Disposición. Señale el colectivo al que
pertenece el trabajador:
Jóvenes desde 18 hasta 29 años Mayores de 45 años
Parados de larga duración Minusválidos
Octava: En lo no previsto en este contrato, se estará a la legislación vigente que resulte de aplicación, y en particular a lo dispues to en el
Estatuto de los Trabajadores, aprobado por Real Decreto Legislativo 1/1995, de 24 de marzo (B.O.E. de 29 de marzo), en su caso, a la
Ley 63/1997, de 26 de diciembre (B.O.E. de 30 de diciembre) y a la Ley 55/1999, de 29 de diciembre (B.O.E. de 30 de diciembre).
Asimismo le será de aplicación lo dispuesto en el Convenio Colectivo de ........................................................ .............................................
Novena: El presente contrato quedará registrado en la Oficina de Empleo .............................................................. .......................................
................................................................................................................................ ........................................................................
Décima: Ambas partes se comprometen a comunicar el fin de la relación laboral al INEM cuando éste se produzca, de conformidad con
lo establecido en el artículo 42.3 de la Ley 51 /1980, de 8 de Octubre, Básica de Empleo.
 CLÁUSULAS ADICIONALES
Y para que conste, se extiende este contrato por triplicado ejemplar en el lugar y fecha a continuación indicados, firmando las partes
interesadas.
En ......................................................................................... a ................................. ....... de ................................................, del 20............
El/la trabajador/a El/la representante El/la representante legal
de la empresa del/de la menor, si procede
 
(4) Habrá de respetarse, en todo caso, lo dispuesto en el art. 14.1 del Texto Refundido de la Ley de Estatuto de los trabajadores, aprobado por R.D. Legislativo 1/1995, de 2 4 de
marzo (B.O.E. de 29 de marzo)
(5) Diarias, semanales, mensuales.
(6) Salario base, complementos salariales, pluses.
(7) Mínimo: 30 días naturales
(8) Ponga una X en la casilla que corresponda
Notes: The figure shows the back page of a labor contract in Spain after the reform in May 1997.
The 6th clause (sexta) has to be filled if the employer hires a worker who falls in one of the categories of
subsidized employment. The 7th clause refers to the availability of lower severance payments in case of
wrongful dismissal. The 8th clause says that the contract will be under the prevailing Spanish labor law,
the 9th clause refers to the employment office where the contract is registered, and the 10th clause bounds
each part to declare the end of the job relationship to the employment office when it happens. The lower
part of the contract is where the employer and employee have to sign.
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(d) Right-to-Manage Union Model
Notes: Figures (a)-(c) shows representations of a competitive labor market under different assumptions
regarding the elasticity of demand and supply. Figure (d) depicts a unionized labor market with different
degrees of union power: 0 ≤ β ≤ 1, where β = 0 is a situation without union power and β = 1 is situation
in which unions have all bargaining power. In each figure I show the impacts of a shift outwards in demand.
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Mean Length of Permanent Contracts
(f)
Notes: Figure (a) shows the employment rate by age. Bin width is one month. The solid black line
representes the maximum employment rate of 100%. The dashed vertical lines show the distance to the
100% rate for several ages. Figure (b) shows the unemployment rate by age. Bin width is 5 years. Figures
(c) and (d) show the ratio of permanent and short-term workers with respect to the number of employed
workers for each month-age bin, respectively. Bin width is one month. Figure (e) shows the starting wage in
permanent contracts by age at hired. Figure (f) shows the mean contract duration of permanent contracts by
age. The period in figures (a)-(d) corresponds to the year before the first policy change (05/1996-04/1997).
For figures (e) and (f) the period corresponds to the time on which I focus my analysis (05/1997-06/2006).
Data for figures (a), (c)-(f) is from MCVL, and for figure (b) is EPA.
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Time: 01/1992−05/1997, Bin Width: 3 months
Short−Term Hiring
(d)
Notes: The figures on the left show the raw hiring data around the threshold at 45 years for two types of
contracts: all permanent (including subsidized and not subsidized) and short-term, for the period when the
policy was in place (1997-2006). Similarly, figures on the right show hiring around the discontinuity for the
period 1992-1997 when the prime-age credit only applied for long-term unemployed workers. The bin width
is three months.
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35 40 45 50 55
Age at Hired
Mean Contract Length Lower CI/Upper CI
1997−2006, Short−Term Contracts that Transition to PTC
Binwidth=3 months. Same Employer.
Mean Contract Length
(f)
Notes: Figures (a)-(e) show the stocks of workers in permanent, short-term, non-employment, and public
jobs, around the age of 45. Figure (f) shows the mean contract length in termporary contracts before being
converted to permanent within the same firm. The red dashed line corresponds to the policy threshold.
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Figure 1.8: Difference-in-Difference Results for the Impact of the Expansion of Payroll
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Treatment: 25−30, Control:30−35
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Treatment: 25−30, Control:30−35




































 Diff−in−Diff Coefficient lci
uci
Treatment: 25−30, Control:30−35
Impact of Payroll Tax Cut on Employment
(e)
Notes: The graphs display coefficients (blue solid line) from regressing dummies indicating whether a worker
was hired as permanent worker (a), transitioned from temporary to permanent within the same firm (b), was
permanently employed (c), was permanently or temporarily employed (d) or employed in any contract (e)
on time period dummies interacted with a treatment indicator (25-30 years old). Thus, the coefficients are
difference-in-difference estimates in each time period. The omitted period is the quarter before the policy
change. The specification is equation 1.3 and it includes time-period dummies, age dummies, and controls
sex, education, experience, firm size, sector, citizenship, part-time job, and workers’ disability. The red
dashed represents the quarter when the policy was expanded, and the blue dashed line are upper and lower
confidence intervals at the 95% level.
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Time: 04/2001−02/2005, Bin Width: 3 months
Short−Term Hiring
(d)
Notes: The figures on the left show the raw hiring data around the threshold at 30 years for two types of
contracts: all permanent (including subsidized and not subsidized) and short-term, for the period when the
policy was in place (1997-2001). Similarly, figures on the right show hiring around the discontinuity for the
period 2001-2005 when the credit for young workers was not in place. The bin width is three months.
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Notes: The figures show the fraction of individuals who are either permanent or short-term workers around
their 30th birthday. The red dashed line represents the month of their 30th birthday. Figures on the left
are for cohorts that could be hired with a subsidy during the 2 years prior to their 30th birthday (born
between 05/1968-03/1971). Figures on the right are for cohorts that could not be hired with a subsidy
during the two years prior to their 30th birthday (born between 03/1973-03/1976) and serve as a placebo
test. The orange line is a local linear smooth of the fraction of workers on the month distance before their
30th birthday. Similarly, the yellow line is a local linear smooth of the fraction of workers on the months
that have passed since their 30th birthday. For cohorts that could be hired as permanent workers with an
employment credit, the slope after 30 is significantly less positive than the slope before 30. In the case of
short-term workers, the slope after 30 is less negative. This indicates that part of the effect of the policy in
the long-run is shifting between types of contracts. None of the slopes after 30 for the placebo groups are
significantly different from the pre-30 slope.
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Notes: The figures show the fraction of individuals who are either working in any type of contract (permanent,
short-term, self-employed, public worker), or are receiving UI, around their 30th birthday. The red dashed
line represents the month of their 30th birthday. Figures on the left are for cohorts that could be hired with
a subsidy during the 2 years prior to their 30th birthday (born between 05/1968-03/1971). Figures on the
right are for cohorts that could not be hired with a subsidy during the two years prior to their 30th birthday
(born between 03/1973-03/1976) and serve as a placebo test. The orange line is a local linear smooth of
the fraction of workers on the month distance before their 30th birthday. Similarly, the yellow line is a
local linear smooth of the fraction of workers on the months that have passed since their 30th birthday. For
cohorts that could be hired as permanent workers with a wage subsidy, the slope of working in any contract
after 30 is significantly more negative than the slope before 30. In the case of UI recipients, the slope after
30 is more positive. None of the slopes after 30 for the placebo groups are significantly different from the
pre-30 slope. Thus, the wage subsidy increases overall employment of young workers even years the policy
was enacted.
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Notes: The figures show three potential scenarios of how the employment credit might affect the age distri-
bution of hiring. The upper figure shows the case when there is no discontinuity. The middle figure depicts
a situation when the employment credit generates both job creation and job destruction on each side of the
threshol. Finally, the lower figure displays the case when the employment credit only stimulates job creation.
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March 2001 Policy Change












































 Diff−in−Diff Coefficient Lower CI/Upper CI
March 2001 Policy Change
Age Incidence Impact of Payroll Tax Cut on Quits
(d)
Notes: figure (a) display the raw data on hires at each age. If there were displacement effects, we would
expect that the distribution of hiring in 2001 changes as in figure 1.12b. However, what we see is that
the convergence occurs as in figure 1.12c, consistent with no displacement occurring. Figure (b) shows the
difference-in-difference estimates for each age bin of the policy change in 2001. The specification is equation
1.4. I show the coefficients of the interaction Pre x Age, where Pre is the period 03/2000-03/2001. The bins
are 3 months wide. The omitted group are workers 20 years old or less. The x-axis is the age when hired.
If there are displacement effects affecting primarily workers over 30, we expect to see significant effects of
opposite sign on each side of the 30 year old threshold (depicted with a red dashed line). As can be seen,
there is no negative effect on hiring above 30, but there is a positive effect below 30. Similarly, figures (c) and
(d) repeat the same strategy for lay-offs and quits, respectively. As can be seen, the effects in the treatment
(25-30) and control (30-35) groups are not significantly different.
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Figure 1.14: Missing Hiring in the Proximity of the Thresholds
























Counterfactual Based on Ages 31.5−40 (Order = 1)
Permanent Hiring with Counterfactual
(a)
























Counterfactual Based on Ages 35−43.5 (Order = 1)
Permanent Hiring with Counterfactual
(b)
Notes: The figures show the raw hiring data (blue dots) and a counterfactual (red solid line) of what hiring
would have looked like in the proximity of the threshold, if the threshold had been moved further to the left
(upper figure) or to the right (lower figure). The black dashed lines contain the data points used to construct
the counterfactual. The green dashed lines show the area for which I measure missing hiring (hole). The
red dashed line represents the location of the policy discontinuity. h is the measure of missing hiring. The
standard error is between parentheses.
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 Diff−in−Diff Coefficient lci
uci
Treatment: 25−30, Control:30−35
Impact of Payroll Tax Cut on Non−Subsidized Employment
(f)
Notes: The figures show the effect on transitions to permanent subsidized (left) and non-subsidized (right)
of the policy changes in 1997 (top and middle figure) and 2001 (bottom figure). The solid blue line are
the coefficients from regressing dummies indicating subsidized permanent employment (left figures) or non-
subsidized permanent employment (right figures) on time period dummies interacted with a treatment
indicator. Thus, the coefficients are difference-in-difference estimates in each time period. The omitted
period is the quarter before the policy change for (upper and middle) or the quarter when the policy was
changed (lower figure). The specification is equation 1.3 and it includes time-period dummies, age dummies,
and controls sex, education, previous wage, experience, firm size, sector, citizenship, part-time job, and
workers’ disability. The red dashed represents the quarter when the policy was expanded, and the blue
dashed line are upper and lower confidence intervals at the 95% level.
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1997−2001, Permanent and Short−Term Contracts



















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 3.0000
1997−2001, Permanent Contracts



















kernel = epanechnikov, bandwidth = 3.0000
1997−2001, Permanent Tax Cut Contracts
Daily Wage Densities, First Month
(e)
Notes: The figures display wage densities for different types of contracts and ages. Figure (a) shows it for
permanent subsidized and non-subsidized young workers. Figure (b) shows it for permanent subsidized and
non-subsidized prime-age workers. Figure (c) shows wage densities both for young and prime-age workers,
pooling together permanent and temporary workers. Figure (d) shows it for permanent young workers and
prime-age workers. Figure (e) shows it for permanent subsidized young workers and prime-age workers.
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Wage Upper CI/Lower CI
Time: 05/1999−03/2001, Bin Width: 3 months
























Wage Upper CI/Lower CI
Time: 05/1997−06/2006, Bin Width: 3 months
Starting Mean Wage of Perm. Contract with Tax Cut
(b)
Notes: The figure on the left shows the mean daily real starting wage around the threshold at 30 years for
permanent contracts with tax cut. Similarly, the figure on the right shows it around the discontinuity at
45. The bin width is three months. The figures correspond to the periods when the policy was in place
as a reduction in the tax rate: 1997-2001 (young workers) and 1997-2006 (prime-age workers). The red
dashed line indicates the location of the threshold. The only visually apparent change in mean wages is in
permanent contracts with a tax cut at 45 years old. After the threshold, mean wages are consistently higher
than before the discontinuity.
1.6.3 Derivations
This section details the derivations of tax incidence formulas. Start from the equilib-
rium condition:
Ld(w(1 + t)) = Ls(w) (1.23)
where Ld is labor demand, w is the net wage, t is the employer’s payroll tax rate, and
Ls(w) is labor supply.
(1) To obtain equation 1.14:
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Suppose t = 0 and the tax rate is changed. Differentiating:
Ld
′
















































































Non-Discriminatory Electoral Rules, Local Public Goods,
and Redistribution: Evidence from US Municipalities
Abstract
The Voting Right Act guaranteed the right to vote for minorities, including the prohibition
of any electoral discriminatory practices on the basis of race. This triggered a series of
court decisions outlawing discriminatory electoral rules between 1970 and 1990. I study the
effects of several court orders that guarantee minority representation on city public budgets,
and find that both local public good expenditures (5-7.5%) and city tax collection (5-10%)
increased, after the changes towards non-discriminatory electoral rules. I also explore the
distributional consequences of non-discriminatory elections and find that the fraction of black
public workers and citizens increased after changes in the election system, while those of whites
decreased. The growth rates of black house values and rents also increase more. The findings
are inconsistent with a negative effect of ethnic heterogeneity in the city council on public
goods, and with common-pool theories. I show evidence that the most plausible channel that
explains the results is the new legislative bargaining power that black communities gained.
I thank Chris Boone, Varanya Chaubey, Ethan Kaplan, Wojciech Kopczuk, Bentley MacLeod,
Suresh Naidu, Petra Persson, Raúl Sánchez de la Sierra, Ebonya Washington, and seminar par-
ticipants at Columbia University, the American Law and Economics 2014 Meetings at Chicago
University, and at the 2012 Alexander Hamilton Graduate Student Conference for Political Econ-
omy at NYU for helpful comments. I also want to thank Kathleen Dreyer for help accessing data,
and Nathan B. Anderson for sharing his data on property tax limits. All resulting mistakes are my
own. fe2139@columbia.edu
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“Whites put fire hydrants mainly in their neighborhoods and few in the black areas...
and small water lines to black hydrants made them useless.” -Black town councilman,
Gretna, Florida. (Button (1989), p. 114).
2.1 Introduction
When blacks and whites prefer different candidates at the polls, electoral districts can
be drawn such that whites obtain all representatives, ensuring that minorities can
never elect a candidate of their choice. In 1973, the US Supreme Court considered
that such election methods could be proven to be unlawful if members of a group
“had less opportunity to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators
of their choice.”2 This ruling triggered the development of a national jurisprudence
that, on a gradual basis, further clarified and reduced the burden of proof necessary
to outlaw discriminatory electoral methods (Davidson and Grofman, 1994; Gerken,
2001).3 In this paper I exploit the court-orders that externally enforced changes
towards non-discriminatory election rules to look for the effects on local public goods,
taxation, housing values and rents, public workers, and sorting, of the prohibition of
discriminatory elections.
The sample is a panel of cities that were externally required to change their
electoral rule and cities that were not. I focus on a specific type of discriminatory
electoral rule, at-large elections, and the solution engineered by the courts to it: single-
districts. In an at-large system, city elections are organized with only one electoral
district, the city, and through plurality rule. There are several candidates that run
for election. Crucially, citizens can cast as many votes as seats are to be filled. When
voting is polarized across ethnic groups, at-large elections do not give representation
to minorities because they are outnumbered by the majority. In contrast, in single-
district elections, the city is partitioned into several electoral districts. In general,
one candidate is elected from each district in a plurality vote. Minorities are packed
2See White v. Regester, 412 US 755 (1973).
3See Kousser (1984) for a list of discriminatory electoral methods, known in the literature as
vote-dilution techniques. He also discusses how these mechanisms work, and provides a history of
their origins, which dates back to the first Reconstruction and post-Reconstruction periods.
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in a number of districts proportional to their population share. Thus, single-districts
guarantee that minorities can effectively elect a candidate of their choice.
The findings can be summarized as follows: first, local public goods and tax
collection increase after single-districts are enacted; second, there is no effect on in-
tergovernmental transfers; third, cities that have to change to single-district elections
increase the fraction of black public workers and experience gains in black population
after the change. These effects are matched by similar decreases in white and other
ethnicities public workers and citizens; fourth, the growth rate of black house values
and rents increases more than that of whites. The latter effect could be driven both by
capitalization of the higher public spending and by an increase in demand of housing
by blacks.4 Fifth, I do not find crime reductions after the changes in electoral rule,
but some evidence of increases in the number of black homicides; fifth, the changes
in the city budget happen in general for all cities no matter their level of previous
discrimination, the effects being weakly stronger for cities where discrimination had
been more important in the past. Overall, this set of results shows that electoral
rules that give more proportional representation to minorities matter for the level of
public goods and for its potential distribution across communities, as well as for the
distribution of public jobs across ethnic groups. In addition, even cities with a former
strong support for segregation change their public budgets. Last but not least, the
common law system, in which both courts and legislative bodies create law, is crucial
to protect the voting rights of minorities.
Identification in this paper exploits three main advantages offered by the quasi-
experiment and the data : exogenous changes, abundant variation, and a panel
dataset. Firstly, during the 1970s and 1980s many cities, specially in the South
of the US, were forced by courts to change towards single-districts electoral rules.5
4Municipal services affect the quality of life of a community and, consequently, are capitalized
into home values (Oates, 1969; Bradbury et al., 2001). Brueckner and Joo (1991) argue that the effect
of public spending on the voter’s wealth must enter in his decision calculus along with consumption
and cost considerations. They show that the voter’s ideal level of spending is a mixture of their
preferences and those of an eventual buyer of their house. Moreover, the house is the main asset for
most families (Tracy et al., 1999) and renters seem not to oppose to increases in local public goods
(Oates, 2005).
5 I focus on cities that were forced to change to single-district elections due to a court-order or
that had some sort of external pressure to do so, such as a lawsuit. The development of an anti-vote
dilution jurisprudence implied that all cities with a sizable minority and with at-large elections were
pressured to change. Specially after being sued, since they did not have the resources to defend
themselves in court.
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This provides a unique quasi-experiment to test for the effects of electoral rules in
ethnically divided societies. The electoral reforms were related to the development of
a nationwide jurisprudence that is exogenous to local conditions that could bias the
estimates, and to any changes at the local level that could drive both the changes in
electoral rules and in policy.6 The solution proposed by the courts was to engineer
single districts in which black minorities were packed to allow them to elect their own
representatives.7
Secondly, by focusing on cities I can exploit many electoral reforms, which in gen-
eral are a rare event (Katz and Rosen, 1987). The literature studying the effects of
electoral rules has mainly focused on cross-sectional or panel datasets of countries
(Persson and Tabellini, 2003; Albalate et al., 2012) to show the correlations between
electoral rules and fiscal policy. Thus, the context of the US South offers very inter-
esting variation not only because of its exogeneity, but also because of the abundant
changes that happened.
Finally, the longitudinal nature of the cities’ public finance data allows me to run
a fixed-effects specification. Identification relies on a parallel trends assumption. I
provide graphical evidence of no pre-treatment trends by including leads and lags
in a dynamic specification. The evidence supports the identification assumption of
parallel trends, allowing me to interpret the estimates as the causal effect on the city
budget of outlawing at-large elections.
The results can be used to discriminate between alternative theoretical mecha-
nisms of the effects of electoral rules on local public goods and the distribution of
resources. First, there is a literature that argues that ethnic heterogeneity has nega-
tive effects on public goods (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005; Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly
and Levine, 1997). With single-district elections, the local councils become more
ethnically diverse.8 If that channel is operating in the local parliament, local public
goods and taxation should decrease once at-large elections are outlawed. Since they
6Trebbi et al. (2008) also focus on electoral reforms in US cities but they drop municipalities that
were court-ordered to change because their interest was on endogenous institutions. In contrast, the
sample in this paper is comprised of cities that were forced externally to change their electoral rule,
and of those that did not change it.
7Single-districts served as geographic political reservations to guarantee representation for a
historically disadvantaged community in the US. See Duflo (2005) for a review of the literature on
political reservations in India.
8There is a large body of evidence documenting that single-districts increase black representation:
Davidson and Grofman (1994); Trebbi et al. (2008); Valelly (2004).
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actually increase, ethnic heterogeneity in the city council does not have a negative
effect on public goods and taxes. The results are of interest because very little is
known about how the documented negative effects of ethnic diversity might be medi-
ated by the institutions that determine fiscal policy, and how changes in their design
might alleviate the problem.9 This is of special importance since minorities tend to
be underrepresented or even excluded (Lijphart, 1986) in these institutions.10 The
results suggest that the underprovision of public goods is partially caused by the lack
of representation that minorities suffer, and that the underprovision disproportionally
affects the members of the minority group. Moreover, the underprovision can be made
less severe if the electoral game is designed to guarantee minority representation.
A second potential channel is related to the literature on how representatives of
geographic constituencies choose the amount of local public goods to provide. Wein-
gast et al. (1981) show theoretically that when a political constituency is divided into
districts, spending is higher. Moreover, they predict that the level of spending will be
higher the more districts there are. Thus, a move from at-large elections (1 district)
to single-district elections (several districts) should increase public expenditures. In
addition, the more districts are created, the more spending and taxation should in-
crease. I test for the latter prediction using the number of districts created and I do
not find significant differences when more districts are created. Moreover, note that
this mechanism applies for all ethnicities: the fact that only black public workers and
black population increase, and that changes in growth rates for black house values
and rents are larger, provides further evidence to discard this channel.
The third theoretical channel to explain the empirical results is drawn from leg-
islative bargaining models (Baron and Ferejohn, 1989; Persson and Tabellini, 2000).
A central result in this literature is that minimum winning coalitions consist of the
agenda-setter and those legislators whose support is the easiest to obtain. Black
representatives are likely to have a weak bargaining position in the council because
they will be a minority, and because it will be their first time in office. Legislative
bargaining models show that even minority groups can negotiate and get benefits for
their districts. There is also support for this mechanism from historical sources doc-
9Alesina and Ferrara (2005) survey the literature.
10 Sample comprises all cities with at least 2.5% black people or at most 40% black citizens,
which are the ones where the minority is big enough to benefit from the changes in institutions that
I study. Thus, all these cities have a certain degree of fractionalization. The results are robust to
changing the lower threshold to 5% and to moving the higher threshold up to 50%.
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umenting the emergence of black pragmatic leaders ready to close deals with white
politicians (Lawson, 1985). Thus, aggregate public good spending should increase as
long as that does not happen at the expense of public goods in white districts. In
that case, there should also be an increase in taxes and an increase in local public
goods targeted at black communities. Moreover, black concilmen should also be able
to improve black job finding in the public sector. The results exploring who benefits
from changes in electoral rules give support to this mechanism: there are more black
public workers and black citizens after a change to single-districts representation. In
addition, increases in growth rates of black house values and rents are higher than
those for whites.11
This paper brings together two literatures. On one hand, the impact of voting
rights statutory law on economic outcomes has been documented in the literature
(Husted and Kenny, 1997; Cascio and Washington, Forthcoming; Naidu, 2012). On
the other hand, there is evidence of how court decisions affect economic outcomes:
Miles (2000) for effects on employment outcomes, Currie and MacLeod (2008) and
Avraham et al. (2010) for impacts of tort reforms on health care. This paper bridges
these literatures by showing how the court system affects economic outcomes through
minority voting rights protection. The main contribution of this paper is to show the
effects of a sequence of court cases, that considered that minority voters “should
enjoy an equal opportunity to coalesce effectively despite the mandate of majority
rule,” on local public goods, taxation, house values and rents, public workers, and
population sorting. The results highlight the importance of the common law system,
in which both courts and legislative bodies create the law, to protect the voting rights
of minority voters.
The second contribution of this paper is that it sheds light on why some federal
policies to end segregation might have partially failed.12 For instance, Cascio et al.
(2013) study the effects of federal grants and federally mandated desegregation in
schools, and find that black dropout was not reduced, while white dropout was.
The authors consider that a potential explanation for their result is the leeway that
local institutions have to allocate the money to schools attended by whites. At-large
11The effects on house values and rents could be driven both by capitalization of the new pub-
lic expenditures, and by an increase in demand of houses by blacks given the increase in black
population.
12See Almond et al. (Forthcoming) for a study of the positive effects on black infant survival after
hospital desegregation.
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elections were also in place in school district boards (Kousser, 1999; NCVR, 2006),
and could have been used to divert the money to only white schools, as the results
for city budgets suggest.
Finally, I also show evidence that politics matters at the local level (Tiebout, 1956;
Epple and Zelenitz, 1981; Epple and Romer, 1991). The presence of changes in policy
could be partly due to the fact that a change in electoral rule modifies completely
electoral competition and, consequently, legislative bargaining in the council. More-
over, the anti-vote dilution jurisprudence implied that all cities were subject to these
changes, probably limiting Tiebout sorting. Thus, the change towards single-districts
is likely to have more important policy effects that changes in mayor’s partisanship
or gender.13
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I explain the details of at-large and
single-district elections and review the history of voting rights in the US. In section 3
I provide a theoretical interpretation of the results. Section 4 describes the data that
was used. Section 5 explains the empirical strategy and shows the results. Finally, in
section 6 I conclude.
2.2 Electoral Rules Background
In this section I provide two types of background information relevant for the analysis.
First of all, I will describe the electoral rule used to hamper minority representation,
at-large elections, and its origins; as well as the solution engineered to give political
representation to black communities, single-districts. Secondly, I explain the history
of the prohibition of at-large elections by courts, and argue that the court orders pro-
vide exogenous variation that allows for identification of the effects of single-districts
on economic outcomes.
13Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) and Ferreira and Gyourko (Forthcoming) show that there are no
effects of mayor’s partisanship and gender respectively. Gerber and Hopkins (2011) show partisan-
ship effects for the categories of spending over which the city has budget authority. See Glaeser
(2013) for a recent review.
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2.2.1 At-large Elections vs. Single-Districts
At-large elections make it impossible for minorities to be represented when voting
behavior is polarized across communities.14 In this electoral system, the municipality
is a single constituency, and all aldermen are elected from the same district (the city)
through plurality rule. Crucially, all people who live within the city borders can cast
as many votes as seats are in the city legislature. This allows white communities
to cast all votes for white candidates and fill all the positions in the city council,
making it impossible for minorities to be represented.15 Figure 2.1a and 2.1b gives
an example for the City of Florence, in Alabama.
At-large elections have their origins in the first Reconstruction and post- Recon-
struction era (Kousser, 1984). Their objective was to minimize the threat of black
political power efficaciously but quietly, so that there was no federal government in-
tervention to protect black voters. Not denying the franchise, this election method
was aimed at hampering minority representation.16 After the passage of the VRA,
at-large elections started to be enacted again with the same purposes as in the XIXth
Century. Trebbi et al. (2008) show empirical evidence of how between 1960 and 1967
cities in the South of the US where black people constituted a minority of the pop-
ulation were adopting at-large elections.17 The court-orders that I exploit created
single-districts in those places that enacted at-large elections in both the XIXth and
XXth century to avoid black representation.
Single-districts enhance a more proportional representation of minorities and were
the alternative election method proposed by courts after the outlaw of at-large elec-
tions in certain cities. This electoral structure divides the city in different districts,
14Voting behavior in the South of the US was polarized during the decades after the approval
of the VRA, and in many cases is still polarized. Black people vote for black candidates and white
people vote for white candidates. For more information see NCVR (2006), p. 90.
15See Amy (1993) for a more detailed explanation of both at-large elections and single-district
elections.
16At-large elections were not the only method used to prevent minority representation. These
techniques are known as vote-dilution mechanisms in the history and political science literatures.
Kousser (1984) identifies sixteen different devices for vote dilution. See Kousser (1984) and Davidson
(1994), p. 22-24, for more details on how these other mechanisms work.
17For example, Mississippi’s legislature started in 1966 a Massive Resistance Legislation (Parker,
1990) aimed at setting new hurdles for black officeholding after the passage of the VRA.
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each of them electing one representative by majority rule. The candidate most voted
in her district will win a seat in the council. Citizens can only cast one vote. Due to
the segregation of racial minorities, this type of electoral rule enhances minority rep-
resentation.18 In fact, the districts created for black communities can be understood
as geographic political reservations for black candidates because they were designed
to contain enough black population so that they would be able to elect black rep-
resentatives. The widespread use of single-districts in the second half of the XXth
Century was possible thanks to the VRA and several court-orders that I explain in
the next subsection (Davidson and Grofman, 1994).
Finally, mixed-systems combine features of both at-large and single-district elec-
tions. Some candidates will run for the city-constituency (at-large) and some will run
for one of the districts partitioning the municipality (single-district). For instance,
in a city with seven aldermen, four might be elected through at-large elections and
three might be elected through single-district elections.
2.2.2 The Creation of Single-Districts
Single-districts were created in many US cities thanks to the VRA and several court-
orders that simplified the judicial process necessary to outlaw at-large elections and
implement single-districts. In this section I will detail the history behind the sources
of variation I exploit, and argue and show evidence that a fixed-effects specification
will be able to capture the causal effects of single-districts on spending and taxation.
The legal starting point to ban at-large elections is section 2 of the VRA, which
prohibits practices that discriminate on the basis of race.19 Its initial interpretation
made that the first lawsuits had to prove that at-large elections had a discriminatory
intent. This supposed a burdensome requirement that made it very difficult to win a
case. However, the burden of proof required was about to be simplified significantly by
some court-orders that influenced the following lawsuits and changes in electoral rules.
18See Cutler et al. (1999) for an explanation of the dynamics of the ghetto in US. According to
them, in 1970 the average urban black lived in a neighborhood that was 68% black. In 1990 it was
the case for 56% urban black (p. 456)
19The exact wording is: “No voting qualifications or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color.”
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In a nutshell, these lawsuits listed several factors that were enough to prove indirectly
that the election system had a discriminatory intent. With the adoption of an easier
to proof results-based test, plaintiffs had to prove a history of discrimination in the
specific jurisdiction and the discriminatory consequences of the dilutive procedures.
The first cases to simplify the proof requirements to be brought to court were
White v. Regester (1973) and Zimmer v. McKeithen (1973).20 They are the first
two landmark cases for the creation of a national anti-vote dilution jurisprudence.
As can be seen in figure 2.2, before 1973 there are barely changes in electoral rules,
whereas the number of changes peaks for first time after these court-orders. Despite
these first advances, the White-Zimmer framework was demolished when the Supreme
Court (Mobile v. Bolden, 1980) asserted that “the XVth Amendment does not entail
the right to have Negro candidates elected”.21 Figure 2.2 shows how after 1980 the
number of changes decreases until being zero in 1982. However, in 1982 the VRA had
to be renewed by the US Congress and Senate, and knowing the difficulties that Mo-
bile v. Bolden imposed for plaintiffs seeking to dismantle vote-dilutive devices, section
2 was amended to incorporate the White-Zimmer framework. In addition, the Senate
Judiciary Committee wrote a report listing several factors that courts could use to
decide whether a particular device had a discriminatory effect prohibited by section
2.22 The Senate factors became very influential for the courts interpretation of the
VRA and reduced the uncertainty about the burden of proof that was necessary to
show by plaintiffs to win a case. After the amendment of the VRA the number of
changes from at-large elections to single-district systems peaks again. Finally, Thorn-
burg v. Gingles (1986) simplified even further the anti-vote dilution jurisprudence.
We can see in figure 2.2 how the changes in electoral rules peak again after 1986.23
Thus, the development of a national anti-vote dilution jurisprudence originated
the changes towards single-districts. New election methods were not enacted because
20See White v. Regester, 412 US 755 (1973) and Zimmer v. McKeithen, 485 F.2d 1297 (5th Cir.
1973).
21See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
22The factors are: a history of official discrimination, the presence of vote polarization across racial
lines, the usage of potentially discriminatory voting practices, the denial to minorities to participate
in the candidate slating process, the presence of discrimination in education, employment and health;
a history of racial appeals in political campaigns, and the extent to which members of a minority
have been elected to public office in the jurisdiction.
23See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
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of voluntary agreement between the ethnicities of each city, but because of external
forces. This provides a compelling justification for a difference-in-differences strategy
because it is unlikely that the changes in electoral rules happen after significant
changes in local economic and political conditions that would violate the parallel
trends assumption . In order to further test for the identifying assumption, in section
2.5 I run dynamic specifications including leads and lags. None of the leads are
significantly different from zero, and there is no evidence of any pre-treatment trend.
These results provide evidence of the validity of the empirical strategy and allow
to interpret the effects of changes to single-districts on expenditures and taxation as
causal.24 Moreover, the differential timing of the changes provides evidence ruling out
the possibility that another common shock to the treated municipalities is driving the
results.
Another relevant question is what are the reasons behind the differential timing
of changes. It would be worrisome for the identification strategy if the time of adop-
tion of single-districts was correlated with city characteristics. I run a test for joint
significance of the year of change with several city variables and I do not find any
evidence pointing to a relationship between the year in which a change happens and
some city characteristics. For only two of the variables the test of joint significance
is significant at the 5% level. Results are summarized in figure 2.3. 25
Finally, what guaranteed that after a change to single-districts the cities did not
adopt other methods to hamper black representation? This was achieved by Section
5 of the VRA, which requires that any election system change in certain covered
jurisdictions has to be submitted to the Department of Justice for preclearance.26
Submitting jurisdictions have to show that the modifications do not have a racial
discriminatory purpose or effect. Thus, section 5 was essential to limit the extension
of new dilutive practices.27 Thus, the combination of section 2 and 5 of the VRA
24See Acemoglu (2005) for a critique of empirical political economy research dealing with the
identification problem using selection on observables and exclusion restriction methods.
25The specification for the test of joint significance is: yi = α+
∑1990
j=1970 βjChangeji + εi.
26The covered jurisdictions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and
South Carolina were fully covered by section 5. Texas and Virginia were also covered with the
exception of some counties. There are also scattered counties and townships covered.
27In Allen v. State Board of Elections (1969), the Supreme Court gave a broad interpretation to
the coverage of section 5, meaning that even minor changes or those affecting voting indirectly had
to be submitted for preclearance.
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with several court-orders allowed a stable shift in minority representation.28
The implementation of single-districts increased black representation (Davidson
and Grofman, 1994; Trebbi et al., 2008; Welch, 1990).29 Figure 2.4 shows the differ-
ence between the percentage of black voting-age people and the proportion of black
local representatives. As can be seen, there are gains in local representation. The
most important ones happen in Alabama, Mississippi, Lousiana, Georgia and South
Carolina.
To sum up, the creation of single-districts in the US during the 1970s and 1980s
was related to the development of a national anti-vote dilution jurisprudence. The
exogeneity of the changes and the lack of pre-treatment trends (proved in section
2.5) give reassurance that a fixed-effects specification will capture the causal effect of
electoral rules on local public good spending and taxation.
2.3 Theoretical Interpretation
There are three channels that predict different effects on local public good expen-
ditures and taxes. In this section, I explain each of them, as well as the different
repercussions that they have for the distribution of spending across ethnic commu-
nities. Each model provides implications that I test in the empirical section to give
evidence of the mechanism driving the results.
The first potential mechanism is related to the link between ethnic heterogeneity
and public good provision. A negative effect of ethnic diversity on public good provi-
sion has been documented in the literature (Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly and Levine,
1997; Miguel and Gugerty, 2005). Alesina et al. (1999) argue that representatives of
ethnic groups value only the benefits of local public goods that are concentrated in
their community and discount the benefits that accrue to other groups. This leads to
underprovision of local public goods since not all their positive effects are taken into
28This is an important feature of the changes to single-districts given the degree of institutional
persistence in the South of the US. See Acemoglu and Robinson (2006, 2008).
29This is a well-known result in the literature and that is why I do not focus on it. Instead, I
explore the budgetary and distributional consequences of changes in electoral rules.
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account, and the population prefers to pay less taxes and devote these resources to
private goods rather than public goods.
The question of interest for us is whether this channel applies after a change
to single-districts. Since at-large elections exclude the minority and single-districts
guarantee its representation, the local parliament will become more diverse racially.
In addition, electoral competition will be organized through ethnic representatives
and ethnic constituencies, emphasizing the fact that representatives only value the
benefits they provide to their community. Then, following Alesina et al. (1999) we
expect to see that the level of public spending and taxes goes down.
A critical assumption in Alesina et al. (1999) is that politicians discount the ben-
efits that public goods provide to other constituencies. However, this might not
necessarily be the case. The second channel is developed by Weingast et al. (1981),
who model how representatives of geographic constituencies decide over the amount
of local public goods to provide. They show that when the political constituency
is divided into districts, the level of spending is higher. This happens because the
electoral districts create a divergence between the political benefits and costs of each
local public good when taxes are the same across districts. Thus, a change from
at-large (1 district) to single-districts (several districts) should increase public expen-
ditures. Moreover, Weingast et al. (1981) also predict that the level of spending will
be higher the more districts there are.30 Consequently, if that is the mechanism, the
increases in spending should be higher the more districts the city has. Note that the
mechanism applies no matter who gains representation and its ethnicity. Thus, we
should expect that the increases in local public goods happen in all districts and that
it is capitalized into both white- and black-owned house, and in the rents both groups
pay. In addition, changes in public workers and population should be of similar size
for both communities.
A last channel is based on models of legislative bargaining, such as Baron and
Ferejohn (1989)31, that predict that minimum winning coalitions emerge among the
agenda-setter and those legislators whose support is the easiest to obtain. Since blacks
will get representation for first time after a change towards single-districts, and they
will only hold a minority of the seats, they are likely to hold a weak bargaining position
30See Baqir (2002) for empirical evidence supporting this result based on a cross-section of US
cities in 1992.
31See also Persson and Tabellini (2000)) for a review.
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in the council. However, precisely because of that weak position, they can manage
to be part of the minimum winning coalition.32 Thus, the weak representation power
gained by black minorities allows them to influence the level of provision of public
goods and its distribution. Self-interested white politicians had a new companion
that, given the low levels of investment in his neighborhood, was easier to please
and to obtain his support for other policies. That is in stark contrast with at-large
elections, when black communities had no representatives in the council and thus had
no role in budget bargaining within the council. Consequently, if blacks manage to
increase spending in their districts, and that does not happen at the expense of white
districts, the level of provision should increase and its distribution should be more
favorable to black communities. In that case, we should expect that capitalization
of public goods into home values happens only in black districts and not in white
neighborhoods.
There is also some support for that mechanism from historical sources. Lawson
(1985) explains that in a scenario of white-supremacist majorities, black politicians
had to necessarily forgo their legitimate grievances to get support for their policies
from white legislators. Kenneth Clark sums up the attitude necessary for successful
policy change: “The Negro political official must assume the additional burdens in-
herent in defining politics as requiring a tough-minded and realistic appraisal of the
power available to him, a determination to obtain and use effectively the power nec-
essary to effect a desired and observable change, and balance this by a stable, deep,
and broad sense of human values.”33 In the transition from civil rights to electoral
competition, black communities turned from leaders with a more radical vision to
more pragmatic leaders, or as stated by Lawson (1985), p. 267, to politicians “who
practiced politics as the art of the possible around the bargaining table.” At the same
time, white politicians were interested in promoting rapid industrial growth in the
South. By joining this alliance, black politicians were able to provide benefits to
their communities (Lawson, 1985). Thus, the rise of more pragmatic elected black
leaders gave black communities the clout needed to benefit from the distribution of
local public goods.
32Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) show that in a parliamentary setting the smallest party will
always be included in the coalition since their support is the cheapeast to obtain.
33Lawson (1985), p. 267.
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2.4 Data and Main Variables
I construct a unique panel dataset of 126 cities from 1970 until 2000 with both data
of the creation of single-districts, government finances, home values and rents by
race, public workers by race, and sorting by race. This dataset allows me to look at
whether public good provision changes after single-districts are enacted, and to learn
who benefits from these changes by looking at capitalization effects, the fraction of
public workers of each race, and population movements. In this section I present
the datasets, provide descriptive statistics, and explain the main independent and
dependent variables that I use.
The sample is restricted to cities in which blacks were enough people to have
their own single-district (more than 2.5% of population) and not a majority of the
city inhabitants (less than 40% of population).34 The reason to justify such sample
selection stems from the findings in (Trebbi et al., 2008): during the 1960s, around
the years when blacks would regain their right to vote thanks to the VRA, cities that
had a black minority switched their election system to at-large elections to difficult
black representation. On the other hand, cities in which blacks were a majority,
the council switched to single-districts to minimize their representation. Thus, is in
cities in which blacks are a minority in which we should expect that the electoral rule
matters the most to obtain minimal representation.35 If the political representatives
of the 1960s hurried up to change the system of representation is probably because
they feared that black representation would change the way in which the city was
ruled, and the distribution of public services and public jobs across communities.36
It is therefore in this cities were single-districts should make a difference.
I collect data on local government revenues, expenditures, employment, and pop-
34The results are both robust to changing the lower threshold to 5% and to moving the higher
threshold up to 50%.
35In cities with a black majority and single-districts, blacks can elect representatives proportion-
ally, as well as whites. In that case, the switch to single-districts from at-large elections passed by
the political representatives was to ensure that whites maintained some representation despite being
a minority.
36Trebbi et al. (2008) also show that such strategic behavior happened between 1970 and 2000.
However, their sample is comprised of cities that were not court-ordered to change their electoral,
since their focus is on endogenous institutions. In contrast, I focus on externally enforced changes
to study effects on the public budget and the distribution of resources across ethnicities.
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ulation from the Census of Governments. This dataset contains yearly information
for the largest cities and every 5 years for all local governments. To take advantage
of high frequency data, I keep in the sample cities for which there is data every year.
All the financial data is deflated using as a base year 2005.37
If we want to understand the effects of single-districts on the city budget, we
should use as outcome variables those categories of spending in which local govern-
ments do not share authority with other level of governments (federal, state, and
local).38 Table 2.1 shows the eight main categories in which municipalities spend
money. The first column shows the mean of the budget share of each item. The
second and third columns are the mean of the spending per capita and the mean of
the ratio between the amount of intergovernmental transfers and direct expenditures
by the local government. Low levels of this ratio reflect the budget items that are
decided at the city council. According to table 2.1, local politics will matter for local
public goods such as police and fire protection, sewerage and parks.39 40 It is in
these categories that we should expect to see effects of changing the electoral rule to
guarantee minority representation.41 Finally, the last column shows how most of the
money spent on roads, local hospitals and public housing comes from transfers, im-
plying that municipalities have at most small influence on these policies. Thus, from
37The deflator is from the Bureau of Labor and Statistics.
38(Ferreira and Gyourko, 2009) study whether partisanship matter at the city level. They use
aggregate expenditure variables and do not find any significant effect. (Gerber and Hopkins, 2011)
follow the same empirical strategy, but disaggregate the spending categories and find that partisan-
ship does matter for fire and police protection, two of the budget items in which cities have total
authority.
39For utilities, police and fire protection, and parks there does not exist a category of transfers.
That is why the ratio is 0. Even if I added all the transfers earmarked for other purposes and the
transfers for general local government support and divided it by the sum of spending in utilities,
police and fire protection, and parks, the ratio is of 0.0001517.
40The absence of intergovernmental transfers for these categories is also reassuring that there is no
crowding out of local government spending in these budget items because of federal or state grants.
See D and Oates (1971); D. and Oates (1971) for a theoretical analysis of how intergovernmental
transfers can crowd out government spending and Knight (2002) for empirical evidence of crowding
out using exogenous variation in delegation political power.
41 Even if the level of intergovernmental transfers spent in utilities is zero, we should not expect
changes on this policy because of changes in the electoral rule. Local utilities are managed by public
and private firms. Then, local governments do not have complete authority over this policy either.
Moreover, households pay for the utilities used through fees or taxes that target each household ac-
cording to the amount consumed, so that there is no space for transfers across households depending
on who pays a service and who actually benefits from it.
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now on, I will refer as local public good spending the sum of fire, police, park, and
sewage expenditures (LPG). In terms of taxes, municipalities can fix the property
tax rate and can change part of the sales tax rate. These are the main sources of
own revenue and I will refer to them as Local taxes. I will also look for effects in the
number of workers in the local public good sector.
Data on changes in electoral rule and year of the change is obtained from Davidson
and Grofman (1994). Their dataset is available at the Interuniversity Consortium for
Political and Social Research (ICPSR) and contains 241 cities in the southern states
of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas
and Virginia. For 74 of these cities I have yearly financial data. I expand the sample
with 52 cities with data from the International City Managers Association (ICMA)
surveys on the municipal form of government for the years 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996,
and 2001. The surveys contained questions about the number of aldermen elected by
single district. Out of the 52 cities, 12 changed their electoral rule and 40 did not
change its election system. The variable of interest is Change, a dummy indicating
whether a city had to change its electoral rule.
In order to understand who benefits from the changes in expenditures I will use
house values, rents, public workers, and population disaggregated by race. These
were downloaded from the National Historical Geographic Information System at
www.nhgis.org. The data on public workers contains all public workers that live in
the city, not only those who work for the city.42 I also use crime data disaggregated
by race to explore whether there was a decline in homicides after a change in electoral
rule. The data is from the Uniform Crime Reports of the FBI, and it contains the
number of murders that happened in each city, differentiating both for the race of
both the victim and the offender.
I also got from NHGIS the main control variables: population by race, share of
old people, number of rooms in each house by race, and the year in which the house
was built by race.
Table 2.2 shows summary statistics for both the treatment and control group in
1970 and 2000. The main difference between cities that had to change their electoral
rule and those that did not have to is that the former are located mostly in the
42Despite city representatives having the most to say about city public workers, they might still
be able to influence who gets hired at other levels of governments: they can announce job openings
in their communities, propose candidates, and make sure that the hiring process is fair.
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US South. This is not surprising given the different history of discrimination of
blacks in the southern states. The percentage of aldermen elected by single-districts
changed dramatically between 1970 and 2000 for treated cities as a consequences of
the court orders and lawsuits. By 2000, 87.8% of local politicians were elected by
single-districts, compared to none in 1970 Note also that some cities switched to a
mixed system with some aldermen still elected citywide, since the percentage is not
100 in 2000. The descriptive statistics also show that the treatment cities are larger
and have a bigger fraction of black population. Blacks also live in cheaper houses and
pay lower rents than whites. It is also worthy to point out the important changes in
black public workers between 1970 and 2000 in cities that had to change their electoral
rule. Finally, cities that had to switch to single-districts spent and collected less taxes
than cities in the control group. These differences, however, are much smaller in 2000
than in 1970. The summary statistics show important differences between cities in
the treatment and control group. However, identification relies in the parallel trends
assumption. In section 2.5 I provide evidence of no significant pre-treatment trends.
As is shown in table 2.2, most of the sample is composed of cities in the South of
the US. This is natural since most black people live in the Southern states. Almost
20% of the people in these cities were black. The median black house value was lower
than the median white house value, reflecting the disadvantaged economic condition
of blacks in the US. The share of aldermen elected by single-districts in 1970 was less
than 7%, reflecting the widespread use of discriminatory electoral rules. In 2000, this
share was 66%, a sharp rise caused by the combined force of the VRA and the courts.
In order to construct measures of discrimination at the county level and test
for the mechanisms that are driving the results, I use the electoral vote that George
Wallace obtained as a presidential candidate in 1968 when he ran with a segregationist
platform (Clubb et al., 2006). As a second proxy for discrimination I use data of the
number of black people lynched in each county between 1900 and 1930 from the
Historical American Lynching Data Collection Project. 43
Property tax limits data is from the Advisory Commision on Intergovernmental
Relations (ACIR, 1995). It is a variable that identifies if the state government imposed
any tax limitation for the local governments. Since the endogenous variables are
public expenditures it is important to control for this variable because property tax




2.5 Empirical Strategy and Results
In this section I will explain the empirical strategy and the results. The empirical
strategy has four parts: firstly I use a difference-in-difference strategy to show that
minority representation increases local public good provision, taxes, and public em-
ployment in the local public good sector. The increases in local public goods happen
mainly in fire protection. These results rule out the first potential mechanism: that
heterogeneity of preferences decreases always public good provision. Secondly, I test
whether the effects are stronger the more districts are created. I show that it is not the
case and discard that the results are driven by a common-pool problem. Thirdly, if
black representatives were able to influence decision-making, there should be changes
in the fraction of black public workers and black citizens. Changes in black popu-
lation should also increase black house values and rents if housing supply does not
keep up with demand. Moreover, if the increases in local public goods are targeted to
black neighborhoods should also be capitalized into black house values and rents. The
results are consistent with black representation benefiting mostly minorities. These
results point to blacks’ new legislative bargaining power as being effective in changing
policy. Fourthly, I use proxies for the level of hostility that blacks faced in their cities
to explore if the effects also happen for cities that faced high discrimination in the
past. The changes in the public budget are of similar size regardless of the past level
of discrimination, and for some variables slightly stronger in places that were more
hostile to blacks. Overall, this set of results shows that electoral rules that give more
proportional representation to minorities matter for the level of public goods and its
distribution across ethnic groups. Moreover, the court system plays a crucial role
in guaranteeing an equal access to public resources for minorities through protecting
their voting rights.
2.5.1 Effects on Local Public Goods and Taxes
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I implement a difference-in-difference strategy, controlling for city and year fixed ef-
fects, county-linear trends, as well as time-varying control variables. In addition,
I report results omitting the county linear trend. City fixed effects control for all
constant municipal characteristics that could be correlated with expenditures in lo-
cal public goods, including geographic features and historical features of the local
government. Year fixed effects control for local public good spending shocks that
are common to all cities in a given year, like those related to national economic and
political factors. County-linear trends control for trends in the endogenous variable
that are common at the county level. The main specification is:
yit = α + β1Changeit + γtXi1970 + δi + θt + ωc ∗ yeart + µit (2.1)
where δi are the city fixed effects and θt are the year fixed effects, and ωc ∗ yeart is
the county linear trend. yit are public spending and local taxes variables in logs per
capita. Xi1970 is a vector of baseline characteristics that contains the log of population,
which controls for the size of the city and for its economic growth;44 the share of old
people, which controls for the effect on public spending of an elderly population; the
share of black people, which controls for the size of the main racial minority; and a
dummy variable for the presence of property tax limits, which controls for potential
effects on local public goods of tax limits. β1 is our coefficient of interest. It captures
the effect of outlawing at-large elections and enacting single-districts on local public
good spending or local taxes.
Table 2.3 shows that the changes towards single-districts increase local public
good provision and local public good employment. Spending per capita in local pub-
lic goods increases by 5-7%, and local public good employment per capita increases
by 4-5.7%. The coefficients of the main regressor are statistically significant, except
for when the dependent variable is LPG and the specification includes county linear
trends, in which the coefficient is marginally insignificant at the 10% level. Table
2.4 show the results on public revenues: the change from at-large elections to single-
districts increases only local tax collection, keeps the budget balanced -coefficient for
Deficit is not significant- and does not affect transfers from other levels of govern-
44Within a country, labor is free to move across cities. Since people migrate according to growth
opportunities, population captures the extent to which a city has become more attractive for eco-
nomic reasons. See Glaeser et al. (1995) for a study of economic growth across cities.
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ment.45 The increase in tax collection per capita is between 5-9%. Note that the size
of the effects both on the expenditure and revenue side are of similar size. If cities
had to finance the new spending they had to do so either by an increase in taxes,
transfers, or debt. They do so through the first channel. The results show a positive
effect on local public goods and tax collection of non-discriminatory electoral rules.
So far, we can conclude that ethnic heterogeneity in the city council does not de-
crease public expenditures, as has been documented in other contexts (Alesina et al.,
1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997). Thus, minority representation guaranteed through
single-districts might play a role in alleviating public good underprovision, an issue
largely unknown in the literature (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005).
Table 2.5, panel A shows the results when I disaggregate by spending categories.
Panel B shows estimates when I disaggregate the categories of public employment.
All the coefficients but one have a positive sign. However, the estimates are only
significant when the dependent variable is fire protection. This raises the question of
why fire expenditures are the only ones increasing significantly after a change towards
single-districts, but not police, parks and sewage. Several comments are in order.
First, recall that the public finance data is at the city level. Thus, it could be the
case that there are no increases but that there is a reallocation of resources within the
city. However, the data does not allow to test for that. Second, lack of significance
could also be due to the limited sample of cities for which I have information on
electoral rules. Third, cities’ public budget is rather limited by economic competition
between them and constraints on their ability to raise revenue (Ladd and Yinger,
1989). For instance, in a study of the impact of partisanship in cities’ budget, Gerber
and Hopkins (2011) find it only matters for fire and police protection.
Moreover, there is plenty of anecdotal evidence showing that fire protection was
an important issue for black communities in the US South. Such stories can also be
found for spending in police, parks, and sewage. Thus, they do not help understand
why the significant effect is only there for fire spending, but it does give insights
into why fire protection goes up after changes towards single-districts. For instance,
in Hawkins v. Town of Shaw Mississippi the plaintiffs won a case proving that the
town of Shaw provided municipal services in a discriminatory manner. Black areas
suffered from an underprovision of fire hydrants and low water pressure. The same
45The deficit variable is defined as Deficit = (Revenue−Spending)/Revenue. Thus, a coefficient
with positive sign implies a safer budgetary position.
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kind of anecdotal evidence regarding fire hydrants is provided by (Button (1989),
p.120) , who studies cities in Florida. Moreover, Button (1989) also documents that
physical divisions between white and black neighborhood reduced the effectiveness
of fire protection in black neighborhoods. In some of the cities in his sample, white
and black communities were divided by railroad tracks, which sometimes impeded
fire trucks to access black neighborhoods when there was a fire. In two out of six
cities studied in his book, once black elected officials gained representation in the city
council, they pushed successfully for the construction of fire stations in black areas.
There is also evidence of fire departments ran by members of the Ku Klux Klan in
Georgia (on the Constitution of the Committee on the Judiciary, 2005), which let
homes in black communities burn for a long period before any action was taken.46
Finally, black areas are more prone to fire because of old and dilapidated housing
(Button, 1989). In fact, even today blacks are disproportionately affected by fire
deaths: they represent 13% of the population but account for 22% of fire deaths
(FEMA, 2009).
As a robustness test of the main results, I run a placebo regression. The results
are shown in table 2.6. I use a sample of cities that did not change their electoral rule
during this period. I simulate 1000 distributions of changes in electoral rules similar
to the actual one (figure 2.2), and I run the same regressions as in the main speci-
fication.47 The mean coefficient of the 1000 simulations is always insignificant and
very close to zero. I obtain the same results when instead of using a fake distribution
similar to the actual one I use a uniform distribution to generate placebo changes in
electoral rules.
I use a dynamic specification to show that the results are not driven by pre-
treatment trends. A potential concern is that there could be a preexisting trend so
that local public good expenditures started increasing before the court order. The
high frequency of the local finance data allows for the inclusion of leads and lags in the
regression to show reassuring evidence that that was not the case. I include 5 leads
and 5 lags, omitting the time period -1, the year before any change to single-districts
happens. Thus, the dynamic coefficients show the change in local public spending
with respect to the year before the change in electoral rule. The specification is as
46See page 510 of the report for more information .
47To increase the sample size of the placebos, I include cities with more than 40% and less than
2.5% of black population.
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follows:






βkChangeit+k + γtXi1970 + δi + θt + µit (2.2)
Figures 2.5a to 2.5e show that there is no pre-treatment trend and that the posi-
tive and significant effects happen some years after the change. They plot the coeffi-
cients of the dynamic specification when the dependent variable is LPG, LPGEmp.,
Local taxes, and fire protection spending and employment. The pre-treatment co-
efficients have confidence bands that are quasi symmetric around 0, confirming the
absence of a pre-treatment trend. However, there is an insignificant jump upwards
for LPG and LPGEmp. two periods before the change that might show some an-
ticipation effects. The changes in electoral rules normally happen some years after
the city has been sued. Local politicians, knowing that the changes were inexorable,
could have started modifying the city budget to suit their new interests.48 Regarding
the lagged coefficients, its range of values is consistent with the results of the static
specification. There are immediate positive effects after a change, though not yet
significant. Further significant increases happen 3-4 years after the change for LPG,
whereas the increases happen smoothly over time for the rest of the variables. The
peak of the effect for all variables except employment in the fire sector happens 3-4
years after single-districts are externally enforced.
As a robustness check, I run placebo dynamic regressions following the same ap-
proach as outlined above for the static specification. Figures 2.6a to 2.6e show the
results. As can be seen, the coefficient is always very close to zero and the confidence
intervals are symmetric around zero. In addition, I show in figures 2.7a to 2.7e the
estimated effect for three percentiles of the distribution of estimates ranked by the
size of the estimate of the fourth lag.49 The actual estimates are similar or above
the estimate of the 97.5 percentile, providing evidence that the probability that the
results are obtained by chance is small.
Thus, the empirical results show a positive and significant relationship between
Change and local public good expenditures and local taxes. There is no evidence of
48For example, in Alabama, a court-ordered change in a county electoral system originated a new
lawsuit affecting many of its local jurisdictions. The prospects for maintaining at-large elections
were very low. Thus, city councilmen could react with some anticipation to protect their seats.
49I pick the fourth lag because it is were the effects become significant for the actual distribution
of changes.
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pre-treatment trends and the placebo regressions do not show any effect. Therefore,
single-districts created to give to the black minority political representation increase
local public good provision. Thus political institutions can make underprovision less
severe and it is not always the case that ethnic divisions decrease public expenditures
and taxes. It is yet unknown what is the channel driving the results. As exposed in
section 2.3, it could be that the rise in public expenditures and tax collection is driven
either by a common-pool problem or by the legislative power that black communities
obtain with single-districts. In the following sections I will show evidence against the
first channel and consistent with the second one.
2.5.2 Are the Effects Stronger the More Districts Are
Created? Testing the Common-Pool Hypothesis
Weingast et al. (1981) predict that public spending increases with the number of
electoral districts that a political jurisdiction has. Moreover, the increase is positively
monotonic in the number of districts. Thus, if the reason why we observe a rise in
local public good spending and tax collection is due to a common-pool problem, we
should see that the effects are stronger the more districts the city created. I test that
hypothesis by focusing only on cities that changed their electoral rule, and including




β2kChangeit ∗#Districtsitk+γtXi1970 +δi+θt+µit (2.3)
#Districtsitk is a dummy equal to 1 if the city has k districts. G refers to the
set of cities that created 5 or more districts grouped in the following way, G =
{5−6 districts, 7−8 districts, 9 or more}. Thus, I include three groups in the regression,
and its coefficients have to be interpreted relative to the effect on cities that created
4 or less districts. In figures 2.8a to 2.8e I plot the coefficients β2k. The figures do not
show a positive monotonic relationship between changes in public spending, public
employment, taxation, fire spending or fire protection employment with respect to the
number of districts. Only for tax collection, cities that create 7-8 districts have larger
increases, but the coefficient drops for those cities with 9 or more districts. Overall,
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the results point to a similar effects regardless of the number of districts created.
These findings are against the increases happening through a common-pool channel.
In the next section, I provide further evidence against that mechanism and in favor of
the rise being caused by the legislative power that blacks enjoy with single-districts.
2.5.3 Who Benefits? Evidence from Housing Values, Rents,
Public Workers, Sorting, and Crime
I have shown that changes towards single-districts elections increase local public good
provision and tax collection. However, such increases might not benefit blacks even
after they gained representation, if those new local public goods are not targeted to
them. Since the public finance data is at the city level, it does not allow to test for
changes in its distribution within the city.
Nevertheless, if single-districts representation benefited mostly blacks we should
observe further changes in variables like house values, rents, the fraction of black
public workers, the fraction of black population in the city, and a decrease of murders
of black people. If black representatives were able to influence policy-making, more
blacks should move to the city, maybe attracted by the improved local public goods,
or because they found a job in the public sector. Very important might have been
the ability of black local politicians to provide black communities with public jobs.
Button (1989) explains how black representatives encouraged minority members to
apply for public jobs in the city, specially in the fire and police departments.
Changes in the population should also be reflected in house values and rents as
long as the housing supply is not flexible enough to match the demand. Note also,
that if the increased fire protection was mostly targeted to black neighborhoods, it
could also capitalize into house values and rents. It is beyond the scope of this
paper to test for the exact causal chain of effects. Moreover, they are likely to be
intertwined, making identification very difficult. Instead, I will focus on the reduced
form effect of a change in electoral in each of these variables. Finally, though increases
in the value and rental prices of houses inhabited by black people, or in the fraction
of black people living in the city, can be interpreted as evidence of single-districts
representation shifting policy towards the needs of black communities, it does not
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imply these changes were welfare improving for all blacks, since they also reflect an
increase in the cost of living.
I use decadal data from the US Census to learn about who benefits from single-
districts representation. I first difference the data , and look for the effects with
different window sizes. I first pool all decades, and then show results for 10, 20, and
30 years differences. I increase the window of time and not focus only on short-run
effects because it is likely that such distributional effects take time to happen. This
comes with a caveat, as I increase the window of time, it is more likely that the
coefficient captures the effects of other changes on cities’ house values and rents, as
well as on public workers and sorting behavior. However, all the effects appear in the
specification in which I pool all decades and the one for a 10 year window, providing
supportive evidence of a causal interpretation. The more long-run estimates can
be interpreted as suggestive evidence of the overall effect of guaranteeing minority
representation on house values and rents, the fraction of black and white public
workers, and the fraction of population of each ethnicity. The specification is as
follows:
4yit = β14Changeit + γ4Xit +4µit (2.4)
dependent variables are the first difference of the log of black and white median house
value, log of mean black and white rent, the fraction of public workers of each ethnicity
who live in the city, and the fraction of people of each race living in the city. For the
variables in logs, the coefficients have to be interpreted as the effects on the growth
rate. For those dependent variables that are fractions, the coefficients are the effect
of the change on the fraction of public workers or population of each race.
Table 2.7 shows the coefficients of Change for each dependent variable. Cities
that changed towards single-districts experienced a 2.42% increase in the fraction of
black public workers in the short-run (10 years), and a decrease in the fraction of
public workers of white and other ethnicities. Results are similar for the fraction of
each population group: the fraction of blacks increases by 2.77%. The growth rate of
the black median house increases by 5.1%, whereas the coefficient for white houses is
negative and not significant. For black and white rents, both coefficients are positive
and significant, but that of black rents is significantly larger. The results are very
similar when I pool all decades.
With respect to longer windows of time, the coefficients have the same sign and
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remain significant. The effects in the long-run (30 years) indicate an increase in
the fraction of black public workers of 6% and of 8% for the fraction black citizens.
Regarding the growth rate of black house values, it increases by 16%. The growth
rate of white house values is also positive and significant in the long-run, but smaller
than that for blacks. The coefficient for black rents remains similar indicating an
increase of 31.4% increase in the growth rate of black rents, whereas that for white
rents is of 15.3%.
It remains to know whether black representation had any effect on crime. Black
communities could have also benefited from the change towards single-districts if their
neighborhoods experienced a decline in crime, both as victims and offenders. I run
specification 2.1 using as dependent variables the number of homicides per capita in
each city, as well as the number of homicides differentiating between the race of both
the victim and the offender.
Results are shown in tables 2.8 and 2.9. Cities that changed their electoral rule
did not experience any increase in the overall number of murders, and murders in
which the victim was white. They did however experience increases in murders for
which the victim was black (though the coefficient is not significant when I do not
include a trend). Results in table 2.9 are consistent with those just described. There
are no increases for cases when the victim was white, both for when the offender was
either white or black. The rise in homicides in which the victim was black is driven
by murders in which the offender was also black. As before, though, the coefficient
is not significant when the specification does not include a trend. Thus, results do
not suggest that police spending was reallocated between districts. The absence of
drops in the number of black homicides could reflect the limited ability to bargain
that blacks had given their minority condition. Also, the increase in black homicides
could reflect the increase in black population in cities that enacted single-districts.
The results show evidence consistent with black representatives being able to
influence some policy decisions and benefit black communities. Cities with single-
districts experience higher increases in black public workers and population, as well as
on black house values and rents. This is consistent with the blacks exploiting their new
bargaining position in the council, despite its condition of minority, as predicited by
legislative bargaining models. It is also consistent with historical evidence that elected
black officials had a pro-bargaining attitude despite the the history of discrimination
in the US South (Lawson, 1985). There is though no evidence of drops in blacks
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homicides, but a positive increase in cities that adopted single-districts.
2.5.4 Heterogeneity
In this section I will show that the effects are of similar size for all cities no matter
what was their level of previous discrimination. In order to do that, I will use a
variable that proxies for the level of hostility that blacks faced in each city: the
support that George Wallace obtained in the 1968 presidential election at the county
level when he ran for president with a segregationist platform. The specifications are
as follows:




+ γtXi1970 + δi + θt + µit (2.5)
where WallaceSupportck is a dummy equal to 1 if in the county c Wallace’s elec-
toral support was between k and k − 10 of the % of votes casted. I omit cat-
egory k = 10. Thus, all the coefficients β2k show the effect of the interaction
Changeit ∗WallaceSupportck with respect to those places where support for Wallace
was between 0% and 10% of the votes. In both specifications I cluster the standard
errors at the county level. Significance does not change if I cluster at the city level.
Graphs 2.9a-2.9e show the ρ2k coefficients and its 95% confidence intervals for the
five main dependent variables, LPG, Local taxes, LPGemp., Fire and FireEmp.
There are no significant effects for Local Taxes. For the case of LPG and LPGemp.,
the graphs show significantly larger effects where most voters supported Wallace, but
the evidence is not as clear-cut for Fire and FireEmp.. Also, for municipalities
in counties where Wallace obtained between 10 and 20% of the votes, the effect
is significant when the dependent variable is LPG. Overall, the evidence points
that the effects on spending and taxes are of equal size no matter the past level
of discrimination in the city, with the effects being only weakly stronger for places
that had more discrimination. This highlights that the court-orders were effective in
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benefiting black neighborhoods even in the most pro-segregation areas.50
2.6 Conclusions
This paper measures the effects of the creation of a national jurisprudence, together
by courts and the legislative body, to outlaw discriminatory election methods. Section
2 of the VRA prohibited electoral discriminatory practises on the basis of race. This
triggered a series of court-orders that forced cities to change their election systems. I
exploit these changes to study the effects on local public goods, taxation, house values
and rents, public workers, population sorting, and crime. The main contribution
of this paper is to show how the court system affects economic outcomes through
minority voting rights protection. While the effects of voting rights statutory law
have been studied (Husted and Kenny, 1997; Cascio and Washington, Forthcoming;
Naidu, 2012), the impact on economic outcomes of voting rights protection through
court decisions is a topic that deserves further study.
I have focused on one specific discriminatory electoral method, at-large elections,
and its alternative, single-district elections. The first results show that after the enact-
ment of single-districts local public good spending (mainly fire protection spending)
and tax collection increased. Such finding is contrary to what we would have ex-
pected from an increase in ethnic diversity in the city council: if racial heterogeneity
brings disagreement over public goods, there should have been a decrease in spending
and taxation (Alesina et al., 1999). Very little is known about how the negative ef-
fects of ethnic heterogeneity documented in the literature (Alesina and Ferrara, 2005;
Alesina et al., 1999; Easterly and Levine, 1997) might be mediated through institu-
tions. This paper suggests that public good underprovision might be related to a lack
of representation of minorities, and that the lack of public goods can be alleviated by
guaranteeing their representation.
50Graphs 2.10a to 2.10e show a robustness check of the heterogeneity analysis but in that case
using the number of lynchings in each county between 1900 and 1930 as a proxy for discrimination.
Results are very similar: the effects on spending and taxes are evenly distributed for all levels of
past discrimination. The only difference is that for tax collection the effect is stronger in places
that suffered more discrimination when measured by lynchings, which is not the case when I proxy
discrimination with % of Wallace’s support.
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A second set of results shows that blacks are likely to benefit from the changes
towards non-discriminatory electoral methods: the fraction of black public workers
and black citizens increases at the expense of whites and other minorities after a
change towards single-districts. In addition, the growth rate of black home values and
black rents increases more than that of whites after a change in electoral rule. These
findings are consistent with models of legislative bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn,
1989; Persson and Tabellini, 2000). If blacks are among the less powerful groups in
the city council, they will form part of minimum winning coalitions because their
support is the easiest to obtain. Thus, we should expect that the changes in the
public budget and public jobs are targeted to black communities. Historical sources
that document the pragmatism of local black politicians, who saw politics as the
art of the possible, and were ready to bargain with whites, also support this point
(Lawson, 1985). At the same time, this set of findings discards that the increases in
local public goods and taxation arise from a common-pool problem (Weingast et al.,
1981), because such framework predicts increases for all districts. I provide further
evidence against a common-pool channel by showing that the effects are not stronger
the more districts are created.
Finally, I show that the effects happen for all cities independently of their level
of past discrimination. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the effects are weakly
stronger for places that suffered more discrimination. Given past levels of institutional
persistence in the US South (Valelly, 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006, 2008),
this and the previous findings underscore the relevance of the common law system in
protecting minority voting rights.
Further work could focus on other discriminatory electoral devices other than
at-large elections (Kousser, 1984), or on its effects at other levels of government
(i.e., school districts. NCVR (2006)). Likewise, future research could concentrate on
understanding if federal interventions to improve minorities’ welfare through transfer
systems might not succeed (Cascio et al., 2013) because of the leeway that local




Figure 2.1: Map of Florence, Al., with Different Electoral Rules
(a) At-Large Electoral Rule
(b) Single-Districts Electoral Rule
Notes: Figures 2.1a and 2.1b show the electoral constituencies when elections are at-large (figure 2.1a) or
organized through single-districts (figure 2.1b). The maps are from one of the municipalities in the sample,
the city of Florence, Alabama. When elections are at-large, the whole city is the electoral district. In contrast,
when elections are organized by single-districts, the city is partitioned in many electoral constituencies. For
the case of Florence, district 1 concentrates most of 19.4% of black population in the city, so that the black
community could have a representative.
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1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990
Year
Notes: The red dashed lines show years in which a landmark case for the anti-vote dilution ju-
risprudence was ruled. The black line shows the only case that increased the burden of proof that
plaintiffs needed to demonstrate in court to ban at-large elections. Each peak of changes happens
after each of the three significant anti-vote dilution rulings, whereas the years in which there were
barely changes correspond to periods when discriminatory intent had to be proven (1970-1972), or
after the negative ruling for anti-vote dilution (1980-1982). Sources are Davidson and Grofman
(1994) and International City Managers’ Association surveys.
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Figure 2.3: Test of Joint Significance
0 .5 1 1.5 2
% white public workers
Monthly rent black houses
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Median white house value











Test of Joint Significance, 5%
Notes: The figure shows the F statistic of joint significance of the year of change for the main city
variables that I use. The red solid line is F’s test critical value. For only two dependent variables,
the monthly rent paid by blacks and the share of white public workers, the joint test of significance
is significant at the 5% level. Overall, there does not appear to be a systematic relationship between
the timing of the changes and city characteristics.
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Notes: The figure shows the difference between the fraction of voting-age blacks with respect to the
voting-age population and the fraction of black local elected officeholders. The higher the difference,
the less are blacks represented in local offices proportionally to the size of its population. We can
see a reduction in the difference during the 1970s and 1980s, years after the poll taxes and literacy
tests were outlawed, that is related to the creation of single-districts. Source is Valelly (2004).
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(e) Dependent variable is Fire employees
Notes: the graphs show the βk coefficients of regression 2.2. I include 5 leads and lags, and omit period -1.
Thus, the coefficients reflect the size of the effect relative to a year before the change took place. The figures
do not show pre-treatment trends. The effects start the year of the change, and grow over time.
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(e) Placebo: dep. variable is Fire employees
Notes: the graphs show the βk coefficients of regression 2.2 for simulated placebos. I include 5 leads and
lags, and omit period -1. Thus, the coefficients reflect the size of the effect relative to a year before the
change took place. The placebo coefficients are always around zero, and confirm that the actual effect is
driven by the change in electoral rules.
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(e) Dep. variable: FireEmp.
Notes: the graph shows the coefficients of three of the 1000 simulated placebos. The dynamic specification
is equation 2.2. I rank the regressions according to their 4th lag coefficient and I pick the coefficients in the
2.5, 50, and 97.5 percentiles.
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Effect on Fire Protection Employees
(e)
Notes: The figure plots the coefficients β2k of regression 2.3. The sample includes only cities that outlawed
at-large elections. The coefficients β2k reflect the change in the outcome variable with respect to cities that
created 4 or less single-districts. The results provide evidence against the common-pool hypothesis, that
predicted a positively monotonic relationship between spending and the number of districts.
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Effect on Fire Employment
(e)
Notes: the solid line shows the coefficients of the interaction Changeit∗WallaceSupportck. The specification
is equation 2.5. The coefficient shows the increase in each dependent variable of interest with respect to a
city in a county where electoral vote for George Wallace was lower than 10%.
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5 10 15 20 25 30
Lynchings per 10000 blacks in 1990
Coefficient Lower CI
Upper CI
Effect on Fire Emp.
(e)
Notes: the solid line shows the coefficients of the interaction Changeit ∗ Lynchingsck. The specification
follows equation 2.5. The coefficient shows the increase in each dependent variable of interest with respect
to a city in a county where no blacks were lynched.
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Changes Before 1982 Amendment
Effect on LPG Spending





















Changes Before 1982 Amendment
Effect on LPG Employees
























Changes Before 1982 Amendment
Effect on Local Taxes





























Changes Before 1982 Amendment
Effect on Fire Spending
























Changes Before 1982 Amendment
Effect on Fire Employees
(e) Dependent variable is Fire employees
Notes: the graphs show the βk coefficients of regression 2.2. I include 5 leads and lags, and omit period -1.
Thus, the coefficients reflect the size of the effect relative to a year before the change took place. The figures
do not show pre-treatment trends. The effects start the year of the change, and grow over time.
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Changes After 1982 Amendment
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Changes After 1982 Amendment
Effect on Fire Spending






























Changes After 1982 Amendment
Effect on Fire Employees
(e) Dependent variable is Fire employees
Notes: the graphs show the βk coefficients of regression 2.2. I include 5 leads and lags, and omit period -1.
Thus, the coefficients reflect the size of the effect relative to a year before the change took place. The figures
do not show pre-treatment trends. The effects start the year of the change, and grow over time.
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2.7.2 Tables
Table 2.1: City Budget
(1) (2) (3)
% Budget $ Per Capita Ratio Trans./Exp.
Utilities 0.303 615.9 0
(0.00399) (12.97) (0.0)
Police Protection 0.0964 118.8 0
(0.000817) (0.884) (0.0)
Roads 0.0755 91.88 596.1
(0.000871) (0.949) (239.3)
Sewage 0.0619 86.02 0.00207
(0.00104) (1.696) (0.000908)
Fire Protection 0.0652 79.94 0
(0.000580) (0.580) (0.0)
Parks 0.0440 56.38 0
(0.000531) (0.708) (0.0)
Hospitals 0.0268 57.53 8651.2
(0.00170) (3.912) (3131.8)
Housing 0.0261 34.32 36628.3
(0.000730) (0.983) (5109.1)
Observations 3906 3906 3906
Notes: sample of 126 cities between 1970 and 2000. Standard errors in parentheses.
The table shows the 8 main spending categories in cities, sorted by expenditure per
capita. The first column is the fraction they represent in the budget. The column
does not add up to 1 because I am not showing all the budget items. The second
column is spending in $ per capita. the last column is the ratio of targeted transfers
to each item with respect to the level of spending in each category. For police and
fire protection, as well as parks there are no targeted transfers and that is why the










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.3: Results for Local Public Goods and Local Public Goods employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPG LPG LPG emp. LPG emp.
Change 0.0751** 0.0541 0.0572*** 0.0412**
(0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0187) (0.0164)
Population -0.178** -0.187 -0.339*** -0.389***
(0.0807) (0.128) (0.0529) (0.0618)
% old -0.0716*** -0.0658 -0.0536*** -0.0288
(0.0226) (0.0425) (0.0185) (0.0291)
% black -0.0111 -0.00821 0.00773 0.00495
(0.00894) (0.0117) (0.00743) (0.0111)
Property tax limit 0.00988 0.0124 -0.0167 -0.0110
(0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0135) (0.0131)
City FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
County trend N Y N Y
Observations 3906 3906 3485 3485
R2 0.570 0.606 0.343 0.501
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the variable of interest, Change, for the
main dependent variables and for several specifications. All the dependent variables
are in logarithm and per capita terms. The first two columns show the results when
dependent variable is spending in local public good. Columns 3 and 4 show the
results when dependent variable is the number of employees in the local public good
sector. Sample is a balanced panel and comprises all cities with at least 2.5% black
people or at most 40% black citizens. The results are robust to changing the lower
threshold to 5% and to moving the higher threshold up to 50% The lower sample size
when the dependent variable is public employees is because cities not always report
it. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, are shown in parentheses. *

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.7: Distributional Results
Dependent Variable All Decades 10 Year 20 Year 30 Year
Frac. Black Pub. Wor.
2.873** 2.42*** 4.432*** 5.959***
1.14 0.486 0.29 1.705
Frac. White Pub. Wor.
-0.72 -1.496** -3.007*** -3.288
1.224 0.677 0.558 2.481
Frac. Other Pub. Wor.
-2.152** -0.951** -1.472*** -2.67
1.011 0.427 0.473 1.979
Frac. Black Pop.
0.016*** 2.773*** 4.759*** 8.009***
0.004 0.196 0.209 1.02
Frac. White Pop.
-3.07** -1.716** -6.177*** -6.487***
1.279 0.737 0.46 2.335
Frac. Other Pop.
-0.002 -1.059* 1.459*** -1.522
0.005 0.627 0.345 2.292
Black Median Value
0.05 0.051** 0.16*** 0.159**
0.047 0.023 0.028 0.071
White Median Value
-0.084* -0.029 0.055* 0.104*
0.047 0.022 0.029 0.057
Black Rent 0.259*** 0.366*** 0.523*** 0.314***
0.054 0.027 0.026 0.066
White Rent 0.181*** 0.234*** 0.281*** 0.153***
0.036 0.019 0.019 0.045
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of the variable of interest, Change, for the main
dependent variables used to explore the distributional consequences of changing the
electoral rule from at-large to single-districts. The dependent variables are from the US
Census and are thus decadal. The specification is in first differences. Column 1 pools data
from all decades, and thus captures immediate effects of the change. Columns 2, 3 and
4 explore effects in 10 years, 20 years, and 30 years windows. Robust standard errors,
clustered at the city level, are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at
5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 2.8: Number of Homicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Murders Murders White Victim White Victim Black Victim Black Victim
Change -0.000142 0.00717 -0.00495 -0.00272 0.00474 0.00969∗∗
(0.00794) (0.00829) (0.00441) (0.00487) (0.00493) (0.00477)
Population -0.0142 -0.0159 -0.00434 -0.00636 -0.0108 -0.0106
(0.0127) (0.0172) (0.00811) (0.00935) (0.00922) (0.0111)
% old -0.00205 -0.0188∗∗ 0.000256 -0.00657 -0.00175 -0.0107∗
(0.00547) (0.00897) (0.00281) (0.00479) (0.00317) (0.00553)
% black 0.00832∗∗∗ 0.00395 0.00315∗∗ 0.00223 0.00512∗∗∗ 0.00160
(0.00279) (0.00455) (0.00149) (0.00290) (0.00181) (0.00225)
Property tax limit 0.00326 0.00325 -0.00333 -0.00331 0.00858 0.00856
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.00648) (0.00657) (0.00696) (0.00704)
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County trend N Y N Y N Y
Observations 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402
R2 0.173 0.221 0.105 0.141 0.120 0.166
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of the variable of interest, Change, for several
measures of the number of murder per capita that happened in each city for every year.
The first two columns aggregate all homicides, third and fourth column have as dependent
variable the number of murders in which the victim was white. Similarly, columns 5 and 6
are for the case of homicides in which the victim is black. Even numbered columns include
a county linear trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, are shown in































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.10: Results for Local Public Goods and Local Public Goods employment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LPG LPG LPG emp. LPG emp.
Fraction Single-District 0.0849** 0.0645* 0.0628*** 0.0479**
(0.0350) (0.0362) (0.0202) (0.0184)
Population -0.177** -0.185 -0.338*** -0.387***
(0.0802) (0.128) (0.0529) (0.0618)
% old -0.0724*** -0.0684 -0.0542*** -0.0307
(0.0222) (0.0423) (0.0185) (0.0290)
% black -0.0112 -0.00826 0.00775 0.00493
(0.00872) (0.0117) (0.00730) (0.0111)
Property tax limit 0.0106 0.0123 -0.0161 -0.0110
(0.0253) (0.0254) (0.0135) (0.0131)
City FE Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
County trend N Y N Y
Observations 3906 3906 3485 3485
R2 0.570 0.606 0.343 0.501
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the variable of interest, Change, for the
main dependent variables and for several specifications. All the dependent variables
are in logarithm and per capita terms. The first two columns show the results when
dependent variable is spending in local public good. Columns 3 and 4 show the
results when dependent variable is the number of employees in the local public good
sector. Sample is a balanced panel and comprises all cities with at least 2.5% black
people or at most 40% black citizens. The results are robust to changing the lower
threshold to 5% and to moving the higher threshold up to 50% The lower sample size
when the dependent variable is public employees is because cities not always report
it. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, are shown in parentheses. *




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2.13: Number of Homicides
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Murders Murders White Victim White Victim Black Victim Black Victim
Fraction Single-District -0.00141 0.00688 -0.00621 -0.00396 0.00465 0.0104∗
(0.00900) (0.00918) (0.00489) (0.00531) (0.00559) (0.00537)
Population -0.0143 -0.0158 -0.00438 -0.00646 -0.0108 -0.0103
(0.0126) (0.0172) (0.00809) (0.00930) (0.00920) (0.0111)
% old -0.00207 -0.0188∗∗ 0.000287 -0.00626 -0.00180 -0.0110∗∗
(0.00544) (0.00889) (0.00280) (0.00473) (0.00316) (0.00547)
% black 0.00843∗∗∗ 0.00404 0.00322∗∗ 0.00229 0.00516∗∗∗ 0.00163
(0.00280) (0.00450) (0.00148) (0.00288) (0.00182) (0.00223)
Property tax limit 0.00327 0.00322 -0.00329 -0.00329 0.00856 0.00851
(0.0105) (0.0106) (0.00648) (0.00657) (0.00697) (0.00705)
City FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
County trend N Y N Y N Y
Observations 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402 3402
R2 0.173 0.221 0.105 0.141 0.120 0.166
Notes: The table shows the coefficients of the variable of interest, SDshare, for several
measures of the number of murder per capita that happened in each city for every year.
The first two columns aggregate all homicides, third and fourth column have as dependent
variable the number of murders in which the victim was white. Similarly, columns 5 and 6
are for the case of homicides in which the victim is black. Even numbered columns include
a county linear trend. Robust standard errors, clustered at the city level, are shown in






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Where Are You? Targeting Marginal Workers and Partial
Employment Protection Reform: Evidence from Spain
Abstract
Most employment protection (EP) reforms are partial. They aim to introduce flexibility
at the margin by targeting new hires and placing restrictions on which firms can hire with
lower levels of EP. However, it is not clear what the right way to target jobs at the margin
is. We exploit a unique quasi-experiment in Spain that decreased employment protection of
new permanent hires who were younger than 31 between 2001 and 2006. Only firms with
very low employment volatility could hire with lower levels of EP. Using an administrative
dataset, we show that the reform had no effect on hirings, lay-offs, quits, contract length,
starting wages and post-entry wages. We compare the results for the policy in 2001-2006
with a similar policy in 1999-2000 but, that instead of restricting which firms could benefit
from it, targeted only workers who had not been in a permanent contract for a certain time.
The 1999-2000 policy had significant effects on hiring. Overall, the evidence suggests that
restrictions on which workers can benefit from the policy are better at targeting marginal jobs
than constraints that exclude firms with high levels of employment volatility.
I thank Wojciech Kopczuk, Bentley MacLeod, and Claus Thustrup Kreiner for helpful discus-




The design and implementation of employment protection (EP) reforms is a politically
arduous task. Employed workers have more to lose than to gain from EP reductions.
Thus, most reforms have been partial. As a way to generate consensus over the reform
between the employed and the unemployed, politicians have targeted them to new
hires, leaving untouched the levels of protection of employed workers (Saint-Paul,
1993, 1995).2 3
However, it is not so clear what the right way to target new hires is, as firms might
break a match to later hire a new worker or rehire the same one with a lower level of
EP (Crepon et al., 2008).4 Moreover, the possibility of excessive turnover might break
the consensus over the reform. It is for these reasons that partial EP reforms not only
target specific groups of workers, but might also limit the use of these contracts to
firms that did not fire a worker for a certain period of time. Thus, the reforms aim
to increase permanent employment by targeting marginal jobs, instead of targeting
both marginal and inframarginal jobs. While such limitations will increase the cost-
efficiency of the policy, they might not help create jobs if the restrictions on firms are
too stringent. Whether these reforms have been successful in increasing permanent
employment is the empirical question that this paper focuses on.
We exploit a unique policy reform in Spain. Between 2001 and 2006, new perma-
nent hires younger than 31 years old could be hired with a permanent contract that
entailed a 26.67% reduction in severance payments. Most important for identification
purposes, there was no other discontinuity at the age of 31.5 The main objective for
the introduction of this new contract arrangement was to reduce the gap in EP be-
tween permanent and short-term contracts, with the specific aim to increase the num-
2Between 1980 and 2007, 199 EP reforms happened in Europe. 52% of them have been partial.
56% of the overall number of reforms have decreased the level of protection. See Boeri (2011) for
further details and a review of the literature on labor market reforms in Europe.
3Moreover, if these reforms are successful and increase the number of workers in flexible contracts,
it can help achieve future reforms affecting all workers (Saint-Paul, 1995).
4See also Schivardi and Torrini (2008) for an analysis of distortions on firm’s growth created by
partial EP reforms that target small firms.
5The new permanent contract with low severance payments was first introduced in 1997. How-
ever, between 1997 and 2001, it was combined with payroll tax credits. This is why we focus on the
period 2001-2006. See Elias (2015) and Kugler et al. (2005) for a study of the effects of the 1997
reform.
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ber of workers in permanent contracts and reduce labor market dualism. Besides the
quasi-experimental setting, we rely on a high quality administrative database. Col-
lected mostly from social security records, it contains more than one million workers
that can be followed since their first employment spell. The dataset provides infor-
mation on employment and unemployment spells on a daily basis, type of contract
(permanent, short-term, and other work arrangements), and wages (top-coded), as
well as personal information such as the date of birth. Thus, we can analyze the
effects of the reform along the main margins of adjustment: hires, lay-offs, and quits
(extensive margin); contract length (intensive margin); and starting and entry wages.
The main findings are as follows. First, we start by looking at whether we can
detect a significant break in the age-distribution of permanent and short-term hires.
If the policy had an effect, we would expect to find a significant jump downwards in
the number of permanent hires at 31. If the policy had spillover effects on short-term
contracts, we would expect to find a significant jump upwards at 31. However, both
visual and regression evidence fail to detect such jumps. We also look at separations
(lay-offs and quits) and contract length with respect to the age at hired, but we do
not find any significant effect either.
Second, if the incidence of EP falls on wages (Lazear, 1990), there might not be
any significant effect on hires. In that event, we expect to find that workers with
lower levels of EP have higher starting wages. The empirical strategy is a regression
discontinuity design (RDD). The identification assumption is that workers on each
side of the threshold are comparable. The evidence on transitions and contract length
suggests that. We provide further evidence on that by confirming that a battery of
other covariates are balanced across the threshold. However, there is no evidence
suggesting that starting wages of workers hired before the age of 31 are higher.
Third, the effect of lower EP could still show up in post-entry wages. Once a match
is formed, workers with higher EP are more protected from separation. Thus, they
might be able to bargain a higher wage (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999; Bertola,
1990; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988, 1989, 1990). Thus, we expect to see that wage
growth is higher for workers hired just after their 31st birthday. Using a sample
of workers that stay with the same employer, we first confirm that attrition is not
significantly different on each side, and thus that workers hired on each side of 31 are
still comparable months after. However, we do not detect any significant effect on
wage growth.
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Overall, the evidence shows that the new contract with lower EP was not being
used by firms. Thus, the reform failed to introduce flexibility in the labor market.
This is all the more surprising given that the size of the incentive is comparable
to reforms in Italy and France that did have an effect (Crepon et al., 2008; Kugler
and Pica, 2008; Leonardi and Pica, 2013; Cingano et al., Forthcoming; Schivardi and
Torrini, 2008). However, the key difference is that in Spain only firms with very low
employment volatility could benefit from low EP contracts. In fact, Kugler and Pica
(2008) show that Italian firms with high employment volatility are the ones most
affected by EP, suggesting that the restrictions imposed by the Spanish reform on
firms were too stringent.
We provide additional evidence that is consistent with this conjecture. We com-
pare the effect of the policy in 2001-2006 to the effects of a similar policy in 1999-2000.
There were two main differences across these policies. First, the policy in 1999-2000
decreased the employer’s payroll tax rate. The size of the treatment in 1999-2000 was
around 3 times higher than the treatment in 2001-2006 in terms of expected reduc-
tion in labor costs. Second, between 1999-2000, firm limitations were more lenient.
Instead, the policy focused its constraints on restricting which workers could be hired
with a lower payroll tax rate: only workers who either held unstable jobs or were
unemployed were targeted by that policy.
We estimate the effects of the 1999-2000 policy. In general, the coefficients are one
or two orders of magnitude higher than those for 2001-2006. Moreover, we show that
the effects in 1999-2000, assuming a treatment dose 3 times smaller, are still larger
than those for 2001-2006.6 However, the coefficients are not significantly different
from each other.
We see this paper as having two main contributions. First, the question of how to
design a partial EP reform that targets marginal workers with minimal distortions has
been overlooked in the literature.7 We show that a significant decrease in severance
payments might fail to have any effect on the labor market if only firms with very
low levels of employment volatility can take advantage of it. We provide evidence
suggesting that, for partial EP reforms to have effects on hiring while not creating
excessive turnover, they should target only workers with a low attachment to the
6We assume that the size of the effect grows linearly with the size of treatment.
7See Crepon et al. (2008) for evidence on the perverse effects of partial EP reforms on job
turnover, and Schivardi and Torrini (2008) for evidence on firm growth.
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workforce.
Second, this paper helps understand why the incidence of temporary employment
has been so persistent in Spain despite the implementation of many reforms reducing
EP (Dolado et al., 2002). It suggests that all attempts at reducing EP in Spain before
the Great Recession might have failed due to the restrictions imposed on firms. This
is relevant given that previous evidence has concluded that EP reforms reducing
dismissal costs for young workers were partially responsible for increasing permanent
employment in Spain (Kugler et al., 2005).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 describes the institutional context,
the data, and presents the main hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3 explains the
empirical strategy and reports the results. Finally, section 3.4 concludes.
3.2 Institutional Setting, Data, and Expected
Effects
3.2.1 Spanish Employment Protection Law
The Spanish labor market features two main types of contracts: short-term and
permanent. The former are specified for a certain period of time, and once separation
occurs the worker is not entitled to severance payments. In contrast, permanent
workers are entitled to receive a compensation in case of dismissal.
The fraction of temporary contracts grew up to around 32-35% since its introduc-
tion in 1984 (Dolado et al., 2002). Temporary contracts are generally considered bad
jobs in Spain, though it is hard to causally prove that they harm workers.8 There
is evidence that short-term contracts have a negative wage differential of about 10%
(Jimeno and Toharia, 1993), though part of it is caused by sorting (Davia and Her-
nanz, 2004). Moreover, Albert and Hernanz (2005) show that temporary workers
employed in firms providing training are less likely to be chosen to participate in
training programs.9
8Autor and Houseman (2010) do provide evidence that temporary job positions harm workers
in a US context.
9Arranz and Garcia-Serrano (2007) also show that job stability has declined in Spain since the
introduction of temporary contracts.
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Besides economic reasons for the existence of a large number of short-term workers,
it is widely believed that the gap in EP across short-term and permanent contracts
also contributes to the segmentation of the labor market.10 Firms have an incentive
to hire new workers in temporary positions, and see how they perform. But even if a
match is quite productive, the firm might still prefer to fire the worker while severance
payments are low, and hire a new worker. As a result, the introduction of short-term
contracts might lead to an equilibrium with more low productivity entry-level jobs,
fewer permanent jobs, and lower overall productivity and output (Blanchard and
Landier, 2002).
In order to reduce labor market dualism -increase the number of permanent jobs
and reduce the number of short-term jobs-, Spain’s central government introduced
in 1997 a new type of permanent contract with a lower level of EP in case of un-
fair dismissal. It was targeted to populations particularly affected by unemployment.
We focus on a discontinuity at 31 years old: all unemployed workers younger than
that could be hired as permanent employees with a lower entitlement to severance
payments in case of unfair dismissal.11 Importantly for identification purposes, that
was the only policy change at 31 between 2001 and 2006.12 There were other age
discontinuities: workers older than 45 could be hired also with the new type of per-
manent contract. However, in that case, the discontinuity in severance payments was
also combined with a payroll tax credit between 2001 and 2006, making it difficult to
analyze the effects of low severance payments.13
The drop in severance payments is sizable. The contract with low EP entitles
the worker to 33 days of salary for each year of job tenure, up to 24 months of
salary. In contrast, the standard permanent contract implies severance payments of
10The main economic justification for the high incidence of temporary contracts in Spain is the
importance of seasonal activities like tourism and construction.
11For a dismissal to be considered unfair, the employee has to take it to the court, and the judge
has to dictate that it was not based on economic grounds or worker misbehavior. 3/4 of all layoffs
are considered wrongful by the judges (Bentolila, 1996).
12Between 1997 and 2001, the discontinuity in EP was combined with payroll tax credits for
employers. See Elias (2015) and Kugler et al. (2005) for a study of the effects of the 1997 reform.
13Other subpopulations that could be hired with the new type of contract were: unemployed
women when hired in an occupation with a low level of female employment, unemployed workers
who have been registered as looking for a job for 6 months, and disabled workers. We focus only at
the discontinuity at 31 years old because all these other subpopulations could be hired both with
lower EP and payroll tax credits for the employer.
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45 days of salary for each year of job tenure, up to a maximum of 42 months of salary.
Thus, the new contract conveys a 26.67% smaller compensation in terms of salary
per year. Figure 3.1 shows the differential evolution of compensation across contract
types with respect to job tenure. For instance, after 5 years in the same job, the new
contract implies 2 months less of severance payments. Relative to other reforms in
France or Italy, the size of treatment is similar. The Delalande tax increased firing
costs by 1 to 6 months of wages (Crepon et al., 2008), and the 1990 Italian reform
increased compensation packages by about 2.5 to 6 months for small firms (Kugler
and Pica, 2008; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008; Leonardi and Pica, 2013; Cingano et al.,
Forthcoming).
A key feature of the reform in EP in Spain is that it limited the type of firms
that could use the new type of permanent contracts. Only establishments that had
not unfairly dismissed workers, or undergone a collective dismissal, during the last
6 months, could make use of them. The limitation applied for job positions with
the same tasks or within the same occupation as the fired workers. Such limitation
restricts the possibility that firms game the regulation by firing workers older than 31
and hiring younger ones, and should make it a more cost-efficient policy. Moreover,
it helps build a coalition of workers in favor of the reform, as employed workers
would not worry about strategic firing affecting them as a consequence of the policy
discontinuity. However, if the limitations are too stringent on firms, no job creation
in permanent contracts will happen.
Finally, the same program applies for workers who have been unemployed for
more than six months, and for temporary workers transitioning to permanent within
the same firm. Though the size of such populations should be balanced across the
threshold, I will take it into account when constructing the sample used for the
analysis, as explained in the following subsection.14
3.2.2 Social Security Data
I use an administrative dataset from social security records in Spain. The Continu-
ous Sample of Work Lifes (Muestra Continua de Vidas Laborales, MCVL) provides
14Contracts with lower severance payments were also available for unemployed workers older than
45 years old, disabled workers, and unemployed women when hired in occupations with low levels
of female employment. However, such contracts also had payroll tax credits for employers, making
it impossible to identify the effect of a two-tier system of employment protection.
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unique and high quality data of the Spanish labor market. It has detailed information
of the start and end of each employment or unemployment spell, monthly earnings
(top-coded), the reason why the job relationship ended, the type of contract (perma-
nent, short-term and other work arrangements), the size of the firm, and the sector,
among other variables. The data also contains information about the individual: sex,
education, date of birth, province of birth, citizenship, as well as the date of birth
and sex of the members of their household.
The sample was first extracted in 2004: over 1 million of workers, or 4% of all
individuals who had some relationship with social security that year were selected.
15 16 The same individuals were sampled in 2005, 2006, and so on. In addition, new
individuals were included in the data each year to keep its representativeness. Very
importantly, for each worker, the dataset contains each employment and unemploy-
ment spell since they started working. Therefore, for the purposes of this paper, I
can follow workers for the whole time that the discontinuity was in place: 2001-2006.
The descriptive statistics in table 3.1 offer a picture of the labor market for workers
around the age of 31 in 2002. They are slightly more likely to be men. Their average
level of education is above high school. Around 80% of them are Spanish citizens.
The incidence of non-employment is very high, ranging between 35-36%. Of those
working, most of them are under permanent contracts, followed by short-term and
self-employment. However, the incidence of short-term contracts is still high, ranging
between 16-19% depending on the age group. A very small number of them are
public workers. The incidence of non-employment slightly decreases with age, while
the fraction of them in permanent jobs, self-employed, or in the public sector, slightly
increases. For those working, the mean daily wage is 44-46 euros, and raises with age.
A big fraction of them have part-time contracts and are employed in rather small
firms (15 employees). Finally, most of them work in the service sector.
The samples that I use in the analysis depend on the question at hand. First, for
the analysis of permanent hiring, I drop those who have been nonemployed for more
than six months, as well as those who transition from job-to-job (also within firm).
The aim of such selection is to make sure that the effects of the policy discontinuity at
15Sampling is random, without any kind of stratification.
16Individuals who had some relationship with social security were either formally employed, re-
ceiving some kind of unemployment insurance, or were perceiving a contributory pension.
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31 are not confounded by the effects of programs that target other types of workers.17
Second, those who fall in the previous category, and were hired as permanent workers,
will constitute the sample to study the effects on separations, contract length, and
wages. Third, since there was no regulation directly affecting hiring of short-term
workers, I do not impose such restrictions when constructing the sample for the
analysis of short-term hiring. Last, the sample to analyze if there were any effects on
employment focuses only on individuals born between March 1972 and March 1975,
since those are the cohorts that can be fully followed two years before and after their
31st birthday for the period when the policy was in place.
3.2.3 Expected Effects
The policy makes hiring of permanent workers younger than 31 cheaper than that of
workers older than 45. Following the theoretical literature on the effects of employ-
ment protection on the labor market, we hypothesize the following main potential
effects:
Hypothesis 1. Job Flows and Employment: we expect to see a higher level
of permanent hiring before the age of 31, and then a significant jump downwards at
31.18 This holds as long as wages do not fully adjust to cancel the difference in labor
costs across the threshold. The reform might have spillover effects on short-term
contracts. If that is the case, we expect to see also a discontinuous jump upwards in
short-term hiring at 31.
In terms of lay-offs, whether we should expect a jump or not at 31 is not so clear-
cut. On one hand, we would expect more lay-offs happening for workers hired before
the age of 31, if firms are less cautious with who they hire in that group. On the other
hand, firms might prefer to fire first those that can claim a high level of severance
payments (hired after 31). In other words, they do not want them to accumulate an
17That is, programs targeting those who have been registered as unemployed for more than
six months, and programs incentivizing transitions from short-term to permanent jobs. See last
paragraph in section 3.2.1 for more details. In section 3.3.5 I repeat the analysis for the whole
sample of individuals and obtain the same results.
18Dolado et al. (2007) calibrate a search-and-matching model to analyze the effects of targeting
the reform to different types of workers. From their results, it can be inferred that the prediction
of a discontinuous jump downwards in permanent hiring at 31 holds even when we do not allow for
direct substitution to happen across types of workers.
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entitlement to severance payments that is so high such that it is better to keep them
at work than to fire them.
Finally, note that the effects on employment are ambiguous, since we expect that
a lower level of severance payments will increase both job entries and job separations.
Hypothesis 2. Starting Wages: we expect to see that starting wages of new
permanent hires under 31 are higher. This will be the case if the incidence of em-
ployment protection falls fully or partially on wages. In other words, a new optimal
contract might emerge that incorporates the lower costs of employment in terms of
higher wages for workers hired before the age of 31 (Lazear, 1990). Thus, holding
everything else constant, we should detect a higher average wage before 31, and a
jump downwards for permanent hires older than 31.
Hypothesis 3. Post-Entry Wages: we expect that post-entry wages of work-
ers hired with lower severance payments (under 31 years) have a less steep tenure
profile than workers hired with high severance payments (above 31). This is because,
once the job is formed, firing costs become a liability for the employer in case the job
is destroyed. Thus, employees with higher employment protection enjoy higher bar-
gaining power. That allows them to claim a higher wage (Mortensen and Pissarides,
1999; Bertola, 1990; Lindbeck and Snower, 1988, 1989, 1990). Therefore, holding
everything else constant, we expect to see that the wage jump in starting wages gets
smaller or even reverses over time.
3.3 Empirical Strategy and Results
3.3.1 Effects on Job Flows, Contract Length, and
Employment
Figure 3.2a plots the hiring distribution over the age when the hire happens. There is
no apparent jump at 31. Likewise, there is no jump in the number of short-term hires
across 31 (figure 3.2d). Figures 3.2b-3.2c show that, for those hired as permanent
workers between 2001-2006, there is no jump at 31 in the number of individuals that
got fired or that quitted their job, with respect to the age at which they were hired.
Similarly, figures 3.2e-3.2f show no discontinuity for separations of short-term hires.
To have further proof that there is no significant jump, I run the following speci-
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fication:
Yim = α + τTreatmentim + f(age
∗
im) + δm + εim (3.1)
where Yim indicates whether individual i transitions into a job in monthm, Treatmentim
is a dummy equal to 1 when the worker hired is under 31 years old. f(age∗im) is a
flexible polynomial on each side of the threshold capturing the month distance with
respect to the worker’s 31st birthday. I will present results for linear, quadratic, and
cubic polynomials. δm are month fixed effects to capture any potential seasonality
when the worker is hired. For robustness purposes, I will report results with three
different window sizes across the threshold: 12 months, 18 months, and 24 months.
Two comments about our empirical strategy are in order. First, note that the
specification is akin to a regression discontinuity design (RDD). However, if we detect
a significant effect, this will not have a direct causal interpretation because it will
confound job creation (more hires below 31) and job destruction (less hires after 31).
Thus, coefficient τ will only give us information about whether the policy was having
an effect, which is actually the first question we are interested in. In other words, for
our purposes so far, we do not care if manipulation of the running variable is taking
place.
Second, recall that the new contract with low EP was implemented in 1997 to-
gether with lower payroll taxes, and that we focus on the period 2001-2006 because
then only a discontinuity in EP was present. Thus, the estimates can be interpreted
as the effects of the new contract in the long-run, once adjustment costs are small
or zero. This is particularly important if, for the policy to have an effect, firms
needed time to restructure the organization of their workforce between permanent
and temporary contracts.
Table 3.2 reports the results for permanent and short-term transitions. It confirms
the visual evidence. As can be seen, there is not a single significant effect on the
number of hires, lay-off and quits. Still, it could be that the policy does not affect
the extensive margin (entries and exits), but that it affects the intensive margin (the
lenght of the job contract). Column 4 reports the results for this variable. We also do
not find a significant effect. Moreover, the coefficient has a different sign depending
on the specification.
Given that the policy does not seem to affect job entries and separations, as well as
the length of job spell, we do not expect to find any significant effect on the evolution
of employment around the age of 31. Figure 3.3a shows the evolution of permanent
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employment across the discontinuity. If the policy had increased job creation but
not job destruction, we would expect to observe a higher slope before the age of 31,
a kink at 31, and a smaller slope after that. However, it is hard to detect such a
kink visually. In addition, I run the same specification as before to estimate potential
employment effects. The coefficient of interest now is the slope of employment after
the age of 31. If it is negative and significantly different than the slope before the
age of 31, it would suggest that the policy was having an effect. Consistent with the
visual evidence and the findings for job transitions, we do not detect a significant
difference between the slopes.
The evidence presented so far shows that the program failed to increase permanent
hiring and decrease short-term hiring. This finding is relevant to understand why
temporary employment, despite several labor market reforms aiming to decrease it,
has been so persistent over time (Dolado et al., 2002). Moreover, previous evidence
studying the Spanish labor market reforms has pointed to the reduction in dismissal
costs as being partially responsible for increases in permanent employment (Kugler
et al., 2005). The results show that, at least for young workers, the decrease in firing
costs played no role.
3.3.2 Effects on Starting and Post-Entry Wages
To identify the effect of lower severance payments on wages, I run equation 3.1 using
the starting wage and the post-entry wage as the outcome variable. This is a RDD.
The identification assumption is that workers on each side of the threshold are com-
parable. The results in figure 3.2 and table 3.2 suggest that there is no manipulation
of the running variable, age at hired. I provide further evidence on that by checking
that the covariates of workers hired on each side of the threshold are balanced.
Figure 3.4 shows that this is the case for several variables: the percentage of
months worked during the last year, the percentage of white-collar workers, the per-
centage hired in small firms, the percentage men, the percentage working in the
services sector, and the percentage of Spanish-born workers. Table 3.4 reports the
results of running equation 3.1 with these and some other covariates as the outcome
variable. In addition to the ones showed in the picture, I include whether the worker
was working 6 and 12 months ago, the percentage of months worked during the last
two years, their level of education, and whether they were hired in the agricultural,
industrial or construction sector. As can be seen, there is no systematic significant
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difference across workers hired on each side of the threshold. Since I also want to
analyze whether post-entry wages increase faster for the group of workers hired after
their 31st birthday, I repeat the above analysis for those still in the same job 6, 12, and
24 months after entry. I do not detect any significant effect across the discontinuity.19
The results can be seen in in the appendix tables 3.7-3.9.
Figure 3.5 displays the raw wage data. We report mean and median wages, both at
the start of the job relationship and 12 months after entry. The pictures do not show
any evident jump at the age of 31. Table 3.5 confirms the visual evidence. There is no
systematic relationship between being eligible for a low severance payments contract
and starting and post-entry wages across specifications.
3.3.3 Robustness
We perform additional robustness checks by repeating the analysis for different sub-
samples of workers and firms separately. The aim of the policy was to increase
permanent employment of young workers, but also restricting which firms could hire
with the new type of contract to avoid excessive turnover. Thus, by pooling together
different types of workers and firms we might be confusing marginal and non-marginal
workers. If that is the case, we might fail to detect the effects of the policy.
Thus, we repeat the analysis of transitions, contract length, covariates, and start-
ing and post-entry wages, separately for men and women, white- and blue-collar
workers, and small and large firms. The results are in tables 3.10-3.27. The results
are consistent with the previous findings: there is no systematic evidence that firms
were using the new type of contract with low severance payments to hire workers.
3.3.4 Comparison with the Effects of Similar Reforms in
Italy and France
We have seen that the new contract with lower severance payments did not have any
significant effect on the labor market. There is no evidence that transitions, contract
length or wages were affected. This is the more surprising given that the policy
19This is consistent with the fact that there was no systematic difference in the number of job
separations and contract length across the threshold. If attrition was not happening strategically
across the age of 31, we would expect the workers on each side of the threshold were still comparable
months after being hired.
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implied a 26.67% smaller entitlement to severance payments per year of job tenure.
Moreover, the treatment was similar in size to French and Italian reforms that had
significant effects on job flows (Crepon et al., 2008; Kugler and Pica, 2008), wages
(Leonardi and Pica, 2013), and capital investment (Cingano et al., Forthcoming).
One could argue that the expected reduction in terms of labor costs is actually
small, given that not all job matches end with the worker being fired and the lay-off
considered wrongful by a judge. We estimate that the expected reduction in labor
costs, taking this factors into account, is indeed smaller: 1.53%.20 However, note that
the same argument applies to the French and Italian reforms. Thus, it cannot explain
why the Spanish reform had no effects, while the French and Italian reforms did.
3.3.5 The Importance of Restrictions on Firms
In this section, we conjecture and show evidence that the restrictions on which firms
could hire with lower severance payments were too stringent. Following the results for
the Italian reform in Kugler and Pica (2008), firms with high employment volatility
are the ones that respond the most to changes in EP. A key difference between the
Spanish reform, and the French and Italian ones, is that in Spain only firms with
very low levels of employment volatility could benefit from it: only firms that had not
wrongfully dismissed any worker during the last six months could resort to that type
of contract. Thus, the firms that will be excluded from the policy are also the ones
that could have benefited the most from it. The remaining of this section provides
evidence suggesting that the restrictions imposed on firms were too strict for the
policy to have any effect.
Ideally, we would want to compare the estimates in this paper to the effects of a
policy with a similar reduction in labor costs but with different restrictions on who
can be hired through that contract. That way, we could provide further evidence
that it is the restrictions on firms that matter. Fortunately for us, in 1999 and
2000 there was a policy that met this requirements. It targeted new hires younger
20For the sample of workers hired between the ages of 29 and 33, we compute what the reduction
in severance payments means in terms of overall labor costs. We apply the following formula to
compute the fraction of labor costs that severance payments represent both in the standard perma-
nent contract and in the one with low severance payment:
#Fired
#Hired∗0.73∗MeanSeverance Payment
AverageLabor Costs . 0.73
is the fraction of dismissals considered wrongful by judges (Bentolila, 1996). The 1.53% is obtained
by subtracting one from the other.
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than 30 years old and two different reductions in labor costs could be claimed by
employers. Moreover, the eligibility rules for each reduction were different, meaning
that claiming one reduction did not mean that the other credit could be claimed too.
Regarding the first reduction: workers younger than 30 could be hired with a 20-35%
lower employer’s payroll tax rate for the first two years of the contract. Note that
this amounted to an expected reduction in labor costs of 4.46%.21 An additional
key difference is that the limitations on which firms could hire with a reduction in
payroll taxes were more lenient: only firms that wrongfully dismissed a worker hired
with a payroll tax credit would be excluded from the 1999-2000 tax credit program.
Instead, the policy in 1999-2000 aimed to avoid excessive turnover by making only
workers with low job stability (temporary workers and unemployed) eligible for it:
neither employees who had been working in a permanent contract within the last
three months nor employees who had a permanent contract with the same firm group
during the previous 24 months were eligible.22
The second reduction in labor costs in place in 1999-2000 is the same we have
studied so far for 2001-2006: younger workers could be hired with a 26.67% smaller
severance payments entitlement, and the limitations on firms were exactly the same as
those in 2001-2006. Thus, everything else constant, the results in this paper suggest
that there were no effects of this policy and that, if there is any discontinuity in hiring
at 30, it is caused by the payroll tax credit.
Figure 3.6a shows the number of permanent hires in 1999 and 2000 with respect
to age. As can be seen, there is a jump downwards at 30, the age at which the
threshold was at that time. That is what we were expecting to see if the policy had
an effect. Figure 3.6b compares the policy for the year 2000 and 2001. The fact
that the age-hiring distributions overlap above 30 suggests that 2000 and 2001 are
comparable years, and that we would have expected to see a jump at 30 if the payroll
21To obtain this number we apply the following formula:
DailyWage∗Tenure∗Payroll TaxRate∗Payroll TaxCredit
AverageLabor Costs . However, in practice, the actual formula is
a bit more complicated since the payroll tax credit changed with tenure in the job.
22Other limitations in 1999-2000 are: the tax-credited contracts cannot be used to hire relatives
of the owner or of the management chief; there are people who cannot benefit from the contract too:
firms managers, home service, people in jail, professional sportsmen, artists, and dockers working
for public societies; the employers need to be current with tax payments and must not have been
excluded from the program because of any infraction they could have committed. Finally, the tax-
credited contract, combined with other programs, cannot suppose a tax credit of more than 60% of
the annual wage.
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tax incentive had been kept in place.
Table 3.6 translates the above discussion into estimates. Since each policy had
different limitations, we use the universe of workers in our dataset, instead of focusing
on those who are likely to be affected by the policy. Thus, we are interested in
knowing whether the policy had, in aggregate, a significant effect on the number of
hires. Column 1 shows the effect on hirings of the policy in 1999-2000. The coefficient
is positive in all cases, and significant in 7 out of 9 specifications. In contrast, results
in column 2 for the policy in period 2001-2006 do not deliver any significant estimate,
and 3 of them have a negative sign. Moreover, the coefficients for 1999-2000 are in
general one or two orders of magnitude higher than those for 2001-2006.
The main drawback from this exercise is that the expected reduction in labor costs
in 1999-2000 was higher than in 2001-2006. Thus, it could be that the size of the effect
is larger because the treatment in 1999-2000 was bigger. Column 3 provides further
evidence of what the effect would have been in 1999-2000 had the treatment dose been
of the same size as in 2001-2006. To do that, we assume that the treatment effect
grows linearly with treatment dose. As can be seen, the coefficients obtained in this
hypothetical exercise are all significantly different from zero.23 Moreover, they are
all still larger than the ones for 2001-2006, though they are not significantly different
from each other.
The above evidence supports the conjecture that the restrictions on which firms
could hire with low severance payments were too stringent. Firms with high em-
ployment volatility are the ones who respond the most to changes in employment
protection (Kugler and Pica, 2008). But these are the firms who will be excluded
from hiring with the new type of permanent contract. Thus, given the size of the
incentive, it might not be worthy for firms facing a volatile demand to change their
firing policy in order to be eligible to hire with the new type of permanent contract.
Finally, the comparison with the effects of the 1999-2000 policy suggests that the
right way to target marginal jobs is to target marginal workers. That is, temporary
and unemployed workers with a low attachment to the permanent workforce. This
suggestion is consistent with evidence in Elias (2015), who analyzes the effects of the
policy in 1999 and 2000 and finds that it had a net effect on young employment.
23We perform 100 estimations using 90% random samples. For each estimation, we divide the
coefficient by 2.92 -the ratio of treatment size in 1999-2000 relative to 2001-2006. The standard
errors are the standard deviation of the 100 coefficients.
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Moreover, results based on a search-and-matching calibrated model for Spain provide
theoretical support in the same direction (Dolado et al., 2007).
3.4 Conclusions
We have studied the effects of partial EP reform in Spain. Between 2001 and 2006,
workers younger than 31 years old could be hired as permanent employees with a
26.67% reduction in severance payments in case of wrongful dismissal. The main
objective of the policy was to reduce labor market dualism by targeting new hires.
Moreover, to reduce the excessive turnover that such policies might generate (Crepon
et al., 2008), only firms with very low employment volatility could hire with such type
of contract.
Using a very detailed administrative dataset of the Spanish labor market, we find
that the policy had no effect on the main margins of response: hires, lay-offs, quits,
contract length, entry wages, and post-entry wages.
The results in this paper are in contrast to the findings in studies of similar reforms
in France and Italy (Crepon et al., 2008; Kugler and Pica, 2008; Leonardi and Pica,
2013; Cingano et al., Forthcoming; Schivardi and Torrini, 2008). A key feature of the
Spanish reform that might explain the lack of an effect is that only firms with very low
employment volatility (firms that did not wrongfully dismiss a worker during the last
6 months) could hire with low severance payments. Indeed, Kugler and Pica (2008)
show that Italian firms with high employment volatility are the ones responding the
most to changes in severance payments.
We provide further evidence that the restrictions on firms were too stringent for
the policy to have an effect. We compare the effects of the low severance payments
contract with those of another type of contract that granted payroll tax credits to the
employers of young workers (less than 30 years old) in 1999-2000. Unlike the contract
with low severance payments, the contract with payroll tax credits could be used
by almost any firm, and it targeted workers with low attachment to the workforce
(unemployed and short-term workers). In that case, the policy had a clear effect on
hiring.
We see the paper as having two main contributions. First, the findings suggest
that restrictions on which workers can benefit from the policy are better at targeting
marginal jobs than constraints that exclude firms with high levels of employment
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volatility. Second, the lack of effects on hiring helps understand the very high and
persistent level of temporary employment in Spain despite the implementation of




Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
Age 29 Age 30 Age 31 Age 32 Age 33
Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N Mean SD N
% Men 53.59 49.87 32,072 53.1 49.9 31,526 53.78 49.86 31,255 53.43 49.88 30,463 53.57 49.87 29,300
Education 3.369 0.722 29,972 3.346 0.726 29,492 3.337 0.725 29,299 3.315 0.739 28,368 3.297 0.74 27,414
% Citizen 80.19 39.86 32,072 80.37 39.72 31,526 81.01 39.22 31,255 80.57 39.57 30,463 81.44 38.88 29,300
% Perm. 35.63 47.89 32,072 36.44 48.13 31,526 37.07 48.3 31,255 36.37 48.11 30,463 36.72 48.21 29,300
% Temp. 19.2 39.39 32,072 18.03 38.45 31,526 17.46 37.96 31,255 16.75 37.35 30,463 16.18 36.83 29,300
% Self-Emp. 6.944 25.42 32,072 7.162 25.79 31,526 7.797 26.81 31,255 8.331 27.64 30,463 8.689 28.17 29,300
% UI 3.963 19.51 32,072 4.146 19.93 31,526 4.044 19.7 31,255 4.146 19.94 30,463 3.976 19.54 29,300
% Public 1.996 13.98 32,072 2.182 14.61 31,526 2.294 14.97 31,255 2.945 16.91 30,463 3.314 17.9 29,300
% Non-Emp. 36.24 48.07 32,072 36.18 48.05 31,526 35.38 47.82 31,255 35.6 47.88 30,463 35.09 47.73 29,300
Daily Wage 44.13 46.66 19,875 45.35 52.31 19,670 45.98 55.6 19,742 46.37 55.39 19,165 46.41 47.38 18,476
% Part-Time 38.78 48.73 32,072 38.56 48.67 31,526 37.74 48.48 31,255 37.61 48.44 30,463 37.05 48.3 29,300
Log Firm Workforce 2.727 3.133 21,718 2.757 3.134 21,425 2.73 3.107 21,460 2.783 3.164 20,876 2.774 3.155 20,184
% Agriculture 2.922 16.84 32,072 3.074 17.26 31,526 3.046 17.18 31,255 3.26 17.76 30,463 3.468 18.3 29,300
% Industry 10.62 30.81 32,072 10.35 30.46 31,526 10.8 31.04 31,255 10.51 30.67 30,463 10.56 30.73 29,300
% Construction 6.432 24.53 32,072 6.633 24.89 31,526 6.809 25.19 31,255 6.424 24.52 30,463 6.399 24.47 29,300
% Services 45.58 49.81 32,072 45.64 49.81 31,526 45.66 49.81 31,255 45.83 49.83 30,463 45.88 49.83 29,300
Notes: The table shows descriptive statistics for indviduals who in 2002 were 29-33 years old.
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Table 3.2: Effects on Transitions and Months of Work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Permanent Contracts Short-Term Contracts
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Length Hires Lay-Offs Quits
Linear Poly. -0.00567 -1.016 0.734 -0.0323 0.00192 -0.193 0.281
12 M. Window (0.0230) (1.131) (0.975) (0.0392) (0.0412) (0.555) (0.486)
Observations 2898330 27175 27175 27175 3088966 102329 102329
Linear Poly. 0.00652 -1.085 0.112 -0.0223 -0.00407 0.185 0.106
18 M. Window (0.0187) (0.927) (0.799) (0.0323) (0.0337) (0.454) (0.398)
Observations 4280526 40066 40066 40066 4563018 151577 151577
Linear Poly. 0.0147 -1.433∗ 0.154 0.00151 -0.0261 -0.0286 0.183
24 M. Window (0.0163) (0.805) (0.696) (0.0281) (0.0293) (0.394) (0.345)
Observations 5652961 53031 53031 53031 6027252 201346 201346
Quad. Poly. 0.0121 -0.00628 2.312 -0.0323 -0.0867 0.779 -0.0724
12 M. Window (0.0357) (1.764) (1.516) (0.0392) (0.0644) (0.861) (0.752)
Observations 2898330 27175 27175 27175 3088966 102329 102329
Quad. Poly. -0.00437 -0.619 1.323 -0.0101 -0.0269 -0.123 0.173
18 M. Window (0.0287) (1.411) (1.214) (0.0489) (0.0515) (0.691) (0.603)
Observations 4280526 40066 40066 40066 4563018 151577 151577
Quad. Poly. -0.0111 -0.716 0.637 -0.0326 -0.00878 0.122 0.266
24 M. Window (0.0247) (1.216) (1.048) (0.0423) (0.0444) (0.595) (0.520)
Observations 5652961 53031 53031 53031 6027252 201346 201346
Cubic Poly. 0.0202 -0.232 -0.423 -0.0323 -0.0998 1.111 -0.977
12 M. Window (0.0522) (2.594) (2.231) (0.0392) (0.0944) (1.259) (1.099)
Observations 2898330 27175 27175 27175 3088966 102329 102329
Cubic Poly. 0.00851 -0.220 2.246 0.0366 -0.0831 0.826 0.0293
18 M. Window (0.0398) (1.972) (1.694) (0.0685) (0.0719) (0.960) (0.837)
Observations 4280526 40066 40066 40066 4563018 151577 151577
Cubic Poly. 0.0161 -0.140 1.590 0.00545 -0.0305 0.256 -0.196
24 M. Window (0.0337) (1.661) (1.429) (0.0577) (0.0608) (0.811) (0.708)
Observations 5652961 53031 53031 53031 6027252 201346 201346
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on transitions in and out of permanent
jobs (columns 1-3), contract length once hired in a permanent job (column 4), and transitions in and out of
short-term jobs (columns 5-7). Dependent variables are dummies capturing whether a transition in or out of
a job took place (multiplied by 100 so that the estimates can be interpreted in percentage points), and the
log number of days in the job. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size on each side of the
threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.3: Effects on Employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Permanent Employment Short-Term Employment
12 M. Window 18 M. Window 24 M. Window 12 M. Window 18 M. Window 24 M. Window
Treatment -0.00125 -0.00133 -0.00129 0.000435 -0.000759 -0.00215∗∗∗
(0.00125) (0.00102) (0.000888) (0.000994) (0.000813) (0.000705)
Slope Before 31 Years 0.00172∗∗∗ 0.00167∗∗∗ 0.00165∗∗∗ -0.0000841 0.00000692 0.0000108
(0.000115) (0.0000654) (0.0000434) (0.0000911) (0.0000515) (0.0000341)
Slope After 31 Years -0.0000981 -0.0000194 0.00000959 0.000168 -0.000210∗∗∗ -0.000404∗∗∗
(0.000173) (0.0000957) (0.0000627) (0.000137) (0.0000761) (0.0000500)
Observations 2484750 3677430 4870110 2484750 3677430 4870110
Notes: The table shows whether there is a jump in employment at age 31 (Treatment), and if the evolution of employment is slower after the age of 31 (Slope
After 31 Years). Dependent variables are dummies indicating if the individual is working in a permanent job or a short-term job (multiplied by 100 so that

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.5: Effects of Lower Severance Payments on Starting and Future Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting Post-Entry Post-Entry Post-Entry
Wage Wage (6 m.) Wage (12 m.) Wage (24 m.)
Linear Poly. 0.000134 -0.00175 0.0159 0.0119
12 M. Window (0.0107) (0.0124) (0.0148) (0.0172)
Observations 22745 16835 12230 8907
Linear Poly. -0.00117 0.00137 0.00994 0.00701
18 M. Window (0.00871) (0.0101) (0.0121) (0.0141)
Observations 33554 24883 18125 13148
Linear Poly. -0.00386 0.00388 0.0174∗ 0.00747
24 M. Window (0.00756) (0.00879) (0.0105) (0.0122)
Observations 44459 33018 24029 17452
Quad. Poly. -0.000948 -0.00669 0.00279 0.0162
12 M. Window (0.0167) (0.0197) (0.0234) (0.0272)
Observations 22745 16835 12230 8907
Quad. Poly. 0.000590 -0.00654 0.0123 0.0120
18 M. Window (0.0133) (0.0155) (0.0185) (0.0216)
Observations 33554 24883 18125 13148
Quad. Poly. 0.00124 -0.00277 0.00607 0.00716
24 M. Window (0.0114) (0.0133) (0.0159) (0.0185)
Observations 44459 33018 24029 17452
Cubic Poly. 0.0304 0.00835 0.0200 0.00932
12 M. Window (0.0247) (0.0291) (0.0346) (0.0407)
Observations 22745 16835 12230 8907
Cubic Poly. 0.00466 -0.00348 0.0107 0.0199
18 M. Window (0.0187) (0.0220) (0.0261) (0.0306)
Observations 33554 24883 18125 13148
Cubic Poly. 0.00275 -0.00898 0.0100 0.0184
24 M. Window (0.0157) (0.0184) (0.0219) (0.0255)
Observations 44459 33018 24029 17452
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on the starting wage (column
1), and post-entry wages 6, 12, and 24 months after entry into the job (columns 2-4). For
post-entry wages, the sample is composed of those workers who stay in the same job. The
dependent variables are in logs. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size
on each side of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side
(lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.6: Effects on Transitions, 1999-2000 Vs. 2001-2006
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1999-2000 2001-2006 1999-2000 (2) and (3)
(simulation) Sign. Diff.
Hires Hires Hires
Linear Poly. 0.110∗∗∗ -0.00102 0.038∗∗∗ NO
12 M. Window (0.0404) (0.0242) (0.0048)
Observations 1236829 3088966
Linear Poly. 0.0818∗∗ 0.00745 0.028∗∗∗ NO
18 M. Window (0.0329) (0.0198) (0.0044)
Observations 1826362 4563018
Linear Poly. 0.0743∗∗∗ 0.0109 0.025∗∗∗ NO
24 M. Window (0.0285) (0.0171) (0.0035)
Observations 2412217 6027252
Quad. Poly. 0.0979 0.0116 0.033∗∗∗ NO
12 M. Window (0.0642) (0.0375) (0.0071)
Observations 1236829 3088966
Quad. Poly. 0.138∗∗∗ -0.00180 0.045∗∗∗ NO
18 M. Window (0.0510) (0.0302) (0.0057)
Observations 1826362 4563018
Quad. Poly. 0.122∗∗∗ -0.00972 0.042∗∗∗ NO
24 M. Window (0.0437) (0.0260) (0.005)
Observations 2412217 6027252
Cubic Poly. 0.217∗∗ 0.0175 0.75∗∗∗ NO
12 M. Window (0.0950) (0.0548) (0.0113)
Observations 1236829 3088966
Cubic Poly. 0.0887 0.0134 0.03∗∗∗ NO
18 M. Window (0.0721) (0.0418) (0.0078)
Observations 1826362 4563018
Cubic Poly. 0.111∗ 0.0270 0.038∗∗∗ NO
24 M. Window (0.0606) (0.0355) (0.006)
Observations 2412217 6027252
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on transitions into
permanent jobs. The left column is for the period 1999-2000, when an employer
payroll tax credit was in place, together with the contract with reduced severance
payments, for younger workers. The right column is for the period 2001-2006,
when only the new contract with reduced severance payments was available for
younger workers. The coefficients in column 3 are obtained in the following way: we
perform 100 estimations using 90% random samples. For each estimation, we divide
the coefficient by 2.92 -the difference in treatment size between 1999-2000 and
2001-2006. The standard errors are the standard deviation of the 100 coefficients.
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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3.5.2 Figures















0 10 20 30 40
Years of Job Tenure
Standard Permanent Contract
Permanent Contract with Low Severance Payments
Severance Payments Entitlement By Type of Contract
Notes: The figure show the amount of severance payments (in months of salary) that a worker is entitled
to in case of wrongful dismissal with respect to the years of job tenure. The blue line displays the amount
that he is entitled to under a standard permanent contract. The red line shows it for the new permanent
contract with lower severance payments.
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Notes: The figures show the flows in and out of permanent contracts (left column) and short-term contracts
(right column). The running variable is the age when the transition happens. The red dashed line corresponds
to 31 years old, the location of the threshold.
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Short−Term Workers
(b)
Notes: The figures show the evolution of permanent and short-term employment across the discontinuity at
31 years old. The red dashed line corresponds to 31 years old, the location of the threshold.
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Notes: The figures show the mean of several variables for workers hired as permanent workers across the
discontinuity. The running variable is the age when the transition into a permanent job happens. The red
dashed line corresponds to 31 years old, the location of the threshold.
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MedianPost−Entry Wage (12 m.)
(d)
Notes: The top figures show the mean starting wage and post-entry wage for workers hired as permanent
workers across the discontinuity. The bottom figures show the median starting wage and post-entry wage
for the same sample of workers. The running variable is the age when the transition into a permanent job
happens. The red dashed line corresponds to 31 years old, the location of the threshold.
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 All Perm. 2000/02−2001/02  All Perm. 2001/03−2002/03
New Permanent Hires by Age
(b)
Notes: The upper figure shows the number of new permanent hires for the years 1999 and 2000 with respect
to age at hired. The red dashed line corresponds to 30 years old, the location of the threshold at that time.
The lower figure shows the same type of graph, but plotting two graphs: the blue dots are for the period
02/2000-02/2001 (before the policy change in 2001); the red dots are for the period 03/2001-03/2002 (after
the policy change in 2001). The blue dashed line represents the threshold during the period 02/2000-02/2001,
and the red dashed line represents the threshold during the period 03/2001-03/2002.
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3.6 Additional Appendix
3.6.1 Covariate Balance for Post-Entry Wage Analysis
Table 3.7: Covariates Balance (Workers in the Same Job 6 Months After Being Hired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Worked Worked Frac. Work Frac. Work White- Small
6 m. ago 12 m. ago Last Year Last 2 Years Sex Education Citizen Collar Firm Agric. Ind. Cons. Serv.
Linear Poly. -0.00638 -0.0105 -0.00664 -0.00292 0.0205 -0.0119 0.0170∗ -0.0177∗ -0.0111 -0.00197 -0.0116 -0.00223 0.0171
12 M. Window (0.0137) (0.0137) (0.0113) (0.0105) (0.0153) (0.0211) (0.0101) (0.0106) (0.0154) (0.00326) (0.0117) (0.00725) (0.0132)
N 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16276 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835
Linear Poly. -0.0128 -0.0127 -0.0104 -0.00666 0.0223 -0.00878 0.00885 -0.000480 -0.00577 -0.00172 -0.00144 -0.00589 0.0111
18 M. Window (0.0112) (0.0112) (0.00924) (0.00857) (0.0125) (0.0172) (0.00833) (0.00860) (0.0126) (0.00261) (0.00956) (0.00592) (0.0108)
N 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24053 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883
Linear Poly. -0.00682 -0.0166 -0.00972 -0.00914 0.0178 0.00151 0.00536 0.00255 -0.00497 -0.000358 0.00223 -0.00408 0.00338
24 M. Window (0.00969) (0.00970) (0.00800) (0.00743) (0.0109) (0.0150) (0.00721) (0.00749) (0.0109) (0.00229) (0.00831) (0.00517) (0.00938)
N 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 31926 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018
Quad. Poly. -0.00446 0.00326 -0.00246 0.000565 0.0315 -0.0449 0.0225 -0.0170 0.0195 0.00384 0.0101 -0.0100 0.000929
12 M. Window (0.0215) (0.0216) (0.0179) (0.0165) (0.0241) (0.0334) (0.0157) (0.0166) (0.0242) (0.00522) (0.0185) (0.0115) (0.0209)
N 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16276 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835
Quad. Poly. -0.00619 -0.00917 -0.00659 -0.000489 0.0325 -0.0292 0.0281∗ -0.0304∗ 0.000205 -0.000555 -0.00581 -0.00369 0.0132
18 M. Window (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0142) (0.0131) (0.0191) (0.0265) (0.0126) (0.0131) (0.0192) (0.00411) (0.0146) (0.00908) (0.0165)
N 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24053 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883
Quad. Poly. -0.0108 -0.00309 -0.00637 0.00107 0.0336∗ -0.0254 0.0213 -0.0171 -0.000296 -0.00248 -0.00379 -0.00497 0.0147
24 M. Window (0.0147) (0.0147) (0.0122) (0.0113) (0.0164) (0.0227) (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0165) (0.00350) (0.0126) (0.00778) (0.0142)
N 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 31926 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018
Cubic Poly. 0.00461 -0.0146 -0.0113 -0.0168 0.0570 -0.0875 0.0242 -0.0166 -0.00811 -0.00216 0.0249 0.00478 -0.0272
12 M. Window (0.0319) (0.0322) (0.0268) (0.0245) (0.0356) (0.0496) (0.0228) (0.0245) (0.0357) (0.00764) (0.0274) (0.0167) (0.0307)
N 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16276 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835 16835
Cubic Poly. 0.00215 0.00877 0.00234 -0.0000667 0.0222 -0.0363 0.0140 -0.0144 0.00782 0.00273 0.00196 -0.00861 0.00484
18 M. Window (0.0241) (0.0243) (0.0201) (0.0185) (0.0269) (0.0374) (0.0175) (0.0184) (0.0270) (0.00580) (0.0207) (0.0128) (0.0233)
N 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24053 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883 24883
Cubic Poly. -0.00771 -0.0134 -0.00832 -0.00543 0.0211 -0.0338 0.0228 -0.0274 -0.00650 0.00123 -0.00724 -0.00624 0.0152
24 M. Window (0.0202) (0.0203) (0.0168) (0.0155) (0.0226) (0.0313) (0.0148) (0.0155) (0.0227) (0.00489) (0.0173) (0.0107) (0.0196)
N 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 31926 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018 33018
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on several covariates. The sample is composed of those workers who are still on the same job 6 months after being hired as permanent employees. Each
row shows the estimates for a different window size and a different polynomial on each side of the threshold. The dependent variables are: dummies indicating if the individual was working 6 and 12 months before
being hired in a permanent job; the fraction of months worked one year and two years before being hired; dummies indicating whether he is a male, a Spanish citizen, and a white-collar worker; a variable capturing his
level of education; and dummies indicating if he was hired in a small firm (less than 10 workers) and the sector of the firm (agriculture, industry, construction, services). All dummies have been multiplied by 100 so
that they can be interpreted as percentage points. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.8: Covariates Balance (Workers in the Same Job 12 Months After Being Hired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Worked Worked Frac. Work Frac. Work White- Small
6 m. ago 12 m. ago Last Year Last 2 Years Sex Education Citizen Collar Firm Agric. Ind. Cons. Serv.
Linear Poly. 0.0111 -0.0149 0.00178 0.00414 0.0266 -0.00822 0.0190∗ -0.0100 -0.0170 -0.00291 -0.00574 -0.00930 0.0178
12 M. Window (0.0158) (0.0157) (0.0132) (0.0121) (0.0180) (0.0243) (0.0108) (0.0130) (0.0179) (0.00348) (0.0139) (0.00853) (0.0155)
Observations 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 11875 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230
Linear Poly. 0.000881 -0.0109 -0.00227 0.00230 0.0290∗ 0.00644 0.0127 0.00765 -0.00905 -0.00214 0.00477 -0.0111 0.0111
18 M. Window (0.0130) (0.0128) (0.0108) (0.00996) (0.0147) (0.0198) (0.00891) (0.0106) (0.0146) (0.00283) (0.0113) (0.00693) (0.0127)
N 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 17592 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125
Linear Poly. 0.00277 -0.0113 -0.00106 0.00189 0.0193 0.0145 0.00997 0.00654 -0.0103 -0.000233 0.00750 -0.00761 0.00178
24 M. Window (0.0112) (0.0111) (0.00933) (0.00862) (0.0128) (0.0172) (0.00768) (0.00924) (0.0127) (0.00250) (0.00985) (0.00607) (0.0110)
N 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 23330 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029
Quad. Poly. 0.0150 0.00130 0.0123 0.0131 0.0287 -0.0749∗ 0.0275 -0.0136 0.0255 -0.00255 0.0182 -0.0118 -0.00598
12 M. Window (0.0247) (0.0246) (0.0207) (0.0189) (0.0283) (0.0381) (0.0167) (0.0204) (0.0281) (0.00557) (0.0220) (0.0133) (0.0245)
N 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 11875 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230
Quad. Poly. 0.0135 -0.0169 0.00287 0.00666 0.0303 -0.0382 0.0280∗ -0.0245 0.00104 -0.00364 0.00222 -0.00993 0.0114
18 M. Window (0.0197) (0.0196) (0.0165) (0.0152) (0.0225) (0.0304) (0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0224) (0.00438) (0.0173) (0.0106) (0.0194)
N 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 17592 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125
Quad. Poly. 0.00698 -0.00781 0.000918 0.00706 0.0414∗ -0.0224 0.0222 -0.00709 0.0000502 -0.00438 0.00588 -0.0123 0.0136
24 M. Window (0.0170) (0.0169) (0.0142) (0.0131) (0.0193) (0.0261) (0.0116) (0.0139) (0.0192) (0.00377) (0.0148) (0.00911) (0.0166)
N 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 23330 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029
Cubic Poly. 0.0306 -0.0123 0.0104 0.00232 0.0350 -0.0919 0.0267 -0.00327 -0.0117 -0.00258 0.0638∗ -0.00790 -0.0516
12 M. Window (0.0366) (0.0365) (0.0308) (0.0279) (0.0417) (0.0558) (0.0241) (0.0302) (0.0413) (0.00825) (0.0325) (0.0190) (0.0359)
N 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 11875 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230 12230
Cubic Poly. 0.0263 0.00734 0.0196 0.0141 0.0252 -0.0741 0.0208 -0.01000 0.00593 -0.00283 0.0122 -0.0125 -0.00303
18 M. Window (0.0277) (0.0276) (0.0232) (0.0212) (0.0316) (0.0424) (0.0187) (0.0227) (0.0313) (0.00630) (0.0245) (0.0148) (0.0273)
N 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 17592 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125 18125
Cubic Poly. 0.0136 -0.0224 0.00359 0.00258 0.0163 -0.0475 0.0236 -0.0236 -0.00472 -0.00272 -0.00283 -0.0113 0.0150
24 M. Window (0.0233) (0.0232) (0.0195) (0.0178) (0.0265) (0.0358) (0.0158) (0.0192) (0.0264) (0.00526) (0.0205) (0.0125) (0.0229)
N 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 23330 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029 24029
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on several covariates. The sample is composed of those workers who are still on the same job 12 months after being hired as permanent
employees. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size and a different polynomial on each side of the threshold. The dependent variables are: dummies indicating if the individual was
working 6 and 12 months before being hired in a permanent job; the fraction of months worked one year and two years before being hired; dummies indicating whether he is a male, a Spanish citizen, and
a white-collar worker; a variable capturing his level of education; and dummies indicating if he was hired in a small firm (less than 10 workers) and the sector of the firm (agriculture, industry, construction,
services). All dummies have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as percentage points. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Table 3.9: Covariates Balance (Workers in the Same Job 24 Months After Being Hired
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
Worked Worked Frac. Work Frac. Work White- Small
6 m. ago 12 m. ago Last Year Last 2 Years Sex Education Citizen Collar Firm Agric. Ind. Cons. Serv.
Linear Poly. 0.0163 -0.00580 0.00798 0.00910 0.0195 -0.0190 0.0136 -0.0169 -0.0314 -0.000963 -0.00886 -0.0183∗ 0.0257
12 M. Window (0.0180) (0.0178) (0.0151) (0.0139) (0.0210) (0.0282) (0.0117) (0.0156) (0.0205) (0.00361) (0.0165) (0.00994) (0.0183)
Observations 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8690 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907
Linear Poly. 0.00358 -0.00839 0.000730 0.00184 0.0268 0.00291 0.00712 0.00665 -0.0167 0.00119 0.00496 -0.0183∗ 0.0142
18 M. Window (0.0148) (0.0147) (0.0124) (0.0115) (0.0172) (0.0231) (0.00965) (0.0127) (0.0168) (0.00300) (0.0136) (0.00822) (0.0151)
N 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 12821 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148
Linear Poly. 0.0101 -0.00757 0.00371 0.00497 0.0175 0.0201 0.00777 0.00633 -0.0206 0.00144 0.0113 -0.0164∗ 0.00434
24 M. Window (0.0128) (0.0127) (0.0107) (0.00992) (0.0149) (0.0200) (0.00830) (0.0111) (0.0146) (0.00270) (0.0118) (0.00718) (0.0131)
N 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17028 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452
Quad. Poly. 0.0287 0.0171 0.0233 0.0210 0.0227 -0.0932∗ 0.0351 -0.0233 0.0227 -0.00441 0.00680 -0.0217 0.0134
12 M. Window (0.0281) (0.0279) (0.0236) (0.0216) (0.0328) (0.0442) (0.0182) (0.0244) (0.0320) (0.00567) (0.0260) (0.0152) (0.0286)
N 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8690 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907
Quad. Poly. 0.0170 -0.00658 0.00797 0.0107 0.0235 -0.0605 0.0280 -0.0373 -0.0170 -0.00300 -0.00397 -0.0179 0.0228
18 M. Window (0.0225) (0.0223) (0.0189) (0.0174) (0.0262) (0.0353) (0.0147) (0.0194) (0.0255) (0.00443) (0.0206) (0.0123) (0.0228)
N 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 12821 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148
Quad. Poly. 0.00693 -0.00352 0.00336 0.00525 0.0350 -0.0390 0.0160 -0.0155 -0.00755 -0.00174 0.00288 -0.0182 0.0187
24 M. Window (0.0194) (0.0192) (0.0163) (0.0150) (0.0225) (0.0303) (0.0126) (0.0167) (0.0220) (0.00394) (0.0177) (0.0106) (0.0196)
N 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17028 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452
Cubic Poly. 0.0557 0.0311 0.0344 0.0294 0.0307 -0.164∗ 0.0479 -0.00651 -0.00972 -0.00993 0.0551 -0.0198 -0.0234
12 M. Window (0.0417) (0.0414) (0.0352) (0.0319) (0.0485) (0.0649) (0.0262) (0.0366) (0.0471) (0.00849) (0.0384) (0.0215) (0.0418)
N 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8690 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907 8907
Cubic Poly. 0.0520 0.0349 0.0398 0.0333 0.0166 -0.0976∗ 0.0281 -0.0161 0.00559 -0.00590 -0.00115 -0.0264 0.0211
18 M. Window (0.0315) (0.0313) (0.0266) (0.0242) (0.0367) (0.0494) (0.0204) (0.0273) (0.0358) (0.00639) (0.0291) (0.0168) (0.0319)
N 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 12821 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148 13148
Cubic Poly. 0.0246 -0.00407 0.0145 0.0141 0.0132 -0.0727 0.0294 -0.0328 -0.0212 -0.00249 -0.0157 -0.0217 0.0337
24 M. Window (0.0265) (0.0263) (0.0223) (0.0205) (0.0309) (0.0416) (0.0172) (0.0230) (0.0301) (0.00535) (0.0244) (0.0143) (0.0268)
N 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17028 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452 17452
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on several covariates. The sample is composed of those workers who are still on the same job 24 months after being hired as permanent
employees. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size and a different polynomial on each side of the threshold. The dependent variables are: dummies indicating if the individual was working
6 and 12 months before being hired in a permanent job; the fraction of months worked one year and two years before being hired; dummies indicating whether he is a male, a Spanish citizen, and a
white-collar worker; a variable capturing his level of education; and dummies indicating if he was hired in a small firm (less than 10 workers) and the sector of the firm (agriculture, industry, construction, ser-
vices). All dummies have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as percentage points. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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3.6.2 Men and Women
Table 3.10: Effects on Transitions and Months of Work, Women
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Permanent Contracts Short-Term Contracts
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Length Hires Lay-Offs Quits
Linear Poly. -0.0230 -0.870 2.434∗ -0.0778 -0.00471 -0.359 0.360
12 M. Window (0.0348) (1.706) (1.333) (0.0560) (0.0617) (0.800) (0.679)
Observations 1302051 12581 12581 12581 1379769 45676 45676
Linear Poly. -0.0152 -1.773 2.121∗ -0.0486 -0.00162 0.194 0.106
18 M. Window (0.0284) (1.396) (1.090) (0.0460) (0.0504) (0.655) (0.557)
Observations 1923500 18472 18472 18472 2038723 67767 67767
Linear Poly. -0.00433 -2.631∗∗ 1.451 0.00363 -0.00725 0.0531 0.296
24 M. Window (0.0246) (1.210) (0.948) (0.0400) (0.0438) (0.569) (0.485)
Observations 2540591 24533 24533 24533 2693430 90107 90107
Quad. Poly. -0.0161 0.640 3.691∗ -0.0778 -0.000460 0.295 -0.0399
12 M. Window (0.0539) (2.670) (2.073) (0.0560) (0.0964) (1.241) (1.050)
Observations 1302051 12581 12581 12581 1379769 45676 45676
Quad. Poly. -0.0310 0.169 2.813∗ -0.0489 -0.0130 -0.198 0.0416
18 M. Window (0.0433) (2.131) (1.655) (0.0700) (0.0771) (0.995) (0.843)
Observations 1923500 18472 18472 18472 2038723 67767 67767
Quad. Poly. -0.0421 -0.685 2.996∗∗ -0.0945 0.000340 -0.00527 0.131
24 M. Window (0.0373) (1.834) (1.427) (0.0604) (0.0664) (0.858) (0.729)
Observations 2540591 24533 24533 24533 2693430 90107 90107
Cubic Poly. -0.0642 1.729 -3.183 -0.0778 0.0566 0.0441 0.388
12 M. Window (0.0788) (3.921) (3.057) (0.0560) (0.141) (1.813) (1.536)
Observations 1302051 12581 12581 12581 1379769 45676 45676
Cubic Poly. -0.0185 0.837 2.850 0.00590 0.0290 -0.354 0.859
18 M. Window (0.0600) (2.982) (2.309) (0.0978) (0.108) (1.381) (1.170)
Observations 1923500 18472 18472 18472 2038723 67767 67767
Cubic Poly. 0.00365 1.325 2.478 -0.00880 -0.00506 -0.0683 -0.0481
24 M. Window (0.0509) (2.513) (1.946) (0.0825) (0.0909) (1.169) (0.989)
Observations 2540591 24533 24533 24533 2693430 90107 90107
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on transitions in and out of permanent
jobs (columns 1-3), contract length once hired in a permanent job (column 4), and transitions in and out of
short-term jobs (columns 5-7). Dependent variables are dummies capturing whether a transition in or out
of a job took place (multiplied by 100 so that the estimates can be interpreted in percentage points), and
the log number of days in the job. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size on each side
of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic).
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.11: Effects on Transitions and Months of Work, Men
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Permanent Contracts Short-Term Contracts
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Length Hires Lay-Offs Quits
Linear Poly. 0.00880 -1.017 -0.882 0.00509 0.0111 0.00397 0.161
12 M. Window (0.0306) (1.501) (1.399) (0.0549) (0.0555) (0.765) (0.683)
Observations 1596279 14594 14594 14594 1709197 56653 56653
Linear Poly. 0.0239 -0.371 -1.739 -0.00152 -0.00427 0.183 0.103
18 M. Window (0.0249) (1.233) (1.149) (0.0451) (0.0453) (0.627) (0.559)
Observations 2357026 21594 21594 21594 2524295 83810 83810
Linear Poly. 0.0302 -0.264 -1.104 -0.00115 -0.0395 -0.108 0.109
24 M. Window (0.0216) (1.073) (1.000) (0.0393) (0.0393) (0.543) (0.484)
Observations 3112370 28498 28498 28498 3333822 111239 111239
Quad. Poly. 0.0360 -0.419 0.980 0.00509 -0.151 1.091 -0.0236
12 M. Window (0.0477) (2.339) (2.172) (0.0549) (0.0865) (1.189) (1.058)
Observations 1596279 14594 14594 14594 1709197 56653 56653
Quad. Poly. 0.0178 -1.083 -0.135 0.0195 -0.0334 -0.0454 0.269
18 M. Window (0.0382) (1.871) (1.744) (0.0682) (0.0693) (0.953) (0.849)
Observations 2357026 21594 21594 21594 2524295 83810 83810
Quad. Poly. 0.0142 -0.533 -1.600 0.0182 -0.0133 0.237 0.375
24 M. Window (0.0328) (1.614) (1.507) (0.0590) (0.0597) (0.820) (0.731)
Observations 3112370 28498 28498 28498 3333822 111239 111239
Cubic Poly. 0.0884 -1.629 1.683 0.00509 -0.220 1.821 -1.940
12 M. Window (0.0696) (3.447) (3.193) (0.0549) (0.127) (1.738) (1.548)
Observations 1596279 14594 14594 14594 1709197 56653 56653
Cubic Poly. 0.0315 -0.977 1.592 0.0605 -0.167 1.678 -0.550
18 M. Window (0.0531) (2.617) (2.432) (0.0956) (0.0965) (1.325) (1.179)
Observations 2357026 21594 21594 21594 2524295 83810 83810
Cubic Poly. 0.0269 -1.281 0.732 0.0162 -0.0450 0.503 -0.292
24 M. Window (0.0450) (2.203) (2.052) (0.0805) (0.0817) (1.119) (0.996)
Observations 3112370 28498 28498 28498 3333822 111239 111239
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on transitions in and out of permanent
jobs (columns 1-3), contract length once hired in a permanent job (column 4), and transitions in and out of
short-term jobs (columns 5-7). Dependent variables are dummies capturing whether a transition in or out of
a job took place (multiplied by 100 so that the estimates can be interpreted in percentage points), and the
log number of days in the job. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size on each side of the
threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.14: Effects of Lower Severance Payments on Starting and Future Wages,
Women
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting Post-Entry Post-Entry Post-Entry
Wage Wage (6 m.) Wage (12 m.) Wage (24 m.)
Linear Poly. -0.0249 -0.0247 0.00145 0.0117
12 M. Window (0.0158) (0.0185) (0.0223) (0.0265)
Observations 10088 7328 5390 3827
Linear Poly. -0.0255∗∗ -0.0180 -0.0115 -0.00417
18 M. Window (0.0129) (0.0151) (0.0182) (0.0217)
Observations 14772 10765 7896 5612
Linear Poly. -0.0257∗∗ -0.0129 -0.00103 -0.0111
24 M. Window (0.0112) (0.0131) (0.0157) (0.0187)
Observations 19673 14335 10504 7490
Quad. Poly. -0.0320 -0.0321 -0.0177 0.000830
12 M. Window (0.0249) (0.0295) (0.0352) (0.0417)
Observations 10088 7328 5390 3827
Quad. Poly. -0.0267 -0.0318 -0.00819 0.00856
18 M. Window (0.0197) (0.0232) (0.0278) (0.0330)
Observations 14772 10765 7896 5612
Quad. Poly. -0.0283∗ -0.0248 -0.0172 0.00387
24 M. Window (0.0170) (0.0199) (0.0239) (0.0284)
Observations 19673 14335 10504 7490
Cubic Poly. 0.00699 -0.0170 0.0126 0.00981
12 M. Window (0.0367) (0.0436) (0.0517) (0.0617)
Observations 10088 7328 5390 3827
Cubic Poly. -0.0224 -0.0295 0.00958 0.0168
18 M. Window (0.0278) (0.0330) (0.0392) (0.0465)
Observations 14772 10765 7896 5612
Cubic Poly. -0.0209 -0.0412 -0.00542 0.0187
24 M. Window (0.0233) (0.0275) (0.0329) (0.0389)
Observations 19673 14335 10504 7490
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on the starting wage (column
1), and post-entry wages 6, 12, and 24 months after entry into the job (columns 2-4). For
post-entry wages, the sample is composed of those workers who stay in the same job. The
dependent variables are in logs. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size
on each side of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side
(lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.15: Effects of Lower Severance Payments on Starting and Future Wages,
Men
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting Post-Entry Post-Entry Post-Entry
Wage Wage (6 m.) Wage (12 m.) Wage (24 m.)
Linear Poly. 0.0184 0.0101 0.0200 0.00705
12 M. Window (0.0140) (0.0162) (0.0191) (0.0219)
Observations 12657 9507 6840 5080
Linear Poly. 0.0160 0.0102 0.0184 0.00834
18 M. Window (0.0114) (0.0132) (0.0156) (0.0179)
Observations 18782 14118 10229 7536
Linear Poly. 0.0109 0.0117 0.0259∗ 0.0166
24 M. Window (0.00997) (0.0115) (0.0136) (0.0156)
Observations 24786 18683 13525 9962
Quad. Poly. 0.0203 0.00459 0.0111 0.0230
12 M. Window (0.0220) (0.0256) (0.0303) (0.0349)
Observations 12657 9507 6840 5080
Quad. Poly. 0.0183 0.00391 0.0198 0.00833
18 M. Window (0.0175) (0.0203) (0.0240) (0.0276)
Observations 18782 14118 10229 7536
Quad. Poly. 0.0216 0.00494 0.0124 0.000372
24 M. Window (0.0151) (0.0174) (0.0206) (0.0237)
Observations 24786 18683 13525 9962
Cubic Poly. 0.0380 0.0128 0.0173 0.00280
12 M. Window (0.0324) (0.0379) (0.0448) (0.0524)
Observations 12657 9507 6840 5080
Cubic Poly. 0.0243 0.0101 0.00474 0.0178
18 M. Window (0.0246) (0.0287) (0.0340) (0.0393)
Observations 18782 14118 10229 7536
Cubic Poly. 0.0204 0.0100 0.0179 0.0156
24 M. Window (0.0207) (0.0241) (0.0285) (0.0328)
Observations 24786 18683 13525 9962
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on the starting wage (column
1), and post-entry wages 6, 12, and 24 months after entry into the job (columns 2-4). For
post-entry wages, the sample is composed of those workers who stay in the same job. The
dependent variables are in logs. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size
on each side of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side
(lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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3.6.3 White- and Blue-Collar Workers
Table 3.16: Effects on Transitions and Months of Work, Blue-Collar Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Permanent Contracts Short-Term Contracts
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Length Hires Lay-Offs Quits
Linear Poly. 0.00572 -1.104 0.00779 -0.00413 -0.0114 -0.249 0.241
12 M. Window (0.0249) (1.220) (1.044) (0.0421) (0.0458) (0.575) (0.506)
Observations 2503479 23825 23825 23825 2693217 96117 96117
Linear Poly. 0.00990 -0.846 -0.197 -0.0270 -0.0107 0.106 0.143
18 M. Window (0.0204) (1.000) (0.856) (0.0347) (0.0374) (0.471) (0.415)
Observations 3698496 35205 35205 35205 3979612 142352 142352
Linear Poly. 0.0166 -1.228 -0.0789 0.00318 -0.0353 -0.156 0.246
24 M. Window (0.0176) (0.868) (0.746) (0.0302) (0.0325) (0.408) (0.360)
Observations 4886150 46613 46613 46613 5258599 189210 189210
Quad. Poly. 0.0226 -1.008 1.983 -0.00413 -0.105 0.882 -0.293
12 M. Window (0.0388) (1.902) (1.619) (0.0421) (0.0714) (0.892) (0.784)
Observations 2503479 23825 23825 23825 2693217 96117 96117
Quad. Poly. 0.0136 -1.133 0.434 0.0424 -0.0507 -0.0817 0.0413
18 M. Window (0.0311) (1.522) (1.298) (0.0524) (0.0572) (0.715) (0.629)
Observations 3698496 35205 35205 35205 3979612 142352 142352
Quad. Poly. 0.000873 -0.849 0.0537 -0.0167 -0.0208 0.133 0.213
24 M. Window (0.0268) (1.311) (1.121) (0.0453) (0.0492) (0.616) (0.542)
Observations 4886150 46613 46613 46613 5258599 189210 189210
Cubic Poly. 0.0401 -0.540 -0.952 -0.00413 -0.0969 1.295 -1.112
12 M. Window (0.0567) (2.796) (2.379) (0.0421) (0.105) (1.305) (1.147)
Observations 2503479 23825 23825 23825 2693217 96117 96117
Cubic Poly. 0.0183 -1.162 1.903 0.0905 -0.0899 0.844 -0.169
18 M. Window (0.0432) (2.126) (1.807) (0.0732) (0.0797) (0.994) (0.873)
Observations 3698496 35205 35205 35205 3979612 142352 142352
Cubic Poly. 0.0307 -0.809 0.692 0.0665 -0.0537 0.331 -0.391
24 M. Window (0.0366) (1.792) (1.527) (0.0618) (0.0674) (0.840) (0.737)
Observations 4886150 46613 46613 46613 5258599 189210 189210
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on transitions in and out of permanent
jobs (columns 1-3), contract length once hired in a permanent job (column 4), and transitions in and out of
short-term jobs (columns 5-7). Dependent variables are dummies capturing whether a transition in or out
of a job took place (multiplied by 100 so that the estimates can be interpreted in percentage points), and
the log number of days in the job. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size on each side
of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic).
Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
180
Table 3.17: Effects on Transitions and Months of Work, White-Collar Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Permanent Contracts Short-Term Contracts
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Length Hires Lay-Offs Quits
Linear Poly. -0.0779 -1.584 5.453∗∗ -0.176∗ 0.0916 0.644 1.131
12 M. Window (0.0588) (2.856) (2.726) (0.100) (0.0808) (2.130) (1.611)
Observations 394851 3350 3350 3350 395749 6212 6212
Linear Poly. -0.0156 -3.386 2.217 0.0281 0.0357 1.588 -0.476
18 M. Window (0.0478) (2.358) (2.229) (0.0822) (0.0661) (1.732) (1.297)
Observations 582030 4861 4861 4861 583406 9225 9225
Linear Poly. 0.00281 -3.389 1.762 -0.00577 0.0401 2.041 -0.699
24 M. Window (0.0416) (2.060) (1.919) (0.0704) (0.0572) (1.512) (1.135)
Observations 766811 6418 6418 6418 768653 12136 12136
Quad. Poly. -0.0522 5.918 4.339 -0.176∗ 0.0522 -0.611 3.379
12 M. Window (0.0907) (4.477) (4.323) (0.100) (0.127) (3.270) (2.482)
Observations 394851 3350 3350 3350 395749 6212 6212
Quad. Poly. -0.118 1.317 7.330∗∗ -0.321∗∗ 0.134 -0.737 2.401
18 M. Window (0.0730) (3.557) (3.440) (0.128) (0.101) (2.641) (2.005)
Observations 582030 4861 4861 4861 583406 9225 9225
Quad. Poly. -0.0878 -1.018 4.649 -0.100 0.0661 0.129 1.070
24 M. Window (0.0628) (3.078) (2.954) (0.109) (0.0870) (2.276) (1.726)
Observations 766811 6418 6418 6418 768653 12136 12136
Cubic Poly. -0.111 -0.518 3.183 -0.176∗ -0.114 -0.979 0.557
12 M. Window (0.132) (6.521) (6.447) (0.100) (0.188) (4.709) (3.561)
Observations 394851 3350 3350 3350 395749 6212 6212
Cubic Poly. -0.0499 5.314 4.366 -0.320∗ -0.0231 0.960 2.652
18 M. Window (0.101) (4.991) (4.887) (0.182) (0.143) (3.619) (2.744)
Observations 582030 4861 4861 4861 583406 9225 9225
Cubic Poly. -0.0755 2.896 7.808∗ -0.382∗∗ 0.129 -0.715 2.929
24 M. Window (0.0858) (4.189) (4.067) (0.151) (0.120) (3.099) (2.354)
Observations 766811 6418 6418 6418 768653 12136 12136
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on transitions in and out of permanent
jobs (columns 1-3), contract length once hired in a permanent job (column 4), and transitions in and out of
short-term jobs (columns 5-7). Dependent variables are dummies capturing whether a transition in or out
of a job took place (multiplied by 100 so that the estimates can be interpreted in percentage points), and
the log number of days in the job. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size on each side of
the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic). Ro-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.20: Effects of Lower Severance Payments on Starting and Future Wages,
Blue-Collar Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting Post-Entry Post-Entry Post-Entry
Wage Wage (6 m.) Wage (12 m.) Wage (24 m.)
Linear Poly. 0.00835 0.00821 0.0267∗ 0.0299∗
12 M. Window (0.0103) (0.0123) (0.0149) (0.0175)
Observations 19948 14499 10323 7425
Linear Poly. 0.00537 0.00712 0.0138 0.0149
18 M. Window (0.00844) (0.0100) (0.0122) (0.0143)
Observations 29484 21501 15348 11010
Linear Poly. 0.0000314 0.00690 0.0214∗∗ 0.0142
24 M. Window (0.00733) (0.00869) (0.0106) (0.0124)
Observations 39108 28561 20373 14615
Quad. Poly. 0.00324 0.00263 0.0146 0.0334
12 M. Window (0.0161) (0.0194) (0.0235) (0.0276)
Observations 19948 14499 10323 7425
Quad. Poly. 0.0111 0.00752 0.0282 0.0370∗
18 M. Window (0.0129) (0.0153) (0.0186) (0.0218)
Observations 29484 21501 15348 11010
Quad. Poly. 0.0106 0.00766 0.0149 0.0242
24 M. Window (0.0111) (0.0132) (0.0160) (0.0188)
Observations 39108 28561 20373 14615
Cubic Poly. 0.0242 0.00331 0.00935 0.00211
12 M. Window (0.0238) (0.0287) (0.0348) (0.0414)
Observations 19948 14499 10323 7425
Cubic Poly. 0.00443 0.00269 0.0210 0.0353
18 M. Window (0.0180) (0.0217) (0.0262) (0.0309)
Observations 29484 21501 15348 11010
Cubic Poly. 0.0118 0.00580 0.0270 0.0429∗
24 M. Window (0.0152) (0.0182) (0.0220) (0.0259)
Observations 39108 28561 20373 14615
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on the starting wage (column
1), and post-entry wages 6, 12, and 24 months after entry into the job (columns 2-4). For
post-entry wages, the sample is composed of those workers who stay in the same job. The
dependent variables are in logs. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size
on each side of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side
(lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.21: Effects of Lower Severance Payments on Starting and Future Wages,
White-Collar Workers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting Post-Entry Post-Entry Post-Entry
Wage Wage (6 m.) Wage (12 m.) Wage (24 m.)
Linear Poly. -0.0240 -0.00545 -0.0155 -0.0406
(0.0273) (0.0294) (0.0307) (0.0323)
Observations 2797 2336 1907 1482
Treatment -0.0497∗∗ -0.0346 -0.0349 -0.0556∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0240) (0.0250) (0.0265)
Observations 4070 3382 2777 2138
Treatment -0.0398∗∗ -0.0255 -0.0247 -0.0459∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0206) (0.0215) (0.0229)
Observations 5351 4457 3656 2837
Treatment 0.0179 -0.00269 -0.0201 -0.00910
(0.0425) (0.0462) (0.0473) (0.0482)
Observations 2797 2336 1907 1482
Treatment -0.00412 0.00950 -0.00569 -0.0158
(0.0344) (0.0371) (0.0384) (0.0399)
Observations 4070 3382 2777 2138
Treatment -0.0278 -0.0120 -0.0251 -0.0420
(0.0294) (0.0317) (0.0329) (0.0345)
Observations 5351 4457 3656 2837
Treatment 0.107∗ 0.0999 0.0911 0.0570
(0.0604) (0.0654) (0.0665) (0.0681)
Observations 2797 2336 1907 1482
Treatment 0.0346 0.00775 -0.0170 -0.0154
(0.0476) (0.0516) (0.0528) (0.0542)
Observations 4070 3382 2777 2138
Treatment -0.000632 -0.00282 -0.00977 -0.0121
(0.0403) (0.0435) (0.0445) (0.0459)
Observations 5351 4457 3656 2837
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on the starting wage
(column 1), and post-entry wages 6, 12, and 24 months after entry into the job (columns
2-4). For post-entry wages, the sample is composed of those workers who stay in the same
job. The dependent variables are in logs. Each row shows the estimates for a different
window size on each side of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials
on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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3.6.4 Large and Small Firms
Table 3.22: Effects on Transitions and Months of Work, Large Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Permanent Contracts Short-Term Contracts
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Length Hires Lay-Offs Quits
Linear Poly. 0.00287 -0.872 0.195 0.00256 0.0411 -0.757 0.343
12 M. Window (0.0279) (1.441) (1.214) (0.0543) (0.0486) (0.850) (0.675)
Observations 1668659 13201 13201 13201 1673429 41191 41191
Linear Poly. 0.0117 -1.014 0.162 -0.0146 0.00774 -0.181 0.0146
18 M. Window (0.0227) (1.188) (0.994) (0.0447) (0.0397) (0.693) (0.549)
Observations 2463821 19402 19402 19402 2470940 61114 61114
Linear Poly. 0.0159 -1.239 -0.827 0.0248 -0.0179 -0.283 -0.0235
24 M. Window (0.0197) (1.031) (0.868) (0.0387) (0.0345) (0.600) (0.476)
Observations 3251334 25676 25676 25676 3260878 81323 81323
Quad. Poly. 0.0211 0.854 4.681∗∗ 0.00256 -0.0193 -1.287 0.714
12 M. Window (0.0433) (2.230) (1.907) (0.0543) (0.0761) (1.318) (1.041)
Observations 1668659 13201 13201 13201 1673429 41191 41191
Quad. Poly. 0.00203 0.0686 1.405 0.00619 0.0342 -1.389 0.611
18 M. Window (0.0348) (1.788) (1.522) (0.0678) (0.0609) (1.057) (0.837)
Observations 2463821 19402 19402 19402 2470940 61114 61114
Quad. Poly. -0.00414 -0.509 1.368 -0.0448 0.0249 -0.552 0.424
24 M. Window (0.0299) (1.546) (1.309) (0.0585) (0.0524) (0.910) (0.721)
Observations 3251334 25676 25676 25676 3260878 81323 81323
Cubic Poly. 0.0495 -0.324 1.303 0.00256 0.0206 -0.199 -0.535
12 M. Window (0.0633) (3.280) (2.830) (0.0543) (0.112) (1.930) (1.525)
Observations 1668659 13201 13201 13201 1673429 41191 41191
Cubic Poly. 0.0289 0.313 4.193∗∗ -0.0446 0.000200 -0.800 0.505
18 M. Window (0.0482) (2.490) (2.134) (0.0945) (0.0851) (1.466) (1.157)
Observations 2463821 19402 19402 19402 2470940 61114 61114
Cubic Poly. 0.0308 0.581 2.276 0.0212 0.0522 -1.612 0.470
24 M. Window (0.0409) (2.097) (1.799) (0.0797) (0.0719) (1.241) (0.981)
Observations 3251334 25676 25676 25676 3260878 81323 81323
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on transitions in and out of permanent
jobs (columns 1-3), contract length once hired in a permanent job (column 4), and transitions in and out of
short-term jobs (columns 5-7). Dependent variables are dummies capturing whether a transition in or out of
a job took place (multiplied by 100 so that the estimates can be interpreted in percentage points), and the
log number of days in the job. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size on each side of the
threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust
standard errors are shown in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3.23: Effects on Transitions and Months of Work, Small Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Permanent Contracts Short-Term Contracts
Hires Lay-Offs Quits Length Hires Lay-Offs Quits
Linear Poly. -0.0153 -0.937 1.389 -0.0710 -0.0374 0.150 0.330
12 M. Window (0.0388) (1.669) (1.484) (0.0550) (0.0691) (0.730) (0.669)
Observations 1229671 13974 13974 13974 1415537 61138 61138
Linear Poly. 0.000273 -1.023 0.169 -0.0341 -0.0169 0.431 0.184
18 M. Window (0.0317) (1.365) (1.216) (0.0452) (0.0564) (0.599) (0.549)
Observations 1816705 20664 20664 20664 2092078 90463 90463
Linear Poly. 0.0141 -1.531 1.137 -0.0232 -0.0325 0.147 0.328
24 M. Window (0.0274) (1.185) (1.057) (0.0395) (0.0490) (0.520) (0.476)
Observations 2401627 27355 27355 27355 2766374 120023 120023
Quad. Poly. 0.00249 -0.517 0.314 -0.0710 -0.157 2.183 -0.516
12 M. Window (0.0602) (2.607) (2.298) (0.0550) (0.108) (1.134) (1.038)
Observations 1229671 13974 13974 13974 1415537 61138 61138
Quad. Poly. -0.0106 -1.050 1.388 -0.0289 -0.0904 0.703 -0.0177
18 M. Window (0.0483) (2.082) (1.843) (0.0684) (0.0862) (0.909) (0.832)
Observations 1816705 20664 20664 20664 2092078 90463 90463
Quad. Poly. -0.0191 -0.786 0.0632 -0.0249 -0.0449 0.555 0.206
24 M. Window (0.0416) (1.793) (1.592) (0.0591) (0.0742) (0.784) (0.718)
Observations 2401627 27355 27355 27355 2766374 120023 120023
Cubic Poly. -0.0172 0.460 -1.648 -0.0710 -0.234 1.902 -1.049
12 M. Window (0.0879) (3.833) (3.372) (0.0550) (0.158) (1.656) (1.517)
Observations 1229671 13974 13974 13974 1415537 61138 61138
Cubic Poly. -0.0156 -0.179 0.840 0.0963 -0.169 1.902 -0.159
18 M. Window (0.0670) (2.913) (2.567) (0.0958) (0.120) (1.265) (1.158)
Observations 1816705 20664 20664 20664 2092078 90463 90463
Cubic Poly. -0.000876 -0.366 1.224 -0.0205 -0.117 1.505 -0.493
24 M. Window (0.0568) (2.456) (2.166) (0.0807) (0.102) (1.068) (0.977)
Observations 2401627 27355 27355 27355 2766374 120023 120023
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on transitions in and out of permanent
jobs (columns 1-3), contract length once hired in a permanent job (column 4), and transitions in and out of
short-term jobs (columns 5-7). Dependent variables are dummies capturing whether a transition in or out
of a job took place (multiplied by 100 so that the estimates can be interpreted in percentage points), and
the log number of days in the job. Each row shows the estimates for a different window size on each side
of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic).





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.26: Effects of Lower Severance Payments on Starting and Future Wages,
Large Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting Post-Entry Post-Entry Post-Entry
Wage Wage (6 m.) Wage (12 m.) Wage (24 m.)
Linear Poly. 0.0133 0.0187 0.0281 0.0250
12 M. Window (0.0154) (0.0168) (0.0190) (0.0213)
Observations 11498 9135 7111 5569
Linear Poly. 0.00958 0.0147 0.0235 0.0193
18 M. Window (0.0126) (0.0137) (0.0156) (0.0175)
Observations 16881 13429 10419 8142
Linear Poly. 0.00523 0.0131 0.0296∗∗ 0.0159
24 M. Window (0.0109) (0.0119) (0.0135) (0.0152)
Observations 22386 17872 13837 10800
Quad. Poly. 0.0227 0.0304 0.0344 0.0236
12 M. Window (0.0241) (0.0263) (0.0297) (0.0331)
Observations 11498 9135 7111 5569
Quad. Poly. 0.0163 0.0212 0.0293 0.0220
18 M. Window (0.0192) (0.0210) (0.0237) (0.0265)
Observations 16881 13429 10419 8142
Quad. Poly. 0.0158 0.0184 0.0235 0.0224
24 M. Window (0.0165) (0.0180) (0.0204) (0.0229)
Observations 22386 17872 13837 10800
Cubic Poly. 0.0618∗ 0.0653∗ 0.0717∗ 0.0542
12 M. Window (0.0356) (0.0385) (0.0435) (0.0486)
Observations 11498 9135 7111 5569
Cubic Poly. 0.0300 0.0383 0.0429 0.0356
18 M. Window (0.0270) (0.0294) (0.0331) (0.0370)
Observations 16881 13429 10419 8142
Cubic Poly. 0.0214 0.0261 0.0293 0.0272
24 M. Window (0.0227) (0.0247) (0.0279) (0.0311)
Observations 22386 17872 13837 10800
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on the starting wage
(column 1), and post-entry wages 6, 12, and 24 months after entry into the job (columns 2-
4). For post-entry wages, the sample is composed of those workers who stay in the same job.
The dependent variables are in logs. Each row shows the estimates for a different window
size on each side of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials on
each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
190
Table 3.27: Effects of Lower Severance Payments on Starting and Future Wages,
Small Firms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Starting Post-Entry Post-Entry Post-Entry
Wage Wage (6 m.) Wage (12 m.) Wage (24 m.)
Linear Poly. -0.0149 -0.0298∗ -0.00664 -0.0257
12 M. Window (0.0141) (0.0174) (0.0217) (0.0267)
Observations 11247 7700 5119 3338
Linear Poly. -0.0134 -0.0164 -0.0111 -0.0220
18 M. Window (0.0116) (0.0142) (0.0178) (0.0216)
Observations 16673 11454 7706 5006
Linear Poly. -0.0140 -0.00869 -0.00221 -0.0167
24 M. Window (0.0101) (0.0124) (0.0155) (0.0189)
Observations 22073 15146 10192 6652
Quad. Poly. -0.0238 -0.0442 -0.0298 0.0129
12 M. Window (0.0222) (0.0277) (0.0347) (0.0427)
Observations 11247 7700 5119 3338
Quad. Poly. -0.0150 -0.0388∗ -0.0103 -0.0137
18 M. Window (0.0176) (0.0218) (0.0272) (0.0333)
Observations 16673 11454 7706 5006
Quad. Poly. -0.0139 -0.0276 -0.0164 -0.0223
24 M. Window (0.0152) (0.0187) (0.0234) (0.0285)
Observations 22073 15146 10192 6652
Cubic Poly. -0.00539 -0.0612 -0.0558 -0.0654
12 M. Window (0.0327) (0.0415) (0.0515) (0.0638)
Observations 11247 7700 5119 3338
Cubic Poly. -0.0237 -0.0501 -0.0293 -0.00464
18 M. Window (0.0248) (0.0311) (0.0388) (0.0476)
Observations 16673 11454 7706 5006
Cubic Poly. -0.0185 -0.0527∗∗ -0.0187 -0.00891
24 M. Window (0.0209) (0.0260) (0.0325) (0.0398)
Observations 22073 15146 10192 6652
Notes: The table shows the coefficient of the treatment variable on the starting wage
(column 1), and post-entry wages 6, 12, and 24 months after entry into the job (columns
2-4). For post-entry wages, the sample is composed of those workers who stay in the same
job. The dependent variables are in logs. Each row shows the estimates for a different
window size on each side of the threshold, as well as for three different types of polynomials
on each side (lineal, quadratic, cubic). Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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